Tag Archive for: Finance

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HOW MUCH for a soap dispenser??

Stories about apparently grotesque over-payment by public bodies for mundane items is always good for a headline or two. We saw that back in the days of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK, with reports that schools or hospitals were having to pay hundreds of pounds to get their maintenance provider to carry out minor tasks. During the National Audit Office’s 2011 investigation into PFI it was revealed one school paid £333 to have a lightbulb changed.  That was often down to very badly constructed contracts, with suppliers expecting to make most of their money from ongoing service charges of that nature rather than from the initial financing and construction. 

In the USA, it often seemed to be military spend where costs were dis-proportionate; the famous ‘$435 hammer’ back in the 1980s, for instance. Now there is another example hitting the media this week. A new report from the Defense Department inspector general accuses aerospace and military giant Boeing of massive overcharging.  The contract with the US Air Force allows Boeing to buy the required spare parts for the C‑17 military transport aircraft, and the Air Force reimburses Boeing for those purchases, according to the report. About 220 C-17s are used by the Air Force, Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve Command. 

But overcharging accusations covered around a dozen spare parts (which does not seem many, to be honest). The much-quoted example was soap dispensers used in the bathrooms of C-17 military aircraft, where the overcharge was estimated at 7,943%. So the dispensers were charged at some 80 times the price of similar commercially available products.

“The Air Force needs to establish and implement more effective internal controls to help prevent overpaying for spare parts for the remainder of this contract, which continues through 2031,” said Defense Department Inspector General Robert Storch in a statement. 

Boeing has issued a holding response, saying they are reviewing the report, “which appears to be based on an inapt comparison of the prices paid for parts that meet aircraft and contract specifications and designs versus basic commercial items that would not be qualified or approved for use on the C-17″.

This is often the truth behind these stories. The specification for special ‘military’ items turns out to be significantly different to the apparent equivalents we might pick up in Walmart or on Amazon. However, that often means that it is a different type of Bad Buying that is taking place. It may not be a rip-off by the supplier, combined with poor scrutiny and contract management by the buyer. It may actually point to a poor specification.

So why exactly would a basic commercial soap dispenser not be fine for a cargo plane? Its not as if they fly at the speed of sound or anything.  In fact, do you really need a dispenser that needs to be cleaned, refilled and so on, at all? Why not a simple bar of soap?  The military and indeed some other public bodies do have a history of over-specifying, sometimes without realising just how much that can add to the costs.

It’s worth remembering that an industry-standard specification, or something that is readily available, perhaps even an item sold to consumer buyers, is almost always a lot better value than something we design and specify ourselves. If the most fundamental way of saving money is just  by saying “don’t buy it”, the next best and most basic route is to say, “buy something simple”.

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CIPS Annual Report – a Mixed Bag

The Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply (CIPS) annual report is out now for the year ending October 2023. I’m not sure exactly when it was published but it always takes a few months to emerge.

The report suggests it was another mixed year for the world’s leading procurement institute. Revenue was up 13% year on year, which is pretty impressive, driven largely by business from corporates in the UK and Middle East. The CIPS Corporate Award programme continues to bring in revenue as firms invest in professional development and capability, which is good news.

However, membership was down 4.5% which is less good news for what is supposedly a “membership organisation”.  That was mainly down to a drop in student numbers, with MCIPS-level numbers pretty static. Exam entries were also short of budget although recovered in the second half – that may be in part because of the well-publicised problems with the new system, which amongst other things, made exam booking tricky at times. And new student numbers were at their highest for ten years, so maybe the decline in student membership is just a “blip”.

Total income was £34.2 million, up 13% on the previous year but below budget. That led to an operating loss of around £400K, although the accounts are not easy to interpret given so many figures for pension valuations and adjustments, loans, and other one-off accounting issues. But the cash position actually improved, with group cash position standing at £5.2 million at year end. To be honest, I struggled to really understand how this increase came about given the loss in the year.   

Generally, CIPS still has the perennial problem that many students want to get their qualification but then don’t want to pay £200+ a year for ongoing membership. Whilst CIPS rightly says you can’t put MCIPS after your name if you are not a current member, I suspect many who pass the exams, and many employers, look at that qualification as more important than the ongoing membership. There are many other ways to demonstrate your continuous professional development these days that don’t cost a fortune.

It is also fascinating to see how CIPS continues to become much less of a UK-centred organisation. Australasia seems to have stabilised after some issues there.  CIPS MENA is not set up as a certified company, but by all accounts is doing very well in many middle-eastern countries, in terms of numbers and revenues, and the recent promotion of regional boss Sam Achampong to run half the world 80% of the world for CIPS indicates one reason why that has been the case in recent years.

Yet some problems continue in other regions. The US is an ongoing disaster really, losing money for CIPS year after year despite ambitious intentions. As Eddie and the Hot Rods once said, maybe it is time for CIPS to Get Out of Denver…

Looking at the numbers in detail, an analyst might worry about control of staff costs. There has been a 16% increase year on year in total cost, with staff numbers up only 4%, implying an almost 12% cost per person increase, well ahead of inflation. However, there is a major distortion.

Malcolm Harrison, the then-CEO, left rather suddenly in March 2023, yet the highest paid member of staff, presumably him, was in the £250-300K bracket for 2022-23 salary.  (Last year he was in the £200-250K bracket). That suggests he received in effect a full year’s package despite leaving just 5 months into the financial year. So his pay-off accounts for quite a chunk of that apparent staff cost hike, although the Trustees need to keep an eye on senior staff costs – there were 16 people earning over £100K in 2023, against 11 in 2022.

The new IT platform seems to have settled down somewhat now, so if that crisis is almost over, I’d suggest CIPS needs to focus on its membership proposition and numbers as the key strategic challenge, which raises some fundamental issues again about the whole nature of the Institute.  

It’s clear that getting rid of the President post has worked well in increasing the standing of the Institute (he said sarcastically…) although I do hear that the relatively new Membership Committee is doing some good work.  High profile individuals such as Sam Achampong and Savita Mace (membership committee) do a lot to keep CIPS in the public eye, but I feel that many of the Trustees (Board members) still need to do more to promote CIPS and the profession now the Presidential focal point has gone.  

But that is by no means the only reason why MCIPS numbers are in slow decline, even as P&SCM increases its importance globally. CIPS really needs to understand how to change that situation to improve its long-term prospects, or accept that it is now in effect a consulting, education and training business rather than one with a membership focus.

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Prioritisation Matters – A Story about my Phone

I’ve been intending to tell this story for a couple of months now, but prevarication is a terrible thing, as we will see.

I owned – well, I still do – a Huawei mobile phone that I got on a monthly contract with Vodafone in (I think) 2017, although it may have been a little earlier. In October 2021 I fell off my bicycle (embarrassing, 200 yards from home, going up a slightly higher than I expected kerb). I fell onto my phone which was in my pocket, the rear casing got badly cracked, so I “repaired” it with Sellotape. I had the intention to replace the phone from then onwards, but it did work, and I replaced the tape every few months.

Finally I went into the Vodafone shop in Camberley in May. My first visit, it turned out I had to change something on my account before they could do anything for me – that was a bit of a process. So I went back a couple of weeks later and I’m sorry to say the two women working in the shop laughed at me! Twice!

They had met me once before so maybe they felt more comfortable having a good laugh when they saw the state of my phone. Apparently the Sellotape was funny, can’t see why myself…  But then the woman who was helping me laughed again when she opened my account on her system and saw the charges.  It was perhaps more of a gasp than a laugh. “You’re paying how much a month?” she exclaimed.

Well of course I had been suffering from the “inflation plus 79.3%” or whatever it is standard contract for 7 or 8 years, and I didn’t really even look at the monthly direct debit to be honest.  I hate to admit it,  but it was about £40 a month for an ancient, knackered phone and really not very much data at all!

There was some more chuckling when she did the transfer of data to the new phone, which took ages  – “your old phone was pretty much on its last legs”, she said.

The Vodafone staff were great actually, I went for the buy my own phone option then a monthly contract and they saved me £50 on the phone by suggesting something surprising, which I won’t repeat here in case it gets them into trouble. So I have ended up with a total cost of ownership that has probably reduced by 50% and gives me much a better contract, hardware and capability.

So, apart from giving you the chance to have a laugh at me, supposedly a serious and experienced procurement professional, why am I telling you this? It just struck me that putting things like this off is always very easy. There always seemed something more urgent or important to do rather than take an hour or two to go and sort out my phone. I was procrastinating for over two years. Or there was an excuse. “I won’t replace it just before Reading Festival in case I lose it / gets damaged” etc.

And we do tend to do the same in our working lives. We know we should review that contract, or look for a new supplier because our current one isn’t really performing, or check out the latest market forecasts and see if we should go “long” on that commodity. But something more urgent comes up. Our internal customer wants to see us NOW.  The CFO wants a report on how to save 10% on everything by Christmas. If I don’t go online at 10am I won’t get my Taylor Swift tickets…

But the cost of delaying all mounts up. In my case, it’s not just the fact that I probably overpaid by the best part of a thousand pounds over the last few years, it is also that I missed the functionality I could have had with a new phone. So prioritisation, which must be accompanied by good general planning, is an undervalued skill in my opinion. I’ve worked with people who were brilliant in almost every way, but could not prioritise.  If this is you, it is important, do work on it.

Clearly, I’m not perfect (!), but also have a think about whether you’re missing some possibly quick and easy wins, in work or in life generally, just because you “never get round to it”.

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PPE and the UK taxpayer get burnt (again)

The BBC ran a story this week about the UK’s spend on PPE during the pandemic. I was contacted by the journalist, Jon Ironmonger, and did a video interview at the BBC, although I believe it has only appeared (a short excerpt anyway) on a BBC East programme, which I haven’t seen! The report centred on Full Support Healthcare, who are based in Wellingborough in that region.

But there were articles on the main BBC website, quoting my remarks. The journalist actually wanted me to be balanced and give an “expert” perspective on what happened with PPE procurement.  I tried to explain the problems when demand for anything suddenly rockets, but I was critical of a number of aspects of the programme, all of which I have written about over the years since 2020.

One continuing mystery is why the initial forecast of demand turned out to be so far out – about twice what in retrospect would have been reasonable. That was what triggered the “panic buying” in May 2020, so arguably it was the single biggest cause of the subsequent disastrous waste of money (over £10 billion).  The forecast led to some incorrect specifications being issued in haste, use of very strange suppliers (not all of whom were properly vetted, despite the re-writing of history that some politicians have attempted), the lack of anything much in the way of cost / price analysis or negotiation with suppliers, and the infamous “VIP Lane” for suppliers with a contact in government.  

The latest article from Ironmonger focuses on the stock management aspect. It appears that some £1.4 billion of aprons, masks and googles just from Full Support have been incinerated, recycled or written off. A general rule of thumb is that around twice as much PPE was contracted for as was needed, as it turned out. So given the total bought from that firm was £1.8 billion, it is not clear why such a high percentage of their product has been wasted.

The Department of Health and Social Care disputes that loss number, saying some money has been recouped by recycling, but the Department basically refused to engage with Ironmonger while he pursued this story, ignoring his requests, and has failed to provide clear evidence of what has happened to stock or financial details.

Full Support was an established supplier of PPE before the pandemic, unlike many of the cowboys who got in on the game once panic set in. Sarah Stoute of the firm told the BBC the shipping containers that transported her company’s PPE were unloaded “various times up to 207 days post-arrival”. She said the masks were “perishable goods and required to be kept cool and dry” and “not intended to be stored for a prolonged period in a shipping container, yard or field”.

The port of Felixstowe became jammed with PPE containers in November 2020, and they were moved to various airfields, other ports and available land. After some stock was sold off to other dodgy people for disposal, it was found dumped on a site in a New Forest.

Here is is one of the many articles I have written on this topic. This one gives a good summary of what I still feel are the key issues or questions around what happened. It’s right that we remember the desperate situation that faced us back in early 2020, and both users and buyers of PPE were in a particular crisis situation. But I still wonder if we have really learnt lessons from what certainly wasn’t one of UK public procurement’s finest hours.

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Labour Wants to Use “PFI” – Please Be Careful!

As we’re into the election period in the UK, the Labour Party is promising capital investment (in roads for instance) but saying that much of the money will apparently come from the private sector. This has brought back memories of the previous “Private Finance Initiative”, which was actually invented by the conservatives under John Major in the early 1990s but was enthusiastically embraced by Labour after 1997 when Tony Blair won the election.

I was procurement director at the Department for Work and Pensions for two and a half years, 1995-7, serving when Labour came into power, and was involved in some large PFI projects, including new construction programmes and some IT initiatives. Then in the noughties, I was consulting in government and held a couple of interim commercial director posts where PFI or similar initiatives were relevant too, including the ID Card programme.

So speaking from the inside, I can say that there were a number of positive aspects to PFI, despite later criticism. Having a single entity responsible for the financing, construction and then maintenance of a new hospital for instance created a clarity of purpose and an interest in whole-life costs. However, there were some less positive aspects which Labour must avoid if it is to make a success of PFI Mark 2 (or Mark 3, or wherever we are up to now).

In the past, some dubious financial engineering was definitely encouraged to get projects through the business case process. The comparisons were generally made in terms of the basic cost of the building in the case of construction projects. So PFI projects were often compared using “cost per square metre” metric, as the ongoing PFI charges overt the contract period were often based on that as the charging “unit”. That figure included the cost of capital, the construction cost and probably the basic infrastructure maintenance. It would then be looked it against the “public sector comparator”, i.e. what it would cost the government to provide the same facilities.

I actually sat in meetings where the PFI adviser (more on that later) said to a supplier, “the public sector comparator is marginally lower than your figure – you need to improve that”. Now that sounds like good negotiation, but the twist was this. The contract usually included a whole list of ongoing activities where the buyer would be locked into using the PFI supplier. And these were rarely included in that value for money comparison. So suppliers were encouraged to make their money on these extras, often around ongoing supply of goods or services, and keep their base charges low to get through the business case process.

The other way of making the contract attractive for the provider was to make it longer. Hence ridiculous 60 year contract periods, with guaranteed price increases of course, which again circumvented the business case issue as the comparisons would rarely look that far into the future.

So this is why seemingly trivial services or one-off type activities ended up costing schools and hospitals a fortune.  “Another school had to pay £302 for a socket, five times the cost of the equipment it wanted to plug in”, as the Daily Telegraph said in one report. This wasn’t an accident or bad negotiation – this was because the payment mechanisms were constructed deliberately to make the basic occupation charges look lower, with the provider making their money from these ‘extras’.

That would improve the apparent business case; then later on the occupier gets hit with unexpectedly high charges. It represented a conspiracy really between all the parties to make these projects happen, and arguably was a failure of finance and procurement across many organisations while these deals were being done; or at least a failure to stand up to pressure from other quarters and point out loudly the problems that were being stored up for the future.  I will take some credit though – one of the (probably few) good things I did in my DSS job was refuse to allow catering, cleaning and security to be included in one large property PFI deal we did, because I was concerned about future lock in for decades. That probably saved millions.

The other very dodgy aspect of “old PFI” was the role of Partnerships UK (PUK) in all this.  From 2000 onwards, Treasury promoted the use of PUK’s services – at extortionate consulting rates – for advice to public sector clients on particularly the commercial and financial elements of PFI deals. If you didn’t pay your three grand a day for a PUK adviser, you wouldn’t get your project approved by Treasury, was the feeling.

Yet PUK was 49% government owned, and 51% owned by the banks! That was a clear conflict of interest there in terms of PUK’s enthusiasm for PFI deals which made huge profits for those same banks. And the politicians – and even some top civil servants – were probably looking forward to their nice non-exec roles with the same organisations once they retired.

So Labour needs to take care here if it wants to bring back PFI-type ideas. It needs considerable commercial and procurement expertise on the government side of the table – and it must make sure the people who are supposedly representing the taxpayer in those discussion really do have our interests at heart, and are not feathering their own nests.   

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Avoiding Bad Buying in UK Local Councils

As the results come in from local elections in England, it is clear that basically the country just wants the Conservative Party to go, the sooner the better. I don’t think there is huge enthusiasm for anyone else but most of the public are just sick of the infighting, incompetence and idiocy of the ruling party in recent years.

However, will changing our local councils make things better? A very interesting article in The Times   looked at data provided by a new agency, the Office for Local Government (Oflog). Ministers set up Oflog last summer to provide “authoritative and accessible” performance data to support improvement in local government.

The data looks at the efficiency and effectiveness of local councils across 27 categories in five main areas: waste management, corporate and finance, adult social care, planning and roads. It revealed for example that some councils have recycling rates that are twice as good as others and that some authorities are failing to process half of planning applications on time, while others are not late on a single one. The figures also show the extent to which many councils are struggling with debts, with six local authorities already having declared themselves bankrupt since 2021. That is certainly in part becuase of lower funding from the centre of government, but competence (or lack of) seems to come into play too in most cases.

The Times accessed all the data to look at variations, which are huge and pretty inexplicable other than by sheer management competence. For example, in the year to September 2022, Hinckley & Bosworth borough council in the East Midlands completed less than half of household planning applications on time. But Tamworth borough council, just 30 miles away, was not late on any.  

The Times also came up with league tables to see if there was any political correlation with performance. Nottingham (Labour controlled) was the worst performing authority. Torridge district council, on the north Devon coast, came top of the table – it is run by independent councillors.

But the results actually supported a theory I’ve held for years, suggesting it is not that the Conservatives (Tories) are generically better or worse than Labour in terms of competence (with the Lib Dems in the picture too in a smaller way). Of the ten worst-performing councils, six are controlled by Labour. Of the ten best-performing councils, six are in coalition or are run by independents, while the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives run two each.  Eight of the ten worst-performing county councils or rural unitary authorities are controlled by the Conservatives – while seven of the best-performing ten are in coalition or run by independents.

So what it does seem to show is that the worst-performing councils are almost always in areas, towns or cities where there has been a long-term dominant party, whether that is Labour or Tory. Conversely, the best-performing councils are generally more contested, so independents rule the roost, or no single party has a clear majority, or power has changed hands over recent years.

That stands to reason really. If there is a long-term dominant party, there is more scope for arrogance to creep into decision making, or fraud and corruption to spring up, and there is less scrutiny of decisions. “Bad buying”, whether it is just wasting money on frivolous or unnecessary spending, or more serious fraudulent or corrupt expenditure, is more likely where power is well entrenched. Take fraud for example. You are less likely to bribe a councillor, or to stand as a councillor yourself so you can influence planning decisions for nefarious purposes, if it is not clear who will be in charge after the next election.

Similarly, some of the arrogance we have seen in councils such as Woking, where the dominant Tory council invested hundreds of millions in unwise property deals, or in Nottingham, where the council (Labour in power since 1991, 50 of 55 councillors) thought it could run an energy firm better than the professionals, came about I’d suggest in part at least because the councillors thought they were unchallengeable and had complete power.  My own council, Surrey Heath, has also lost money – not as much as Woking though – on property deals put in place by a very arrogant Tory leadership. But last year for the first time ever the Lib Dems took power here.  

However, the correlation is far from perfect. Thurrock, where the council is now suing “businessman” Liam Kavanagh, who allegedly cheated the council out of over £100 million with dodgy solar farm investment schemes (hopefully the ex-finance head at the council will end up in court too), has actually had a few changes of council over the years.

But Liverpool is another example where single-party dominance led to a culture of corruption. Even after commissioners came in to run the City in 2021, the job description I saw for the Head of Procurement role still did not suggest a real appetite to put in place all the controls and governance you would want to see as a taxpayer!

Anyway, all this suggests that if your main interest as a voter is in the effective running of local services, rather than any deep political beliefs, you should aim to keep your local council and councillors on their toes by creating a competitive environment. How you can best do that will vary by area and even local electoral ward. But that seems the best strategy if you want your money to be used honestly and well.

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The NHS gets “supplier” incentivisation all wrong

(Pic; A&E on a Saturday night)

Incentivisation is a fascinating topic. In a business context, for example in terms of incentivising the right behaviour by suppliers, it can require knowledge of psychology, contract law, finance, economics, and operations management. Most of us in procurement will have seen examples of it going wrong too – indeed, I dedicated a whole chapter in the Bad Buying book to dodgy incentivisation that drove unexpected or simply bad supplier performance.

In the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), the way “the centre” (usually the Department of Health or NHS England) incentivises hospitals and other Trusts that deliver services is very similar to a commercial buyer/supplier relationship. Basically, the centre gives money to Trusts and they agree to aim for certain performance levels.

Now I’ve looked up the cvs of  Sarah-Jane Marsh, National Director of Integrated Urgent and Emergency Care and Deputy Chief Operating Officer, NHS England, and Julian Kelly, Deputy Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer, NHS England. To be honest, there is nothing in them to suggest that these two are stupid. And yet they have launched one of the daftest and most inappropriate incentivisation-related initiatives I’ve ever seen.

It is in effect a “competition” through which Trusts can receive additional funding for capital expenditure in 2024/5. This is what they say in their letter to Trusts this week.

We recently met with ICB and acute trust leaders to discuss how we best work together to meet the challenge of delivering the agreed target of 76% A&E 4-hour performance during March 2024 so that more patients are seen, treated and discharged in a timely way….

In addition we are now announcing three other routes through which trusts will be eligible for additional capital funding in 2024/25:

  1. The 10 trusts delivering the highest level of 4-hour performance (that means seeing people within 4 hours of their arrival at the accident and emergency department) during March will each receive £2 million.
  2. The 10 trusts who deliver the greatest percentage point improvement in March (compared to January 2024 performance) will each receive £2 million.
  3. The next 10 trusts who deliver the greatest percentage point improvement in March (compared to January 2024 performance) would each receive £1 million.

(It continues…)

So where do we start with this? As I say, I look on it as a supplier incentivisation exercise, and on those grounds I would immediately point out a few major flaws .

  • It was issued on March 12th, and relates to performance in March. So how can Trusts possibly have time to make any significant or lasting changes to their processes to improve A&E within days?  
  • Shouldn’t capital expenditure be allocated based on where it will get the best return rather than on some sort of “Hunger Games trial by A&E”?  You would put money into a collaborative venture with a supplier based on its potential return, not on some spurious “performance measures”, wouldn’t you?
  • Doesn’t relating much of it it to improvement mean those Trusts that were particularly awful in January have more chance of winning then the consistently good Trusts? That seems unfair.
  • How do you stop “gaming” of the process and the data?  I’d pay a few local layabouts to come into A&E with a “bad finger”, see and discharge then in two minutes, then rinse and repeat until my figures look amazing.
  • Indeed, this could lead to patient care that is driven by finance, not needs. See the easy cases in A&E, not those with their leg hanging off…

This strikes me as politically driven, surely the only explanation as to why Kelly and Marsh would take this deeply flawed step. Ministers desperately want some good news from the NHS now in case there is a Spring election. Officials must have been instructed to do this – that must be it? If not, if this really is an NHSE internal initiative, then the NHS really is in even deeper trouble than we thought.

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You Get What You Incentivise

Incentivisation is a topic that probably isn’t discussed in procurement as often as it should be. I find it fascinating, as it encompasses a mix of finance, economics, contract law, psychology, low cunning…  How we construct contracts, the success measures we set for suppliers, how we reward their good behaviour or performance and punish the opposite – these all feed into how they behave.

Suppliers generally behave rationally given the incentives they are presented with. In the Bad Buying book, there is a whole chapter on the topic, because I found so many interesting case studies about incentives going wrong.

We see another example in a slightly different context in the UK at the moment, where the dental element of the National Health Service has failed in its core objective – to keep the nation’s teeth in good condition. A BBC investigation in 2022 found that nine out of ten dental practices weren’t accepting new NHS patients.  In some regions, that figure was 98%. That has led to more and more patients turning up at hospitals with terrible dental problems that require urgent treatment – which puts more pressure on over-stretched hospitals of course. Tooth decay is the most common reason for hospital admission of young children, shockingly. And 20,000 adults and 60,000 children were hospitalised last year to have teeth extracted under general anaesthetic. 

There are stories of people pulling out their own teeth, or making homemade dentures, fillings and crowns. We seem to have gone back to Victorian times. And it is all because the contract for dentists incentivises the profession in a manner that has led to that situation. The NHS contract does not pay dentists based on their actual effort, and does not allow them to make what they consider a reasonable income. So they have learnt that treating only private patients will reduce their patient numbers, but overall, the dentist will make more money. More and more practices are taking this view, unfortunately, making totally rational decisions.  

Funding for dentistry has been cut under this government. And one of the incentivisation issues is that the dentists’ contract does not always relate the income they make to the amount of work they do. So, simplifying the problem, their pay is broadly based on a fee for each course of treatment they deliver to an individual. So they receive the same amount whether they do one filling for me or six.

There is a vicious circle here – if people can’t find an NHS dentist easily, by the time they do, they probably do need more work doing, so they are even less attractive for the remaining NHS surgeries.  The current contract actually goes back to the days of the last Labour government, but the Tories have done nothing to address this issue in recent years – until now, when they see it becoming a potential election issue this year.

One solution would be to increase the supply of dentists, which in classic economic terms should drive prices down in the market – pushing more back into NHS work perhaps. But the five-year training scheme means this is impossible in the short or medium term. Another possibility would be forcing dentists to do NHS work for a certain number of years after qualifying, given they benefit from the taxpayer subsidising their training. Neither option has been tried.

Last week, the government announced incentives to encourage more dentists to do NHS work, but the profession doesn’t think this will work. We will see. But devising a contract that incentivises the behaviour the government (and the taxpayer) want to see should surely not be impossible.

However, politicians have struggled with contracts and incentivisation for the medical profession for years. I remember the new GP contract for first line “family doctors” that was agreed by the Labour government back in 2004. My friend who was a GP told me that he and his colleagues were astonished how favourable it was to them. When he first read the letter about his new payments and contract, he honestly did not believe it.

Anyway, I am fortunate to still have an NHS dentist, although I’m also fortunate to be able to afford private additional treatment when I need it. But the current situation is a disgrace. When we see people travelling from the UK to the Ukraine – a country at war – to get dental treatment, you know something has gone badly wrong with the UK situation.

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Horizon – Robert Colvile Investigates and Fujitsu Owns Up

Coming back to the Post Office Horizon scandal, last week at the long-running enquiry into the events, Fujitsu finally apologised and owned up to their contribution to the terrible events. The firm has now promised to make substantial contributions to the payments which should go to the affected sub-postmasters shortly, we hope.

As the BBC reported, “The boss of Fujitsu’s European arm says it has “clearly let society down, and the sub-postmasters down” for its role in the Post Office scandal.

Paul Patterson admitted there were “bugs, errors and defects” with the Horizon software “right from the very start”.  Mr Patterson also reiterated the firm’s apology for its part in the scandal.

Some of the Post Office staff involved in prosecuting the sub-postmasters came over at the enquiry as being both stupid and vindictive, enjoying their role as the “bad guys”. Clearly, the Post Office saw a role for nasty, vicious people in this case.

Then, in the Sunday Times today, Robert Colvile has written an excellent article about the history of the Horizon software. I was also surprised and pleased to find that he quoted from my book, Bad Buying, within his article. He reviewed the book (pretty positively) when it came out in 2020.  My quote is nothing to do with Horizon though – Colvile uses another story of mine to demonstrate general issues with contract management in the public sector.

But he makes a connection that I had missed (and I should have spotted). Horizon started with an ICL project, “Pathway”,  working with the then Department of Social Security back in the 1990s to automate benefits payment. I was actually Procurement Director at the DSS for part of the time this pretty lousy programme was running! But I had not realised it morphed into Horizon, and along the way the failing ICL got acquired by Fujitsu.  

When I joined the DSS, in 1995, I was not exactly welcomed by the people running that programme. I was struggling to get any traction with the programme leadership. So I asked my boss whether I should push harder to get involved. “Do you have plenty of other things to do”, he asked me. Yes, I replied, loads of stuff. “In that case, I think I would leave that programme alone”, he advised. He knew it was a dog and was saving me from failure by association.

That was when the Minister Peter Lilley stood up at the Tory Party conference and showed off the “benefits payment card”. It wasn’t real of course – there never was a working benefits payments card. His was mocked up in his hotel suite the night before by his aides, I was told.

I followed the Horizon case from the beginning and I thought I wrote about it on Spend Matters many years ago but I can’t find the article now, so maybe I just thought about covering the case. I do remember my internal debate about whether to include the story in my Bad Buying book, but it was complex, unfinished and subject to ongoing legal action, so I decided not to, unfortunately perhaps. Although I don’t think my book would have had any effect compared to the TV programme.

Let’s just hope now that the compensation gets sorted out quickly for those affected. And I’ll come back to another issue which Colvile comments on, the question of why Fujitsu has continued to win government contracts since the Horizon affair became public. That takes us into some interesting questions about public procurement regulations, so I’ll save that for another day.

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A Bad Buying Play in One Act

(Peter is sitting at his computer, shopping on Amazon. The CEO, Shirley, enters his office).

Hi Peter, how’s that big project going?  I’m pleased to see that you’re taking personal responsibility for it, as our Head of Procurement. It’s an important project for us.

  • Thanks Shirley, yes, I’m on top of it I think.

So the CFO told me that we’ve started making payments to the service provider?

  • Yes, indeed. We paid them around £140 million last year.

OK, so what are they delivering now? How’s it going?

  • Well, nothing yet, that was just to get them on board really, get their co-operation, and help them get set up, you know what I mean.

Not sure I do really … so when do we expect to actually start getting some services from them? Soon I hope.

  • Well, we don’t know to be honest. I mean, they’ve pushed back on the specification in one area. Apparently we wanted them to do something that might be outside international law. So we’ve still debating that.

But we won’t spend any more until this is sorted?

  • Well actually, there was another £100 million we paid in April. Sorry, didn’t I mention that before?  

So that’s £240 million and nothing to show for it. Are you are absolutely sure they will actually deliver the services?

  • Well no, we might still change our minds. Or they might raise more issues. Or that legal issue could get in the way. But don’t worry, we’ve agreed we’ll only pay another £50 million next year. So that’s good news…

Well, thanks for explaining. I’ve got something for you (she hands Peter an envelope).

It’s your P45. £290 million, for nothing. It’s a disgrace and frankly – you’re useless.  Security will escort you out.

Yes, it is spot the analogy time. I do have some strong views on the refugee issue in the UK and more widely, because I see bigger problems ahead driven by climate and other developments that will increase the flow of refugees further. I’m not a “let them all in” person by any means. But keeping the politics out of it, the handling of the Rwanda issue by the UK government is just sheer incompetence. It is a huge waste of money from a government that has made huge wastes of money its speciality. It is truly dreadful.

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