Japanese brewer Asahi is setting up a new global procurement operation in Singapore, according to the Food Navigator Asia website. The target is to save $100 million a year from 2024. The new CEO of the operation is Tomas Veit, who told the publication, “the key focus is currently on creating a strong and capable team to provide efficient and effective services”.

But the bigger issue is the internal dynamics in the firm. What worries me here is this statement from Atsushi Katsuki, President and CEO, quoted in the company’s press release.

Asahi Global Procurement is the first functional organization of the Asahi Group to be integrated globally. We view this as an initiative to elevate our management to a new level and promote the advancement of overall management. We expect the consolidation of category management and sourcing functions on a global scale to not only create group synergies, but also contribute to solving various issues in the global environment and society, leading to the promotion of sustainable procurement.”

So procurement is the “guinea pig”,  the early adopter of a new corporate strategy of more centralisation. I understand why firms often see procurement in that way – it looks like an “easy” area to start the centralisation journey and show rapid savings. But any business school or CIPS course would suggest that procurement strategy must be aligned with corporate strategy. In cases like this, the corporate strategy isn’t changing, and countries or regions still have considerable autonomy. However, the procurement strategy is now mis-aligned, so it is an outlier or an experiment in effect.

That is not to say it cannot work. But Veit will have to be prepared for considerable push-back from those who hold power locally. They won’t just be concerned about losing some power to choose suppliers and make procurement decisions – they will see this as the thin end of the wedge, a wedge that could lead to much more significant power loss if procurement is successful.

There is also the supplier side to consider. Many years ago, I was trying to set up a Eruopean procurement capability for the Dun & Bradstreet Group (when it included about 10 different businesses). We spent a fortune on car hire, so that looked like a fairly easy quick win. I negotiated a great deal with Avis for all the major European countries, leveraging our spend across the continent. The senior European account director for Avis assured me she had given me the very best pricing.

After a few months, I asked our businesses if they were using the deal. No, said our Spanish operations. They weren’t. So which supplier were they using, I asked?  “Oh, we’re using Avis, we just get a better deal from the local operation”, they said. That taught me a good lesson – sometimes suppliers aren’t set up to implement global or regional deals. So that’s something for Asahi to consider.

There is also an interesting dilemma for the CPO. I am sure that there is significant value that a central function can bring. That includes areas such as developing skills across the function, potential harmonisation of systems and data, support in specialist areas such as commodity price forecasting, and of course developing strategic and long-term initiatives with the most important global suppliers. It is interesting that sustainability is mentioned explicitly in the press release above; that is certainly an area where I can see some strong potential actions and benefits.

However, the new central team might struggle to show direct “savings” arising from this type of work. Because of that, there may be a temptation to look for those apparently obvious quick win, leverage-based, price-focused savings – my car rental deal, for instance. And those projects can be exactly those that will run into local opposition.

My advice to Veit therefore would be to look for a few large potential quick wins in areas that are not too contentious. Major IT contracts perhaps – some global licence deals or a major deal with a hosting service? Or areas where you are not even asking people to change suppliers. A global set of route deals with Japan Airlines maybe? Then combine that with delivering longer-term value in terms of the longer-term imperatives. Work hard to get the local or regional barons on your side (they can get you fired if you don’t).  And remember that bigger deals aren’t always better deals.

But Veit does have one major advantage – several years’ experience already with the firm. That gives him a much higher chance of success than a CPO brought in from outside with what might turn out ot be a controversial mandate. We wish him luck and success. 

Readers of the Financial Times (or the Sydney Morning Herald) will be well up to speed with the events at Greensill Capital, a leading provider of supply chain finance funding and solutions. Other broadsheet newspapers and websites are also getting increaingly interested in the story.

Lex Greensill is the son of an Australian watermelon farmer. After an early career at Morgan Stanley and Citibank, he made a big impact in the UK as a “crown commercial representative” in Cabinet Office and supply chain finance tsar for David Cameron’s government. When Cameron stepped down, Greensill made him an adviser with (allegedly) a barn-full of share options.

Greensill also recruited Bill Crothers, government’s Chief Commercial Officer (the top procurement man) from 2012-15. Crothers was deputy chairman of Greensill for a while but resigned as a director in February, and has perhaps sensibly dropped all reference to Greensill now from his LinkedIn profile. Greensill also incomprehensibly got a CBE from the Queen in 2017, whilst Crothers got a CB in 2013, the equivalent award for civil servants.

However, in a few short months, Greensill Capital has gone from planning a flotation that would have valued the firm at $7 to basically going under. We don’t have the time or space to go into all the details here, but broadly, the Greensill proposition was this. A firm such as Vodafone might offer suppliers payment terms of, say, 60 or 90 days. But the suppliers have another option. Instead of waiting for payment, they can get immediate cash from Greensill – at a small discount. So if Vodafone owes you £10,000, then you can get paid now by Greensill for perhaps a 2% discount (£9,800).

Then of course Vodafone pays Greensill the £10K after 60 days, so Vodafone benefits from a cash flow perspective. Greensill makes its money on that margin (the £200).  Nothing wrong with this conceptually or ethically. Another version of this sees the finance provider making their offer to a supplier (rather than a buyer). So the finance might cover immediate payment against a wide range of invoices that the firm has issued.

Where does the cash come from?

In both cases, Greensill has to find the money to pay out up front to suppliers. Historically, the banks have offered this sort of service, because they have easy availability of money. But Greensill had to find a way of raising the cash. So they packaged up the offering into bonds, offering investors a decent rate of return, in return for providing the funding for the scheme. If you can turn over that funding 6 times a year based on 60 days payment cycle, making 2% each time, that is 12% – plenty to offer bond holders a decent return and make millions for Greensill too.

Just to make it even safer, the bonds were insured, so an investor knew that even if Greensill somehow didn’t get all the money owed to them back from the buyers, they were protected. So what went wrong?

The unravelling started with Greensill’s insurer refusing to continue covering that risk. The firm failed to find an alternative – so no insurance meant they couldn’t raise finance and could not continue to offer the service.  But the big unanswered question is this. Exactly WHY did insurance companies refuse to provide insurance? I mean, blue chip clients such as Vodafone aren’t going to renege on their agreement to pay Greensill (which for Vodafone is in effect simply the equivalent of paying their suppliers)?

So there must be more to it. Maybe Greensill has offered the service to buyers or suppliers who were less solid and secure than Vodafone, so the risk of default was greater. The position also gets murkier if you consider this possibility. What if the buyer / supplier relationship at the heart of the transaction was an inter-company relationship?  So one part of my business supplies another, and the supply side gets the payment from Greensill based on those invoices. But what if my sister company doesn’t really have the cash on the buy-side to then repay Greensill? It could be a way of raising money for a struggling firm, but maybe the underlying transactions aren’t even genuine?

One client of Greensill in particular has cropped up as a concern, and represents a pretty large proportion of the total business – do a bit of Googling and you can read more (it’s NOT Vodafone, I should stress)!  That might have got the insurance firms worried, to say the least. Then there was the alleged extravagance from Greensill. For what was still a pretty young business, running four corporate jets seems a little questionable.

So we will see what emerges in coming weeks, months and probably years. The reputations of Greensill, Crothers and Cameron are on the line, as well as potentially real jobs and businesses. There is nothing wrong with supply chain finance per se – but we might see the accountants and regulators looking harder at how firms report on their use of the technique.  And in the next edition of Bad Buying, will this go down as a failure, a fraud or a f**k-up? Time will tell.