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US Government Takes Down Procurement Fraudster

This story from the Homeland Security Today website dates from a couple of months ago, but it is an interesting procurement fraud case, as it does not involve any internal participants – it is a purely supplier-based fraud. Whilst that is certainly far from unique, it is probably not as common as those driven by internal staff or through collusion between internal and external players.

In this case, Cory Collin Fitzgerald Sanders, age 39, of Hagerstown, Maryland, was sentenced to 45 months in federal prison, followed by three years of supervised release, for wire fraud, false claims, and making and using a false document in connection with his companies’ performance on federal contracts. He also had to pay around $200,000 in fines and restitution.

The offences related to his two telecoms firms between 2015 and 2020.  The charges were pretty wide ranging but generally related to contracts with federal agencies that required his firms, Sandtech or Cycorp Technologies, to provide new telecommunications equipment which was still under manufacturers’ warranty. 

He contracted to supply new equipment, but then actually provided second hand, or non-warranted equipment instead. He claimed to have accreditation from the OEMs (original manufacturers) that would protect his customers when in fact he didn’t. He also was not authorized to provide certain IT services to the federal government, but represented to government officials that he was. It sounds like he invoiced in a fraudulent manner too, getting the agencies to pay for “deficient or non-existent performance”.

“Mr. Sanders deserves to be held fully accountable for his actions to defraud the U.S. Government by routinely providing telecommunications equipment that did not meet contract specifications and submitting false documentation in an attempt to cover up his scheme,” said Special Agent in Charge Greg Gross. 

The US government does seem pretty hot on prosecuting dodgy suppliers, more so than I’ve seen generally in the UK, for instance. In this case, a prison sentence of 45 months again feels more severe than “white collar criminals” tend to get in the UK. That’s a good disincentive for others who might be tempted to commit fraud, of course.

So what can procurement people and others do to protect their organisations against this sort of fraud? There are a few potential risk mitigation steps.  Firstly, checking out the credentials of any new supplier (and their directors) is important. And take up references wherever possible. Maybe that would not have stopped Sanders – but it certainly makes it harder to create new firms for fraudulent purposes.

Another obvious point is that goods delivered, whatever they are, should be checked to make sure they align with what was contracted for. And don’t assume that any accreditations and certifications are genuine – documents and emails can be forged. It is better to go back to the source if you can  – you could go back down the supply chain and check with the OEM that a distributor really is properly accredited, for instance.

So the usual safeguards against procurement fraud come into play again – and you can get the full list of mitigating actions and plenty of good advice on avoiding fraud and corruption in the Bad Buying book of course!

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What’s Gone Wrong with CIPS Systems? Part 2 – Advice to Help Avoid Similar Issues!

In part 1 of this discussion, we talked about the issues CIPS (the Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply) has faced in implementing its new systems. Moving away from the CIPS specifics now, here are some lessons related to this field, based on both personal experience and wider research.

  1. Nothing wrong with Oracle software, but small clients (and CIPS are small in the greater scheme of things for a firm like Oracle) sometimes struggle to get the attention that a Unilever, Barclays or Toyota might receive as customers of any software giant. In many sectors, including procurement software (which is not what CIPS has bought, I should say), I’ve always felt there is a lot to be said for smaller organisations choosing smaller suppliers.  
  2. Optimism bias is often an issue too. Suppliers are almost always likely to tell you that “yes, our product can do this” and “yes, it can be up and running in six months, no problem”. They might not be lying – but they omit to mention the conditionality. “Yes our product can do this as long as the data is in this format…” Or “yes, six months is feasible – as long as a, b, c, and d all apply…”  
  3. My understanding is that CIPS went for the “big bang” approach with the Oracle software. An alternative might have been to look at different aspects of the requirement – the student and exam booking element, core membership management, conferences and events, etc – and perhaps gone for a staged approach, with a more “best of breed with good inter-operability” approach to the software products chosen too. Whilst this might have looked somewhat more expensive and less rapid in theory, incremental approaches do tend to de-risk programmes like this.  
  4. The US example in Bad Buying mentioned in part 1 was undoubtedly made more complex by the involvement of several parties. I do understand why Oracle “don’t do implementation”, but immediately you have potential for dilution of responsibility when another party or parties are involved. Most senior buy-side people tell me they would always prefer “one backside to kick”, if you pardon the language. It’s not always possible, but having real clarity about who is responsible and accountable for what on the vendor side is vital. That’s true not just in technology, I should say, but in many other areas including construction, outsourcing projects, etc.  
  5. The Enigen statement (see part 1) is interesting in its mention of “evolving and additional requirements”. The very first chapter of Bad Buying is all about getting the specifications right. It’s the first chapter because it is the most fundamental cause of failure – if you get the spec wrong, nothing else matters. For complex technology projects, and that includes something like the Army’s disastrous Ajax armoured car programme as well as digital tech, changing specifications once work is underway will almost always cause problems. In terms of a software project, a client that starts saying, “oh, could we have that functionality as well please, sorry, forgot to mention it earlier…” is asking for trouble. Suppliers like to say “yes” of course, but not only can it lead to delays, it muddies the water in terms of accountability.  
  6. Software implementation that involves a systems transition – rather than a totally new system / functionality – is often difficult because problems with (for instance) transferring data don’t always come to light until you’re well into the project. It is easy to say that thorough due diligence before choosing a supplier or starting the programme is the answer, and of course that is important. But sometimes issues do emerge from the woodwork (or from the silicon, we should say) only once you are actually pressing that “go live” button!  is It is often a sensible move to look at cleansing data, perhaps using a real specialist in this area, as part of the pre-contract award market engagement process and planning.  
  7. On the client side, effective programme management is absolutely key. One would hope CIPS recognised that, but there might be questions now about factors such as the programme manager, governance, reporting, stakeholder and risk management. Now you can have a brilliant programme manager and still end up with a failed programme, but I’d hope the CIPS Board would be insisting on a detailed review of what has happened (if they haven’t done that already).  
  8. Expanding on that point, clients MUST understand they are reputationally, contractually and commercially on the hook for leading the implementation. You can’t just hand this off to software providers, SIs (systems integrators) or consultants. Programmes must have the right level of senior people involved and fully engaged from programme inception, and involved in governance of the project throughout. A lack of appropriate senior input is the root cause of many implementation disasters – leaders must ensure early decisions are made and do not get missed. Small issues can fester into multi-million pound disputes  requiring un-picking, and causing cost, delays and disruption.  

In November 2021, CIPS net assets (excluding the defined benefit pension fund notional surplus) were about £6 million. The accounts up to November 2022 should be out in the next couple of months – it will be interesting to see if the systems issues have visibly affected the financial position. For the sake of next year’s membership fee inflation, I hope not!

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What’s Gone Wrong With CIPS Systems?

Anyone who has been around in business for a few years knows that there is nothing more nerve-wracking, tense and challenging then implementing a new technology solution in a mission-critical area for the business.  When I was researching my Bad Buying book, I found enough case studies on that topic to have pretty much filled the book with that alone.  

I did include a few examples, from different sectors and countries, from an Australian government payroll system disaster to the US drugs firm FoxMeyer, who went bankrupt after major problems with a project that included two software providers plus a systems integrator.

But despite the challenges, digitisation is essential. A recent article quoted Malcom Harrison, CEO of the esteemed Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply, as saying this. “Whatever your corporate goal might be, a digital platform is critical to making more informed decisions”.

Unfortunately, CIPS itself has run into difficulties related to its own set of new digital platforms which it has been implementing over the last year or so, including its website, customer and membership systems. In an email to CIPS members recently, CEO Malcolm Harrison apologised for the inconvenience members and students have experienced over recent months in using the platforms.  I had seen some comments which were critical of the new platform around social media, and even a comment sent to the Spend Matters website. Several mentioned exam booking as a particularly problematical area. But clearly the problems are wider than that.

In the email, Harrison explained that CIPS chose tech giant Oracle as the software provider, after a thorough procurement process.  But Oracle don’t do implementation themselves – which is true of many major software providers. (Company valuations are generally higher for pure-play software firms than for combined software / services businesses). Instead, an Oracle approved systems integration partner, Enigen, has worked on that task. 

In the email, a joint statement from CIPS and Oracle said this:  CIPS, Oracle and Enigen are committed to modernizing the CIPS member and customer experience. Oracle has stepped in to ensure the project delivers on its full potential.”

The cynical might wonder how Oracle will “ensure” that delivery, given they don’t do implementation, and some might feel there is an implication there that Enigen are at fault, that Oracle having to “step in” to sort things out.  

A spokesperson for Enigen gave us this short statement: “This has been a complex project with many evolving and additional requirements. We are working collaboratively with CIPS and Oracle to create an exceptional digital experience for their members.”

We will come back to that statement in part 2 of this commentary – it is interesting to see that mention of “evolving and additional requirements”. That will no doubt set off alarm bells with readers who have experience of large software programmes! And of course, if Oracle has now “stepped in” to sort out the problems, it does beg the question as to why this level of integrated involvement from the firm was not already planned and present in the implementation programme.

I don’t want to be too critical here. To be honest, I managed to get through my lengthy procurement leadership career avoiding responsibility for many significant systems programmes. That was partly deliberate and partly luck (thanks to RBS for buying NatWest just as we were starting the mega-SAP programme … which RBS canned, incidentally). This is intrinsically difficult work – when I talked to a good friend of mine, one of the best complex programme managers I have ever met, he simply said, “it can happen to the best of us”.

But these events are not a great advert for the procurement profession, or for the firms involved, so hopefully the issues can be resolved quickly. I would also hope that CIPS will be open with members as to what has gone wrong. That could represent a learning opportunity that might help thousands of other CIPS members and their organisations, and CIPS has plenty of opportunities to feature this programme and all the experience gathered from it through its own channels. In that spirit, in Part 2 we will suggest some general good practice points (not necessarily linked to the CIPS case) when it comes to major systems implementation programmes.  

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Supercomputer – Not Very Super Procurement

We started the New Year with an expensive error made in UK government procurement. Atos, the large French technology firm, were paid £25 million after the firm complained about the decision to award Microsoft the £850 million contract for a new Meteorological Office super-computer. Most of the cash was paid by the government’s Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy with the Met Office itself stumping up the rest.The language is often the same when this sort of case drops into the public domain. No-one is to blame. “There was no admission of liability”, said the government here.

That begs the question of course – why pay £25 million if you didn’t do anything wrong? Clearly, the government’s legal advisers must have thought there was a very high probability that Atos would have won if the case had come in front of a judge, and might have been awarded substantially more in damages.

The best description of the dispute I found is on The Register website. A fairly technical and technological issue around the specification of the computer and the solution proposed by Atos led to the French firm receiving a score of 0/5 for several evaluation questions and their bid being declared in effect “non-compliant”.  Then, as the Register reported, “It was also alleged the government was “disproportionate” in ruling its bid non-compliant without seeking further clarification on the architectural equivalence of the Atos system”.

Eliminating a serious bidder on a complex specification issue is rarely a good idea in my experience. You need to be absolutely sure the bid really does not meet your spec, and I would certainly have wanted “further clarification” from Atos before I took the drastic step of kicking them out of the competition. Poor judgement at the very least on the buy-side. Or maybe somebody just didn’t want Atos to win and was looking for an excuse to disqualify them (yes, that does happen…) 

There was then an interesting debate on Twitter about the case too. Duncan Jones, the highly respected expert who led who led the procurement practice at research firm Forrester until he “retired” last year, was rather angry about this money ending up with Atos. If a company is on the wrong end of a bad piece of procurement by a private sector firm, the disappointed bidder doesn’t get recompensed, he said. So why should it be different in the public sector, with our money going straight into the profits of Atos (and others).

It is a fair point. But my argument is that you must have some way for bidders to highlight when there has been incompetent or even corrupt public sector procurement. And if they have lost millions because of that, why shouldn’t they be able to get something back? Otherwise I do think we would see more nepotism and even criminality in public procurement, with politicians, advisers and public officials acting in their own interests rather than those of the taxpayer. If the procurement rules did not have the “teeth “ provided by bidders’ right to challenge decisions, I think we would see lots of cases that would make the UK pandemic PPE procurement experience look like a model of probity and effectiveness!  

However, I think Duncan made a fair point about how much compensation should be payable in cases like this. Working out “loss of profit” is an inexact art, and many suppliers make very low margin on big government contracts. So £25 million does sound on the generous side; but as I say, the lawyers must have felt the amount could have been a lot more if the dispute has continued.

At the early stages of development of the new UK Procurement Bill, I seem to remember that there were some major changes proposed around supplier challenges, compensation and so on. Introducing the scope for a less legalistic dispute resolution process was one idea I liked (some countries have a “procurement ombudsman” which is an interesting idea), alongside less scope for big supplier pay-outs. The proposals seemed interesting, but I believe most of those have gone now from the draft legislation, and the Bill is not going to drastically change the current situation. 

Finally though, the point to remember is this. If an unhappy potential supplier ends up being paid lots of money, it is ALWAYS because there has been a failure in the procurement process. Don’t blame the supplier – look at what went wrong on the buyer side. In the case of this Met Office supercomputer, it may have been something rather complex around the specification. But it was still a failure, another case of Bad Buying, and one that has cost us £25 million.

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Why Did Apple Sack Top Procurement Guy?

Tony Blevins was sacked as Apple’s VP of procurement recently. He was at a car event in Pebble Beach with his Mercedes-Benz SLR McLaren when he was approached by TikTok creator Daniel Mac, who asks the owners of expensive cars what they do for a living. Blevins answered “ ‘I have rich cars, play golf and fondle big-breasted women, but I take weekends and major holidays off. Also, if you’re interested, I got a hell of a dental plan.’ 

That’s an approximate quote from the 1981 comedy movie, Arthur, where Dudley Moore says ‘I race cars, play tennis and fondle women, but I have weekends off and I am my own boss.’  So it wasn’t an original comment, which doesn’t really excuse him – also, if you are going to say something some might consider offensive, at least make sure its funny!

Anyway, the video hit the Internet, staff at the firm complained to Apple HR, and he went. He apologised, telling Bloomberg, “I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely apologize to anyone who was offended by my mistaken attempt at humor”.  

Blevins reported to either the CEO Tim Cook or COO Jeff Williams. He was known as the Blevinator and had a reputation as a fearsome, tough negotiator, with stories of his tactics reported in the press – including getting FedEx to hand-deliver his rejection of a price proposal to their rival, UPS!  To be fair, some of his tactics seem pretty smart. Running what was in effect a real-life reverse auction by going from supplier to supplier in their hotel rooms, negotiating to drive down price on glass for the new Apple office seems a reasonable approach to me. He also rotated staff every couple of years to avoid them forming close relationships with suppliers – again, many firms do that and to some extent it is not a bad idea from a complacency or indeed corruption poot of view.

But we might wonder why Apple needed to take such a tough line with suppliers given their very healthy profit margins. The simplest answer is – because they can. Power is still the basis of commercial relationships, as Professor Andrew Cox always told us. Where Apple hold that power, why wouldn’t they use it with their suppliers? We could argue however that sacrificing a little margin in order to develop stronger relationships with key suppliers would be worth it in the longer run. And if Blevins tough negotiation actually drove suppliers out of business or out of Apple’s supply base, then it certainly wasn’t sensible.

So there are three reasons why Apple might have got rid of the Blevinator. The most obvious is the (arguably) offensive nature of his comment, and perhaps what it might indicate about his general attitude. Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, has spoken about the need to get more women into tech roles so his CPO making such comments is not the best support for that objective.

The second might be that Apple wants to move away from the old-fashioned leveraged approach to procurement and become more collaborative, working in a more harmonious manner with suppliers. Blevins might have stood in the way of that, representing as he did that previous tough approach.

And finally, in many firms, a CPO driving a supercar might ring some alarms. I remember a Ministry of Defence procurement official in the UK years ago who earned maybe £60K a year (in current terms), yet lived in a multi-million pound mansion in the Thames Valley. Surprisingly, no-one asked the key question – where did he get the money from? The answer of course was “bribes paid by suppliers”.

Now I’m not accusing Blevins of anything of that nature – I’m sure he earned plenty from Apple. Finding the odd half-million for his car wasn’t a problem for him given his likely stock options. But perhaps driving that sort of car just isn’t the sort of image a CPO should project.  And a supplier might well think, “Apple can afford to pay me a bit more for my product if its VPs are driving supercars!”

Anyway, this is a “Bad Buyer” story rather than bad buying, but fascinating, nonetheless. And if you want to learn more about it, do listen to Kelly Barner’s excellent podcast on this topic at Supply Chain Now  – it’s a very enjoyable, informative and interesting 20 minutes during which time she goes into more detail on Apple’s approach to suppliers – and how that might be changing.

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NHS Procurement Platform – Was it Bought Properly?

The UK National Health Service is one of the largest organisations in the world in terms of number of employees and its running cost. Whilst it is a single organisation in some senses, really it is made up of thousands of smaller organisations, many with considerable levels of autonomy. Even when we think about hospital trusts, each still has its own Board and is set up as an independent entity from a legal perspective, although that is slowly changing with the introduction of the regional Integrated Care System model.

So it is not surprising that over the years, there has always been tension in procurement between the urge to centralise and control more from “the top” (whatever structures might be defined in that way) against the desire for local autonomy and power.  Now no-one would argue for total centralisation (everything needed by every hospital bought from a huge central office somewhere) or total decentralisation (every doctor or hospital negotiating its own deals for pharmaceuticals!)

But getting the balance right has proved difficult. For instance, Ministers persist in claiming “the centre” did a good job in terms of pandemic PPE procurement. But the truth is that pre-pandemic central procurement strategy proved inadequate, and local action was needed to maintain supply in many hospitals. And whilst once the pandemic was underway some central activity was necessary, mandated central buying cost the UK billions in waste and super-profits for suppliers.

The new Chief Commercial Officer for the NHS, Jacqui Rock, who sits in NHS England HQ, recently launched a Central Commercial function for the NHS. A key strand of that is a technology initiative that is designed to help the manage procurement better across the system. The aim is to have a more common approach to procurement, and to start enabling better access to spend data across the whole network. That is a very sensible aim – gathering data does not mean in itself a more central approach to category strategies, and however you want to approach procurement, having good data is essential.

The mechanism for achieving this has raised some eyebrows though. Via Crown Commercial Services, all trusts, integrated care boards and other NHS entities can now use a software platform provided by Atamis, with CCS funding that to the tune of £13 million over three years (it is not clear if CCS has actually “pre-bought” licences here, which could be a risk in itself).

Atamis is a procurement and tendering platform with spend analysis functions as well as tools for managing programmes, tenders, contracts, and supplier relationships. It was chosen for use by NHS England and the central Department two years ago, although NHS Supply Chain chose software firm Jaggaer for their similar requirements.However ,this new contract with Atamis was put in place using the government’s Digital Marketplace, a set of frameworks that gives the public sector access to thousands of suppliers. And it appears that no competitive process was used to choose Atamis. They were simply awarded the contract. Now there are rules (laws) about when you can award a contract in that manner without seeking proposals from other firms also listed in the Marketplace. And I cannot see in this case how a “single tender” can be justified, when there are other firms on the framework who provide similar products and indeed supply many Trusts already.

I should say that I have no axe to grind with Atamis or their product. When I worked at Spend Matters, I had contact with the founder of Atamis and liked him and the business. But the firm was sold to a Canadian software company last year, and the NHS could represent a considerable proportion of their business.  There are also questions about what happens once the 3-year CCS funding ends, dependence (the Atamis product is built on the Salesforce platform) and “lock-in” to Atamis.

When the initiative was announced, there were a whole host of interesting comments from readers of the HSJ (Health Service Journal). This extract from one probably encapsulates much of the content.

“Why has the centre decided to create a monopoly situation, by endorsing, promoting and funding this only provider for, say contracts management? What happens to other providers with better value solutions? Should UK Tech Plc pack up and shut shop? Are these other solution providers now out of the whole NHS market? Why”? 

For me, the most fundamental question is whether it was legal and commercially appropriate to award the contract to Atamis without competition. (There are “business issues” too of course). The new central function should set a good example, and surely competition is the most fundamental principle of good procurement. But given the way the contract was let, I would not be surprised if we see challenges to that process from other suppliers who are clearly at a competitive disadvantage now, with Atamis being available “free”.  

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Look Who’s Talking – FACT360 AI Detects Potential Fraud

The fraud section in my new book was great fun to write. I know you can’t and shouldn’t call fraud “fun” in any sense, but the case studies I researched were interesting, and often quite astonishing.

In one case I saw personally (which I couldn’t mention in any detail in the book) we discovered a fairly senior colleague, who everybody thought was a lovely, capable person, was actually involved in approving six-figure invoices from a fake supplier. The police thought this “firm” was probably linked to the “Russian mafia”, and we only found out about the fraud when the police discovered this gang was receiving large payments from my firm (and told us)!

Anyway, buying-related frauds can involve just internal staff, as in the case of fiddling your expenses or using the company charge card wrongly, or can be purely externally driven, as in the case of many “invoice misdirection” cases, or might involve both internal and external players. That third category is perhaps the most common and includes classic frauds such as overpayments to suppliers or biased supplier selection in return for bribes or inducements to the buyer.

But technology, artificial intelligence in particular, is helping to pick up some frauds through its ability to analyse huge amounts of data and spot trends, patterns, inconsistencies and oddities. I remember a presentation from two or three years back which talked about using AI to search through corporate payments or approvals. The idea was that you might find for instance a budget holder who always submitted an invoice for approval or payment on a Friday afternoon, when it might be scrutinised less carefully! Or someone who always makes purchases with a value of £9,999 if the cut-off for approval is £10K.

But more recently, I learnt of another interesting approach. In this case, the AI focus is on emails and documents that flow within the organisation and to external third parties. It has been developed by a firm called FACT360, which is led by Paddy Lawton, who founded, ran and then sold spend analytics software firm Spend360 to Coupa in 2017. I spoke to Lawton and fellow director Andy Slater to get a quick overview of what they’re up to.

Of their three core products, AI Forensics  is most relevant to buying-related fraud work. It analyses documents and emails and produces a network “map” of who is talking to who within an organisation and across organisational boundaries, including to suppliers, for instance. It generates insights from that communication flows as well as from the content of the messages themselves.

So for example, if you apply the analysis to Enron’s data, before that firm’s crash and disgrace, you can see that one particular person was at the centre of a major web of communication within the firm, even though he wasn’t apparently very senior. It turned out he controlled one of the technology “marketplaces” that enabled Enron to falsely claim to be making money on transactions. This analysis of what FACT360 calls “prestige” can tell you a lot about what is going on within an organisation, and who is really important or powerful. 

“And there are subtle changes in communication behaviour that occur and can be detected when actors plan and engage in covert activity” according to Slater.

One of the interesting corruption cases in my Bad Buying book tells the story of the Sainsbury’s supermarket potato buyer, who conspired over some years with a major supplier to pay over the odds for potatoes in return for bribes. Might Fact360 artificial intelligence have picked this up?  Probably, says Slater. It is likely that emails between the main players would have been more frequent than for other similar suppliers, or show different patterns in terms of timing or even use of language. There might have been more obvious clues in the content too.

Of course, knowing that your email trail could be used in his way might discourage fraudsters from using that medium, but there is always going to be some record of contact, unless the participants are using real secret service tactics! And the beauty of these emerging AI technologies such as FACT360 is that the user doesn’t need to know or define what they are looking for – the system will highlight where it finds potential “unknown unknowns”, as Donald Rumsfeld famously put it. 

We’re still at the early stages of understanding just how AI is gong to affect our lives, and it may be that some implications will not be positive for many of us. But using it to detect and deter fraud and corruption in our organisations – and reduce Bad Buying – must be one of the more positive aspects of this fascinating technology.

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Satellite of Love? The Perm Sec Doesn’t Think So…

A ”Ministerial Direction” sounds like a very dry and boring aspect of civil service bureaucracy, but that is far from the case. It happens when a government Minister in the UK (an elected politician) insists that their most senior civil servant (the “Perm Sec”) takes an action that the civil servant believes is against the principles of good value for the taxpayer.

Or, as the Institute of Government puts it, “Ministerial directions are formal instructions from ministers telling their department to proceed with a spending proposal, despite an objection from their permanent secretary”.

They are unusual; through the nineties and noughties, a couple a year was the average. There were more around the banking crisis, and we have seen a not unexpected flood of directions in recent months around Covid-related issues. But often, they are not really reflecting a genuine disagreement between the Minister and the mandarin. It is more that the spending can’t definitely be seen as good value, so the permanent secretary has to seek the direction to protect themselves, even if they are wholeheartedly in agreement with the Minister in terms of the actual action.

Much of the Covid spending in areas such as the furlough scheme for instance may prove to be poor value ultimately, and cannot be clearly justified upfront; but I suspect civil servants were right behind the Chancellor and fully supportive of the actions he took.

However, very occasionally you get a direction which reflects a real disagreement, where the Perm Sec is basically saying “I think this is a waste of money and I am doing it because you are forcing me to, you idiot”. Put in nicer words of course. And one such case came to light this week, relating to the UK investment in proposed purchase of OneWeb, a (bankrupt) start-up company whose ambition is to provide global broadband. $500m in equity investment is being considered to co-finance the purchase of OneWeb from US Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.

Perm Sec at the Business Department, Sam Beckett, says in her letter to Alok Sharma, the Minister, that while in one scenario “we could get a 20 per cent return, the central case is marginal and there are significant downside risks, including that venture capital investments of this sort can fail, with the consequence that all the value of the equity can be lost”.

There is more in terms of the issues, and Beckett does recognise that this could prove to be an opportunity for the UK, but she feels this would be an unusual investment for a public body, and you have to wonder why it would be attractive for the UK government if it is not to other more experienced investors!

Is this Bad Buying though? Well, you could argue that we won’t know that until we see if OneWeb succeeds or fails. But actually, good decision making is NOT really related to outcomes.  If I make the decision to stand out on the golf course in a thunderstorm with my umbrella up, and I stay dry and don’t get hit by lightning, that does not make it a good decision. It was a bad decision, because based on the facts available at the time it was made, it was the wrong choice (assuming that staying alive is high on my priority list).  You might argue it was successful in terms of outcome, but it wasn’t right at the key moment.

Sharma’s reply says that “I have been informed that even with substantial haircuts to OneWeb’s base case financial projections the investment would have a positive return”. But other experts have suggested that the chances of success here are pretty low. One attraction of the investment is to provide an alternative space system for GPS services to the EU’s Galileo system (the UK is leaving the EU of course). But some believe the OneWeb satellites are not fit for that purpose (follow the link for more techie debate!)

The Guardian talked to Dr Bleddyn Bowen, a space policy expert at the University of Leicester, who said “the fundamental starting point is, yes, we’ve bought the wrong satellites.” (This from Forbes is a pretty balanced view of the technology issues if you want to get into more detailed pros and cons).

That Bowen comment sounds like “getting the specification wrong”, which is literally chapter one in my new book, Bad Buying, out in October.  A good spec as any procurement professional knows is an essential starting point to a successful contract.  So, whilst I don’t understand all the aspects of this, it looks like this is the wrong decision based on risk and opportunity.

It may of course turn out to be a successful decision in terms of outcome – but that still won’t mean it was the right decision, if the facts at this stage suggest a high probability that the UK taxpayer will lose out. And on that basis, we nominate it indeed as an example of Bad Buying.

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