Tag Archive for: Finance

Last week the Sunday Times ran an expose of the UK’s HS2 rail project. The programme is being severely curtailed now due to massive over spending against the budget.

Over several pages, the Times laid out a culture of overspending and bad financial forecasting, with those who tried to point out the problems often forced out or removed if contractors. The accusation is that senior managers knew that budgets were unrealistic but covered up the facts for as long as possible. Presumably that was to keep their lucrative jobs, and keep ministers happy. The thinking may have been that If the programme got to a certain point, then it could not be cancelled.

There was more in yesterday’s edition of the Sunday Times, including an interview with Stephen Cresswell, one of the whistleblowers.

This first phase was expected to cost £21 billion and yet his calculations suggested a fairer assessment was £30 billion — a huge discrepancy. “There were problems with the way the figures had been calculated and it was likely to cost an awful lot more,” he says. “I did the calculations pointing this out but I was told to concentrate my efforts on something else.”

Unfortunately this good piece of reporting did not get much discussion on national TV news certainly, perhaps unsurprisingly given the disaster unfolding in Israel and Gaza.  The report did say that the internal audit function at HS2 is looking into the allegations – but that isn’t good enough. We really need a detailed external review of what happened in HS2, to understand that specific case but more importantly, to see what lessons can be learnt that apply to other large capital programmes in the UK.  Maybe that is best done by the National Audit Office, although several ex-employees have written to the SFO (Serious Fraud Office) accusing HS2 of mismanagement of public funds, so maybe this will all turn more “criminal”. 

If no action is taken quickly, then we will have to see if Labour will have the appetite for driving a review if they do form the next government. After all, it was Labour and Lord Adonis, then Transport Minister, who kicked off HS2 and Adonis was a non-exec of HS2 for some years. But we really do need a review. We can’t allow huge expenditures where the people involved and responsible are pursuing their own goals rather than the taxpayers’ best interests. As Cresswell put it: “Costs, risks, timescales and benefits are being manipulated to suit individuals or organisational goals rather than the public interest”.

Another interesting point the Sunday Times highlighted last week is that Ministers appear to have lied to Parliament – or at best “misled” the house. Chirs Grayling was one, but a junior Minister is also accused.

“ On June 7, 2019, Cook sent a first draft of his report to Grayling. It suggested HS2 was billions of pounds over budget and years behind schedule.….  In July, the minister for transport, Nusrat Ghani, fielded questions during a Westminster Hall debate on HS2 before the Commons final vote on the bill to approve the Birmingham to Crewe phase two leg.  She said: “I stand here to state confidently that the budget is £55.7 billion and that the timetable is 2026 and 2033.” She repeated her assurances five days later, during the third reading debate in the Commons.

An FOI request exposed that she had been told 3 months earlier that the programme would breach its budget – so doesn’t that sound like lying to Parliament?  

It was good to see the shadow Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, announcing that a “covid corruption commissioner” will look into PPE procurement during the pandemic and the waste of billions of public money. In terms of waste, HS2 is at least on that scale, so surely that also deserves a very thorough and independent look at what happened there?

It was tempting to write again about the HS2 rail programme given recent events and the question of whether it is going to ever get to Manchester – or indeed to Euston.  It will go down in history as one of the great British public sector disasters, perhaps costing us even more than NPfIT, the NHS IT programme a decade or more ago which certainly cost us billions.  From the very beginning, it was clear to me that the business case was a con in order to justify the programme, which was enough for me to think it was a misjudged idea.

But the wider question is this – why are we so bad in the UK at capital projects and programmes? A recent article in The Times from chief culture writer Richard Morrison highlighted that failure in the specific area of arts-related building projects. The renovation of the Colston Hall in Bristol – to be renamed the Bristol Beacon – is now expected to cost £132 million, against an initial budget of £48 million. In Manchester, the Aviva studios opens soon, with the price-tag of around £240 million, more than double the original cost estimate. In Edinburgh, the redeveloped National Galleries of Scotland is a relative bargain, a mere £38.6 million, only £22 million over budget.

In East London, there is the new East Bank cultural quarter on the former Olympic Park at Stratford. That was supposed to be £385 million, now we are looking at £628 million and still rising. As Richard Morrison said, we might wonder “what difference this glitzy arts campus will make to ordinary lives in London’s poorest borough”. Political vanity projects in London aren’t new of course. Remember Boris Johnson’s “garden bridge” fiasco?

Is it optimism bias we are seeing time and time again?  Is it simply incompetence in terms of properly defining the specification and carrying out costing exercises up front? Can we just blame inflation?  Is it poor contract management and a lack of control that allows suppliers to escalate prices through the project?  Or lack of control on changes in specification, changes which genuinely cause costs to grow?

The other possibility is conspiracy. It is in everyone’s interest for a project to look like a bargain when it comes to justifying it through the business case process. Your new concert hall (or railway) looks like a good investment at £x whereas it wouldn’t look good at £2x. so the sponsors, the professional services, engineering and construction firms involved, perhaps even local people, all want the case to be approved, so let’s make sure it is estimated at x and not 2x.  Everyone also knows that once it is underway, it is very difficult to stop these projects even as the costs escalate, as we are seeing with HS2 now.

This was discussed in a long running legal case over the new concert hall in Paris, which featured in the Bad Buying book. The dispute between the authorities and the architect, Jean Nouvel, got rather nasty before the case was eventually settled in October 2021.  Here is an extract from the book.

“In 2007, he (Nouvel) was contracted to build the auditorium for €119 million, but the final cost was estimated at €328 by the owners and €534 million by the regional state auditors (which in itself seems like a big discrepancy). Le Monde reported Nouvel saying that the €119 million was quoted purely to match the ceiling set for the public tender, and was not really a genuine cost estimate. He claims that €100,000 per seat was the established cost for similar concert halls, and the €119 million total would have required spending only half that much, so it was never realistic. He also claims that everyone knew that the real cost would be much higher – “this is pretty usual in France in public tenders for cultural projects”, he was quoted as saying. His lawyer also says Nouvel is being made responsible for failures in project management”.

So might HS2 have been a case of a conspiracy to reduce the predicted cost in order to get the project approved?  Is this happening in too many UK projects?  If Labour does win the next election, I would suggest an immediate and wide ranging review of why we seem to be so hopeless at building stuff to budget. You’ll need people who are genuinely independent or maybe folk who will blow the whistle on what really goes on! Because the answer can’t just be “a bit of inflation”. Something is going wrong on far too regular a basis in the UK.  

Increasing numbers of local authorities (county, city and town councils) in the UK are facing financial crisis. The latest is Birmingham, England’s second largest city, which has issued a Section 114 notice – in effect declaring itself bankrupt. Commissioners will be sent in from central government to take over the running of the authority.

The core reason is an equal pay claim going back years. Women employed by the council weren’t paid as much as men doing similar jobs. But it seemed for some years that financial provisions had been made to pay those affected and all was well. But there appear to be more claims now, which suggests the original problems weren’t sorted out when they should have been. There should have been a serious job evaluation programme but somehow that hasn’t happened. Infighting amongst the ruling Labour Party has not helped either, some observers claim.

However, there also seem to be other reasons for the crisis. Birmingham spent over £100 million hosting the Commonwealth Games last year – good for motivating the locals perhaps, and maybe it brought cash into the city, but a lot of many to spend when you’re in a bad financial position.

Now we are moving into “bad buying” territory too, with  accusations of money being wasted in the procurement area. A report in the Daily Mail says, “calls for police probe into bankrupt Birmingham Council’s £11M payments to tiny taxi firm charging £200 a day to take one pupil to school”.  This firm, Green Destinations Ltd, (GDL) has grown rapidly in recent years to become the main beneficiary of  school transport contracts, and there is a suggestion that it might have been “close” in some way to executives who had influence on the contracts.

Now we have to be careful with headline reports. £200 a day might be for a special educational needs pupil who needed accompanying in the taxi and so on. But competitors also claimed that council officials told their drivers they might be better off working for the favoured firm in question. And the table of fares quoted by the Mail does seem to show very high fees compared to standard taxi rates. No doubt more will emerge on this.

However, there hasn’t been any suggestion that procurement in Birmingham is generally useless or corrupt. But I did feature the authority a couple of times in my Bad Buying book. The first was a call-centre contract with Capita, which an enquiry into the service pointed out did not incentivise Capita very sensibly. They were paid on a per call basis, so had no incentive to sort out problems first time or take the required time to do that.  (However, it was the council itself that wasn’t very good at sorting out the underlying problems, to be fair to Capita).

The other mention in the book was the disastrous road maintenance contract with Amey, which ended up with the firm paying £215 million to get out of a 25-year PFI deal. The relationship between the two parties had broken down completely, with a famous report that the council tried to charge Amey penalties of £48.5 million because the firm didn’t repair two bollards quickly enough. All of that was not necessarily the council’s fault, but you have to wonder why you would get into a 25 year contract for any service really. (Maybe it would have some logic for a large construction PFI, but not for roads maintenance). Put those two together and you might perhaps draw conclusions about naivety and a lack of commercial nous in Birmingham.

Anyway, the city may now need to sell art galleries, housing and land to try and balance the budgets, which is very sad for what is a great city. Of course, the national Conservative government is loving this, claiming it is an example of “Labour failure”. But in fact, it is just the latest in a long line of local government waste, corruption, bad buying and financial problems, a line that runs through Liverpool, Northamptonshire, Somerset, Thurrock, Slough, Surrey Heath, Woking, Croydon and more – both Tory and Labour authorities.  Reduced funding from central government is one reason; but there are also too many incompetent or corrupt people in our local government system, it seems.

The Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply (CIPS) has had a troubled couple of years. We saw major arguments about changes to governance, then implementation of a new Oracle technology platform to manage membership, exam bookings, events – pretty much everything really – has been a disaster. The CEO, Malcolm Harrison, left at the end of March in circumstances that weren’t altogether happy, I understand. The Institute did manage to publish its accounts on time, and you can now examine the document on the Charities Commission website here. They run up to October 31st, 2022, so we’re already two-thirds of the way though the subsequent financial year.

The headlines – CIPS Group turnover in FY22 was £30.2 million with net income of £2.4 million before investments and pension scheme movements. The turnover was below budget expectations, but still represents an increase 11% above FY21, and operating profit was above budget despite the revenue shortfall. Reserves were down on plan but not dangerously low.  

There are a number of wider points of interest in the report. I liked the focus on volunteers; I don’t think I have ever seen information provided before on number of volunteers, where they are and so on. The report is pretty honest about the problems caused by the system failure; there is talk of staff having to go above and beyond to keep the show on the road, workarounds and more.  But the report makes this claim.

A programme is now in place to resolve the issues with the platform and to remove all workarounds. However the impacts have been significant with membership, exam bookings, revenue and profits all being negatively impacted.”  But clearly the issues were not resolved by the end of March when Harrison went – I’m not convinced all is sorted even now in July.   

But there is no simple number provided in terms of what the programme has cost or what more it might still cost to get the platform up and running.  However, there is a table that gives figures for “Intangible Fixed Assets. “Assets under development” stood at £4.9 million in November 21 and a further £2.6 million was spent in 2022. The assets under development were “brought into use” during 2022 – if all of this was the new platform, that means some £7.5 million had been spent by November 22.

Maybe some of this was other development though, but it is not clear. I was told a while ago that the budget was in the £5-6 million area so this would represent a major overspend by last November, with more since then. We’ll have to see what the number is in this year’s accounts, and maybe next year’s too! But it seems quite possible that CIPS will end up spending the best part of £10 million.

There have been other impacts too driven by these problems. MCIPS membership is down some 700 on the year, and the blame for that is put at the door of the system. Examinations revenue was up, although there was also mention of system issues there, so maybe it should have been even better. Some of the impact is not really financial but still matters. Talking to a Fellow the other day, it is clear that the issues have made even organising basic events much more difficult. The Fellows group has been one of the success stories of recent years; it would be a shame if it lost momentum simply because of a technical issue.

Looking at those membership numbers, and where revenue comes from, I think it is fair to say that CIPS is no longer primarily a membership organisation. Its two “core businesses” are student education and examinations; and corporate training and development. In terms of the latter, CIPS does not say how much of that revenue comes now from NGOs, governments and charities who provide grants to CIPS to help develop procurement in the developing world. The Bill Gates Foundation is mentioned, and the work in the health system in Africa sounds very worthwhile. Such revenue is not reliable year after year of course, but my feeling is once you get a decent reputation, there are a lot of funds out there for delivering these “good works”.

But 17,000 MCIPS members means membership fee revenue of around £4 million, only some 13% of total revenues. And it is hard to see that growing much, to be honest. As I’ve said before, so much of what used to be the CIPS membership proposition is now replicated by other organisations, from Procurious to the Sustainable Procurement Pledge, by tech and consulting firms or even by individual “influencers” in the profession, who together provide a huge among of insight, IP, networking opportunities and more – free of charge. Why pay CIPS if that is what you value?

So – wild idea – maybe CIPS should make membership free?

You would still need to do the exams or go through a rigorous non-examination route to get your MCIPS, but the “affiliate” status could be developed further for those who don’t want that. And just think how much more the CIPS membership list would be “worth” if it was five times the size it is now!  CIPS also needs to get better at working with software firms, consultancies etc – there is a lot more potential revenue there if CIPS gets its act together. But an expanded membership list would be a huge benefit.  And the credibility CIPS has in terms of winning corporate work or NGO and charity funded projects would also be far greater with more members.

The alternative is for MCIPS numbers to stagnate at best, and the organisation becomes that training and education body as I suggested earlier, with more and more focus on Africa and the Middle East  in the main.  But there are issues with the overseas approach too; the US was a disaster last year, losing over £230K after revenues fell and costs rose quite dramatically.  I’m also not totally sure about the ethics of doing so much work in Saudi Arabia. I guess our government and our football clubs don’t worry too much about that so there is no reason why CIPS should. 

In summary; CIPS had a difficult year, but to be clear, it is not about to go bust. However, the new system has cost millions more than planned and has caused other problems. Some of the overseas operations also look problematical. There is a new Chair and a new CEO (who has solid IT and procurement experience but has never run a business or a P&L before) just getting their feet under the table.  Core membership is static or declining, but education and training activities are going pretty well, with grant funded work in particular showing a lot of potential.

I gave up my membership last year after the governance shambles – but I wish the Institute well and hope 2023 proves a better year than 2022. I suspect some innovative thinking is necessary though.

We have local council elections in England on Thursday this week (May 4th). According to the opinion polls, the Conservatives may lose one thousand seats to Labour and (in areas like Surrey where we live), the Lib Dems.  Of course, as a mere procurement author and commentator, I wouldn’t dream of suggesting how you should vote. I mean, if you think we have seen growing prosperity in recent years, improving public services, clear rivers and lakes, a great train service, a ruling cadre that deeply cares about the people… you should vote accordingly.

Personally, I would like to see more councils where there is no single party in control, or at least where the control does and can change over the years. Where the same party rules for decades on end, complacency can set in, or elected councillors can even start behaving in an unethical or criminal manner.

We’ve seen some extreme cases of this in recent years. It is not just one political party behind these disasters either – it was Labour led councils that failed in places including Slough, Liverpool and Croydon, and the Tories in Thurrock, Woking and Northamptonshire. But they have all presided over financial disasters, with gross incompetence always a factor and accompanying fraud in some cases. 

Certainly one common thread is the secrecy, lack of openness and transparency that we see in the behaviour of the councils. My own local council, Surrey Heath, is not quite a disaster on the scale of some of these others, but the Tory council made an extremely misjudged investment in commercial property in Camberley town centre, buying right at the peak of the market. In terms of asset value, that has cost the local taxpayer over £50 million and counting. But the deals were stitched up by a very small cabal of councillors and executives – not even all the Tories in council knew what was going on. Hopefully, the Lib Dems will win here this week, then at least we might get to see the full accounts and the full story behind what went on.

In the case of Thurrock, it was brilliant work by journalist Gareth Davies that exposed the huge and very “strange” investments that may end up costing the taxpayer £500 million in real cash losses. Again, there was no transparency and councillors refused to disclose information for year, even after Freedom of Information requests. (I will be astonished if no-one ends up in court over this case).

Many of the cases involve “bad buying” in a conventional procurement sense too. That was certainly true in Croydon, where construction and refurbishment contracts were part of the story – that is another case where we don’t know yet if the driver was fraud, incompetence or both.  In other examples, it is dodgy investments (which is “buying” of a sort, I suppose), and we also see ridiculously extravagant payoffs to top executives too.

At the end of 2022, Labour published their plan for greater devolution of power. If Labour win the next election, the government will devolve more budget and control to local councils and mayors. I’m all for that in theory, but given what we have seen in the last few years, it also makes me nervous.  If Keir Starmer really wants to do that, he must put in place some checks and balances to make sure we don’t just see more Croydons and Thurrocks, but with even bigger sums of money.

Transparency needs to be addressed, public scrutiny should be made easier, and there should be a strengthened audit regime for councils. But the problem with audit is it is after the event when the money is already gone! So maybe there should be some sort of pre-expenditure check for projects, investments or contracts over a certain amount?  Perhaps a reincarnated Audit Commission could fulfil that role? Anyway, just throwing more money and power at some of the incompetent and /or crooked muppets we have seen around local government in recent years does not seem sensible.

The UK’s National Audit Office recently refused to sign-off the accounts of the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) for 2021-22.

A lack of sufficient, appropriate audit evidence and significant shortcomings in financial control and governance” meant that NAO head Gareth Davies was unable to provide an audit opinion on the accounts of the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA).  Even taking the “challenging context” into account, Davies called the UKHSA’s inability to produce auditable accounts “unacceptable”.

UKHSA replaced Public Health England in October 2021. That was a challenging time because of Covid, but even so, the financial management of the new organisation appears to have been chaotic.  

UKHSA was unable to provide the NAO with sufficient evidence to support balances relating to £794m of stock, and £1.5bn of accruals from NHS Test and Trace, which were transferred from DHSC, or to support £254m of stockpiled goods transferred from its predecessor organisation, Public Health England (PHE). DHSC had not resolved issues with its management systems, financial controls and records, which the C&AG reflected in his report on DHSC’s 2020-21 accounts”.

Internal controls were lacking; there weren’t even effective bank reconciliations, something the smallest business would expect to have in place. “Shortcomings in the introduction of a new accounting system, combined with a reliance on temporary staff, meant that UKHSA was not able to provide the NAO with evidence to support key balances and transactions in the accounts”. So goodness knows what was happening in terms of errors or even fraud at that time.

Moving on to the wider Department, NAO “was unable to obtain the evidence needed to support £1.36bn of stock, due to issues related to inventory management”.

DHSC did not carry out end of year stock counts to check items including PPE (personal protective equipment) and Covid lateral flow tests, “as it was unable to access 5 billion items (which cost £2.9bn) that were stored in containers”. Whilst that might be excusable, or at least understandable, there was also a lack of adequate processes to check stock in warehouses, which is less so.

There was also a write-down of £6bn in terms of pandemic related purchases. £2.5bn of that is items already purchased but no longer usable, or where the market price is now way below what was paid. £3.5bn was a write-down on PPE, vaccines and medication which DHSC has committed to purchase, but no longer expects to use.

Taken together with the £8.9bn written-down in its 2020-21 accounts, over the last two financial years, DHSC has now reported £14.9bn of write-down costs related to PPE and other items”. 

And if you are thinking, well, at least that’s it, there is more salt to rub into the wounds.

DHSC estimates that ongoing storage and disposal costs for its excess and unusable PPE will be £319m. At the end of March 2022, the estimated monthly spending on storing PPE was £24m.”

So that’s £15 billion of taxpayer’s money gone. It has been in effect a huge transfer of wealth from the UK economy and citizens to a range of largely non-UK manufacturers and of course to a whole bunch of crooks, conmen, exploitative agents and middlemen, many with political connections, and the occasional genuine business person, all involved in the supply chain somewhere.  Every issue of Private Eye seems to have more examples – taken from the company accounts that are now emerging – of firms making huge margins, often 50% or more, on the PPE, tests and so on that were supplied during the pandemic.

We’ve discussed the reasons for this disaster many times over the last couple of years A failure to prepare and mis-management of the emergency PPE stocks; catastrophically bad demand planning which led to huge over-ordering;  incompetence in terms of drawing up specifications; a lack of even basic negotiation, cost analysis and supplier due diligence; political interference and nepotism; these drivers all feature. But as the NAO lays out the cold, hard numbers, we can say with confidence that when we construct the league table for the all-time costliest failures in UK public procurement, this is right at the top.

I’ve read about a couple of procurement-related frauds in the media in recent days. They go to show that there is very little new in this game – both rely on tried and tested techniques, and both really would not have happened if some basic controls had been in place.

Accountant Jeffrey Bevan stole £1.7 million by making 50 fake payments to himself when he was payments manager for the accountant general of Bermuda (the islands equivalent of a finance minister). The payments were presumably disguised as going to “suppliers” and he spent the money on cars, multiple properties and gambling. He was sent to jail in 2018 but was back in court recently having been released, hence the news reports last week. A proceeds of crime hearing is trying to recover more of the stolen money from his pension, which Bevan claims is unfair.

This type of fraud is not unusual and there are several examples in the Bad Buying book. This case again shows that the perpetrator can be anyone, including senior managers, accountants, head teachers, NHS directors … In fact, it is generally more senior people who have the power to authorise payments, or to choose suppliers, so of course they are more likely to commit fraud.

But the mitigation of this risk is pretty straightforward. All payments (other than the very smallest) should be authorised by more than one person. Any new “supplier” must be checked out to make sure the organisation is genuine – and not owned by the person making the payment!  Bank details should be checked and again more than one person should be involved in authorising new payment details or changes to details. This is all common sense really, yet many organisations don’t follow the basic principles.

The second case featured a senior engineering manager for Coca-Cola Enterprises UK, Noel Corry (it actually hit the news a few months back but I missed it at the time). His role included identifying electrical contractors for bottling plants across the UK, but in some cases he handed out contracts to favoured suppliers where no actual work was ever undertaken.

He took more than £1.5 million in backhanders from the firms as well as getting season tickets for Manchester United. The judge didn’t send him to jail, saying he had suffered enough (my little joke there).  Actually, he was spared jail, which seems rather lucky, being given a suspended sentence. Two executives from the supplier side were also given similar sentences.

Corry ensured that work went to various companies including Boulting Group Ltd, Tritec Systems Ltd and Electron Systems Ltd in return for large sums of money paid directly or indirectly to him. The prosecuting QC said, “‘Mr Corry had the power to award general contracts directly or through a tender process. He would determine which work needed to be done and by whom…  Mr Corry would ensure that companies were awarded genuine CCE contracts at inflated rates or contracts were raised in their names for bogus work never intended to be completed. The companies would invoice and then be paid. The extra money generated created a slush fund held on behalf of Noel Corry”.

Again, we see a single individual with too much power to make decisions. In this case, the fraud involved awarding contracts as well as making dubious payments. But where was the procurement function in all this? Was there no check on why and how these firms won the work? And in terms of paying for work that was not even delivered, that comes back to having multiple sign-off on invoices, so someone could have asked what exactly had been done for the money being charged.

So do check that your organisation is not open to these or other basic procurement-related frauds. Get a group of your most creative colleagues together, peple who do also know a bit about your organisations processes and systems, and ask them to “think like a crook”. How would they extract money from your organisation? Where are the weak spots in your processes, checks and controls? Most organisations do still have such issues; so it is up to procurement (and finance) leaders to find them before the criminals do – and close those loopholes!

 Supply Management reported this week that retailer Marks and Spencer (M&S) is buying Gist, a logistics business.  Gist apparently do much of the food logistics work for M&S, but clearly all has not been well. M&S said its food supply chain “remains less efficient and, we believe, higher cost to serve than our competitors”.  Stuart Machin, the CEO, said “M&S has been tied to a higher cost legacy contract, limiting both our incentive to invest and our growth”. 

But it seems a rather strange move to buy the firm rather than perhaps;

  1. Negotiating a better deal with Gist so that performance and cost is more in line with that achieved by M&S’s competitors; and / or
  2. Finding alternative suppliers if Gist can’t or won’t meet those requirements.

I know that changing suppliers is not easy when it is clearly a large and strategically important contract. But it is not impossible.

Let’s dig into the transaction more deeply than Supply Management did. Gist is currently owned by Linde – the largest industrial gas company in the world.  But how did Linde end up as owners of a transport firm? According to Wikipedia,

“In 1969, the BOC Group acquired GL Baker, after it expressed interest in its use of liquid nitrogen in chilled containers. The company was renamed BOC Distribution Services in 1991, before being rebranded as Gist Limited ….  Gist was acquired by Linde as part of its 2006 acquisition of BOC.  Following the group’s merger with Praxair to form Linde plc, Gist continues to operate as a separate entity under Linde”.

Gist declared profits of £24.3M on 2020 revenues of £472M (2021 results are not yet published). The M&S website tells us that “M&S is acquiring the entire share capital of Gist for an initial consideration of £145m in cash. A further amount of £85m plus interest will be payable in cash from the proceeds of the intended onward disposal of freehold properties or, at the latest, on the third anniversary of completion”. 

Another £25M might be payable under certain conditions and somewhat confusingly, “M&S has the ability to retain the freehold properties should it wish to do so in which case the full amount of £110m plus interest will be payable.” So I assume the basic deal does not include the freeholds.  

The big question is how M&S got into this position in the first place. It is a pretty dramatic step to spend over £200M to get out of a logistics contract! I can’t think of a similar case. Going back to the original M&S strategy here, you can imagine why a firm might go for the “strategic partnership” option in this spend category, rather than either insourcing or using a more dynamic multiple-supplier strategy. “Playing the market” might give the buyer more competitive leverage when it comes to negotiation, but might have some less positive practical implications compared to a longer-term partnership.

But how on earth do you get into a  situation where you are apparently locked into “a higher cost legacy contract which expires in 2027”? The M&S announcement also says this.

“The Gist business being acquired generated a proforma EBITDA of c.£55m in the year ended December 2021, with the majority of profit reflecting management fees recharged to M&S under contractual arrangements, which will be eliminated upon consolidation to M&S”.

So “the majority” of Gist’s profits come from M&S.  You would think the firm would therefore be in a powerful position to re-negotiate this onerous contract?  But you can also see that Linde may not have had much interest in owning a non-core logistics business – perhaps they just said, “we’re not moving on the contract, but if you want to buy Gist, we’ll do you a good deal”.

And in the short-term, it does look like a pretty good deal, if you can pick up £55M EBITDA for £230M!  But the downsides of owning your own logistics firm need considering. Some analysts would consider it a distraction from the M&S core business – as a retailer of food,  clothing and homeware. What makes the top management think they can run a logistics business, and how much attention and time might it divert from that core business?  

Secondly, Gist may well find that other retailers do not want to use a firm owned by their retailing rival. It’s hard to see Tesco, Sainsburys or Waitrose rushing to Gist’s door.  Might M&S ownership cause an exodus of other customers, which could be an issue even if they aren’t as important as M&S itself?

I have no personal interests here, but I see this as a worrying sign. It must have been a pretty bad deal with Gist, or M&S was incapable of managing the contract to their own satisfaction.  Neither gives you much confidence in the firm’s commercial nous. I’d also worry about the distraction factor going forward. So unless M&S can explain better what they are up to, I’d put this down as a (potential) Bad Buying case study.

Having spent several years researching, writing and now promoting the Bad Buying book, I thought I’d heard pretty much everything in terms of public sector organisations finding ways of wasting taxpayers money through incompetent or corrupt procurement, investment and spending.

But there is always something new, and the case of Conservative-run Thurrock Council in Essex and their investments in bonds linked to solar power is unique and astonishing. You can read the full story here – it is great work by Gareth Davies of the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, supported on this story by the Daily Mail.

Thurrock has invested in solar farm businesses owned by an individual called Liam Kavanagh. Now I suspect most procurement professionals are inherently suspicious of people who haven’t been around for long, or whose businesses are only recently established, but who buy multiple fancy cars / fancy homes. In the case of Kavanagh, “his jetset lifestyle included the use of a private jet, a fleet of super-cars and a Hampshire farmhouse with a swimming pool, wine cellar, home cinema and steam and hot tub room”.

As the Mail reported; “Cash-strapped Thurrock Council in Essex borrowed £655million of public money – the equivalent of triple what it spends on services each year – to invest in 53 solar farms across the UK. It agreed a series of deals with globe-trotting businessman Liam Kavanagh, whose integrity was later questioned by a High Court judge over £5million his company banked in ‘commission’.”

And now there appears to be some £130 million of Thurrock’s money that has “disappeared”, with questions over even larger sums owed to the council. Kavanagh has liquidated companies that took money from Thurrock and has re-arranged his financial affairs, leaving the council with concerns over up to £200 million that it is owed. Incredibly, much of the investment was made by borrowing from other local authorities, who could be in trouble if Thurrock then default!

Davies reports this.  “In an interview at the time, Clark (Thurrock’s CFO) described a bizarre arrangement, involving dozens if not hundreds of short-term loans, many as short as a month in length, with the effect that the council was in a perpetual state of borrowing from one local authority to repay another. Piecing together data in obscure spreadsheets revealed Thurrock had borrowed from at least 150 other councils”.  Thurrock also borrowed some £350 million from a Treasury-run lending body.

Local authorities seem to be a hotbed for financial waste, incompetence and fraud. There are many questions still being asked about Croydon’s property “business” – that council went bust and Whitehall had to send in “commissioners” to run it. The same has happened in Slough – dodgy property investment there too.

Nottingham Council decided to get into the energy business and its “Robin Hood Energy” firm stole from the taxpayer to give to … well, tens of millions in losses disappeared anyway. Gloucester tried something similar and failed.  My own local council, Surrey Heath, invested some £120 million in buying commercial property just before the bottom dropped out of that market. The valuation is now more like £50 million.

So the problems cover councils run by Labour (Slough, Liverpool) and the Conservatives (Surrey Heath, Thurrock). It does often seem to be council officials who are the driving force behind reckless investments and spending, while the councillors are not informed or don’t have the intellect or power to intervene. In the case of Thurrock, Davies reported that officials kept elected councillors in the dark for months and have not given full access to the details (as well as blocking FOI requests and questions).

Whilst Davies has to be careful in his reporting – “While there is no suggestion that any rules were breached….” he says, we must wonder whether in some of these examples, corruption was involved, although it is hard to prove. Do external parties (suppliers, property developers etc.) say to their inside-the-council enabler “look, I can’t give you anything now, but in five years’ time when the heat has died down, there’s a million for you”.  

Anyway, if it is not corruption, then we are seeing far too many examples of gross incompetence from our councils. And it is costing taxpayers many, many millions.

A ”Ministerial Direction” sounds like a very dry and boring aspect of civil service bureaucracy, but that is far from the case. It happens when a government Minister in the UK (an elected politician) insists that their most senior civil servant (the “Perm Sec”) takes an action that the civil servant believes is against the principles of good value for the taxpayer.

Or, as the Institute of Government puts it, “Ministerial directions are formal instructions from ministers telling their department to proceed with a spending proposal, despite an objection from their permanent secretary”.

They are unusual; through the nineties and noughties, a couple a year was the average. There were more around the banking crisis, and we have seen a not unexpected flood of directions in recent months around Covid-related issues. But often, they are not really reflecting a genuine disagreement between the Minister and the mandarin. It is more that the spending can’t definitely be seen as good value, so the permanent secretary has to seek the direction to protect themselves, even if they are wholeheartedly in agreement with the Minister in terms of the actual action.

Much of the Covid spending in areas such as the furlough scheme for instance may prove to be poor value ultimately, and cannot be clearly justified upfront; but I suspect civil servants were right behind the Chancellor and fully supportive of the actions he took.

However, very occasionally you get a direction which reflects a real disagreement, where the Perm Sec is basically saying “I think this is a waste of money and I am doing it because you are forcing me to, you idiot”. Put in nicer words of course. And one such case came to light this week, relating to the UK investment in proposed purchase of OneWeb, a (bankrupt) start-up company whose ambition is to provide global broadband. $500m in equity investment is being considered to co-finance the purchase of OneWeb from US Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.

Perm Sec at the Business Department, Sam Beckett, says in her letter to Alok Sharma, the Minister, that while in one scenario “we could get a 20 per cent return, the central case is marginal and there are significant downside risks, including that venture capital investments of this sort can fail, with the consequence that all the value of the equity can be lost”.

There is more in terms of the issues, and Beckett does recognise that this could prove to be an opportunity for the UK, but she feels this would be an unusual investment for a public body, and you have to wonder why it would be attractive for the UK government if it is not to other more experienced investors!

Is this Bad Buying though? Well, you could argue that we won’t know that until we see if OneWeb succeeds or fails. But actually, good decision making is NOT really related to outcomes.  If I make the decision to stand out on the golf course in a thunderstorm with my umbrella up, and I stay dry and don’t get hit by lightning, that does not make it a good decision. It was a bad decision, because based on the facts available at the time it was made, it was the wrong choice (assuming that staying alive is high on my priority list).  You might argue it was successful in terms of outcome, but it wasn’t right at the key moment.

Sharma’s reply says that “I have been informed that even with substantial haircuts to OneWeb’s base case financial projections the investment would have a positive return”. But other experts have suggested that the chances of success here are pretty low. One attraction of the investment is to provide an alternative space system for GPS services to the EU’s Galileo system (the UK is leaving the EU of course). But some believe the OneWeb satellites are not fit for that purpose (follow the link for more techie debate!)

The Guardian talked to Dr Bleddyn Bowen, a space policy expert at the University of Leicester, who said “the fundamental starting point is, yes, we’ve bought the wrong satellites.” (This from Forbes is a pretty balanced view of the technology issues if you want to get into more detailed pros and cons).

That Bowen comment sounds like “getting the specification wrong”, which is literally chapter one in my new book, Bad Buying, out in October.  A good spec as any procurement professional knows is an essential starting point to a successful contract.  So, whilst I don’t understand all the aspects of this, it looks like this is the wrong decision based on risk and opportunity.

It may of course turn out to be a successful decision in terms of outcome – but that still won’t mean it was the right decision, if the facts at this stage suggest a high probability that the UK taxpayer will lose out. And on that basis, we nominate it indeed as an example of Bad Buying.