Tag Archive for: Fraud

Coming back to the Post Office Horizon scandal, last week at the long-running enquiry into the events, Fujitsu finally apologised and owned up to their contribution to the terrible events. The firm has now promised to make substantial contributions to the payments which should go to the affected sub-postmasters shortly, we hope.

As the BBC reported, “The boss of Fujitsu’s European arm says it has “clearly let society down, and the sub-postmasters down” for its role in the Post Office scandal.

Paul Patterson admitted there were “bugs, errors and defects” with the Horizon software “right from the very start”.  Mr Patterson also reiterated the firm’s apology for its part in the scandal.

Some of the Post Office staff involved in prosecuting the sub-postmasters came over at the enquiry as being both stupid and vindictive, enjoying their role as the “bad guys”. Clearly, the Post Office saw a role for nasty, vicious people in this case.

Then, in the Sunday Times today, Robert Colvile has written an excellent article about the history of the Horizon software. I was also surprised and pleased to find that he quoted from my book, Bad Buying, within his article. He reviewed the book (pretty positively) when it came out in 2020.  My quote is nothing to do with Horizon though – Colvile uses another story of mine to demonstrate general issues with contract management in the public sector.

But he makes a connection that I had missed (and I should have spotted). Horizon started with an ICL project, “Pathway”,  working with the then Department of Social Security back in the 1990s to automate benefits payment. I was actually Procurement Director at the DSS for part of the time this pretty lousy programme was running! But I had not realised it morphed into Horizon, and along the way the failing ICL got acquired by Fujitsu.  

When I joined the DSS, in 1995, I was not exactly welcomed by the people running that programme. I was struggling to get any traction with the programme leadership. So I asked my boss whether I should push harder to get involved. “Do you have plenty of other things to do”, he asked me. Yes, I replied, loads of stuff. “In that case, I think I would leave that programme alone”, he advised. He knew it was a dog and was saving me from failure by association.

That was when the Minister Peter Lilley stood up at the Tory Party conference and showed off the “benefits payment card”. It wasn’t real of course – there never was a working benefits payments card. His was mocked up in his hotel suite the night before by his aides, I was told.

I followed the Horizon case from the beginning and I thought I wrote about it on Spend Matters many years ago but I can’t find the article now, so maybe I just thought about covering the case. I do remember my internal debate about whether to include the story in my Bad Buying book, but it was complex, unfinished and subject to ongoing legal action, so I decided not to, unfortunately perhaps. Although I don’t think my book would have had any effect compared to the TV programme.

Let’s just hope now that the compensation gets sorted out quickly for those affected. And I’ll come back to another issue which Colvile comments on, the question of why Fujitsu has continued to win government contracts since the Horizon affair became public. That takes us into some interesting questions about public procurement regulations, so I’ll save that for another day.

This story from the Homeland Security Today website dates from a couple of months ago, but it is an interesting procurement fraud case, as it does not involve any internal participants – it is a purely supplier-based fraud. Whilst that is certainly far from unique, it is probably not as common as those driven by internal staff or through collusion between internal and external players.

In this case, Cory Collin Fitzgerald Sanders, age 39, of Hagerstown, Maryland, was sentenced to 45 months in federal prison, followed by three years of supervised release, for wire fraud, false claims, and making and using a false document in connection with his companies’ performance on federal contracts. He also had to pay around $200,000 in fines and restitution.

The offences related to his two telecoms firms between 2015 and 2020.  The charges were pretty wide ranging but generally related to contracts with federal agencies that required his firms, Sandtech or Cycorp Technologies, to provide new telecommunications equipment which was still under manufacturers’ warranty. 

He contracted to supply new equipment, but then actually provided second hand, or non-warranted equipment instead. He claimed to have accreditation from the OEMs (original manufacturers) that would protect his customers when in fact he didn’t. He also was not authorized to provide certain IT services to the federal government, but represented to government officials that he was. It sounds like he invoiced in a fraudulent manner too, getting the agencies to pay for “deficient or non-existent performance”.

“Mr. Sanders deserves to be held fully accountable for his actions to defraud the U.S. Government by routinely providing telecommunications equipment that did not meet contract specifications and submitting false documentation in an attempt to cover up his scheme,” said Special Agent in Charge Greg Gross. 

The US government does seem pretty hot on prosecuting dodgy suppliers, more so than I’ve seen generally in the UK, for instance. In this case, a prison sentence of 45 months again feels more severe than “white collar criminals” tend to get in the UK. That’s a good disincentive for others who might be tempted to commit fraud, of course.

So what can procurement people and others do to protect their organisations against this sort of fraud? There are a few potential risk mitigation steps.  Firstly, checking out the credentials of any new supplier (and their directors) is important. And take up references wherever possible. Maybe that would not have stopped Sanders – but it certainly makes it harder to create new firms for fraudulent purposes.

Another obvious point is that goods delivered, whatever they are, should be checked to make sure they align with what was contracted for. And don’t assume that any accreditations and certifications are genuine – documents and emails can be forged. It is better to go back to the source if you can  – you could go back down the supply chain and check with the OEM that a distributor really is properly accredited, for instance.

So the usual safeguards against procurement fraud come into play again – and you can get the full list of mitigating actions and plenty of good advice on avoiding fraud and corruption in the Bad Buying book of course!

The UK’s National Health Service has for years been a “good” source of Bad Buying fraud and corruption stories.  There are several reasons for that. Firstly, it is huge organisation, employing some 1.3 million people. Secondly, it actually has a pretty good counter-fraud unit, and when fraudsters are discovered, they are often prosecuted, so the news becomes public domain, whereas private sector firms often hush up embarrassing cases. But it has to be said – the cases I’ve seen over the years often also suggest that too many NHS organisations have very weak policies and processes around procurement and payments.

The latest case reported in the media recently saw Thomas Elrick, 56, jailed for 3 years and 8 months.  He was assistant managing director for planned and unscheduled care at Harrow Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) where he had the authority to approve invoices up to £50,000. That organisation is a purchaser rather than a direct provider of healthcare – so it buys services from providers on behalf of the local citizens. 

Elrick created a company, Tree of Andre Therapy Services Limited, using the name of his husband (who knew nothing about it) as the owner, and invoiced the Trust for services that were never provided. Between August 2018 and December 2020 he authorised payments totalling £564,484. To cover his tracks, he also sent an email from the account of his dead wife which claimed to show details of patients the firm had “treated”.

Elrick spent over £100,000 on holidays to Dubai, Hong Kong, the Maldives, Singapore and Switzerland, and also spent just under half a million on shopping, with Amazon, Apple and David Lloyd gyms. But eventually a smart colleague decided to look up the Care Quality Commission accreditation for this firm and found of course that it did not have one, and then the connection to Elrick was found.

There is an interesting angle here in terms of his response. In a statement after he was sentenced, Elrick said “I wish I could turn back the clock but I know that I cannot and I sincerely apologise…  I am not a bad person. I believe that I am fundamentally a good person who made bad decisions, for which I take sole responsibility.” 

Self-delusion is an amazing thing, isn’t it?  I stole half a million from the NHS but I am “fundamentally a good person”.  The mind of a fraudster is often interesting, I suspect.   

But we have to ask how on earth this fraud was possible?  In my Bad Buying book, I give seven key anti-fraud precautions every organisation should follow and this case study and organisation broke several of them. There was no check on the onboarding of a substantial new supplier, which had no trading record, no CCG listing and a conflict of interest in the ownership (although that might not have been easily spotted). There was no check apparently that services paid for were actually received; and of course most fundamentally one person could conduct the whole pseudo-procurement process and authorise payment of large invoices without anyone else being involved or approving the spend. “Separation of duties” and all that.

This was not a sophisticated fraud. It was enabled by an incredibly weak process that was wide open for exploitation by anyone with a modicum of intelligence (and a lack of morals).  Personally, I would fire the CFO and the Procurement Director at the Trust for allowing this money to be stolen so easily.  But this is the case in so many organisations and so often – basic precautions against fraud are simply not put in place. Is it ignorance, laziness, or maybe a management team that wants to leave the door open just in case they want to do something dodgy themselves? Who knows.

The US Government Department of Justice recently issued a news release.  

Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation has agreed to pay the United States $377,453,150 to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by improperly billing commercial and international costs to its government contracts. Booz Allen, which is headquartered in McLean, Virginia, provides a range of management, consulting, and engineering services to the Government, as well as commercial and international customers”.

I do love the precision of the final $150 on that number! Couldn’t they have rounded it slightly?

The accusation was that between 2011 and 2021, the consulting firm charged costs to its government contracts and subcontracts that should instead have been billed to its commercial and international contracts. That particularly applied to some indirect costs. So the government was allegedly paying for activities and services that had nothing to do with the work the firm was actually doing for government organisations.

Now allocating overheads can be a tricky issue, as many of us know. And Booz Allen issued a statement, as you might expect.

“Booz Allen has always believed it acted lawfully and responsibly. It decided to settle this civil inquiry for pragmatic business reasons to avoid the delay, uncertainty, and expense of protracted litigation. The company did not want to engage in what likely would have been a years-long court fight with its largest client, the U.S. government, on an immensely complex matter. The company fully cooperated with the government and is pleased to move forward.”

So there is no admitting liability or guilt here. I can understand why the firm does not want a long, expensive fight – on the other hand, if you were 100% sure of your position, many firms would choose to take it further rather than handing over quite such a large amount of cash.

The most amazing element of this story is this. The investigation was sparked by a whistleblower, a former Booz Allen employee, Sarah Feinberg, who tipped off the authorities about the alleged misconduct from 2011 to 2021. And now she will receive no less than $69,828,832 as a thanks (it’s that precision again…)  

$69.8 million!  Good grief, I’m going to have a good think now about every firm I’ve ever worked for and whether they might have done anything “naughty” in their dealings with the US government …  

The moral of thee story is simple. Check your billing from professional service firms. I once took on a senior interim commercial/procurement role in government with an organisation that had around 100 consultants from one firm working on its major programme. That was £500K A WEEK we were paying this firm (it better be nameless…)  

I took a look at the invoices – incredibly there was no contract manager for this contract – and found that amongst other things, we were being billed for the senior partner’s assistant. The partner was only working about a day a week on our project, but we appeared to be paying a grand a day, every day, for his PA. We were also billed for the whole day for the whole team when I knew they had stopped work at lunchtime for their office Christmas Party! “An unfortunate error” I was told.  I saved £50K with one phone call there…

Of course, if you can structure any professional services assignment on a fixed price basis, most of these issues are avoided. That approach is usually – although not always – better for the buyer and actually arguably for the provider too. That is another question in this Booz Allen example. Why was so much government work being done on what sounds like a pretty loose “time and materials” basis?

Programmes to support minority owned businesses, smaller firms, social enterprises and the like via public sector procurement have become increasingly popular over recent years in many countries. The Social Value Act in the UK in 2012 made this sort of action more prevalent in the UK, but the USA is probably where such schemes are longest established.

However, the irony is that the more successful such programmes are in terms of actually directing spend towards such suppliers, the greater the temptation for fraud and corruption to spring up. Genuine firms that need support might lose out to unscrupulous criminals and conmen/women.

One mechanism for that is basically using what we might call “non-value for money” evaluation criteria to award contracts to a supplier that doesn’t really deserve them. That can lead to distortion in the selection of winning bidders. “This firm’s bid wasn’t the cheapest but they are a small firm / owned by a women / promise to employ lots of disabled local people. That gave them lots of marks for “social value” in the bid evaluation”.  What isn’t made public is that the firm is also owned by the budget holder or decision maker’s sister-in-law.

The other quite common fraud is where a firm is apparently owned by a person or people who qualify as a “minority” but in fact, control rests with non-minority owners. We have seen that a lot in the USA and also in countries such as South Africa which have had schemes to give preference to black-owned businesses in public procurement.  I gave several examples of this in the Bad Buying book from both of those countries.

But this is still going on – a recent report in the Chicago Tribune highlighted a current case. It is not clear yet which of those two mechanisms is suspected here; is it disguised ownership or the use of minority programmes to favour a firm for improper reasons?  But federal prosecutors are “investigating possible minority-contracting fraud involving a series of Chicago government contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars, including many with ties to a clout-heavy trucking and recycling company owner, according to sources and documents obtained by the Tribune”.

James Bracken and his wide Kelly own several companies engaged in construction, waste management and transportation. Investigators have asked city agencies for copies of bid documents and more relating to several contracts and for information relating to the city’s women and minority owned “set aside” programmes.

The programmes started in 1990 with the aim of awarding at least 25% of the total value of all city contracts to minority businesses and 5% to women-owned operations. But there have been accusations of fraud from the beginning. Company owners, chasing multimillion-dollar contracts, have put up phony “frontpeople” to get certified as minority or women-owned. Another route is to claim that a high percentage of work will got to minority subcontractors. In my experience, that is the sort of claim that rarely gets checked once a contract is operational!

A lot of this comes down to procurement carrying out the appropriate due diligence and checking out firms at the bidding stage, managing contracts well once they are operational, and of course keeping an eye out for conflicts of interest and other potential drivers of corruption. It is a constant battle between the forces of good (procurement, usually) and evil (certain dodgy potential suppliers and general low-life scum!)

There are a number of very common procurement frauds; well covered of course in the Bad Buying book.  “Inside jobs” based around a corrupt employee take a number of forms but often consist of someone internal diverting spend to fake companies that they control or have a stake in, or to companies that are paying them a bribe. Fraud from outsiders often means submission of fake invoices, or diverting invoice payments away from genuine suppliers to the fraudster.  However, most frauds could be prevented by some sensible and standard policies and processes.   

So having collected examples of fraud and corruption in a fairly serious manner for over a decade now, it is rare for me to see a new variant. But a recent case in the US was quite unusual, in that it was based on buyer impersonation, which we don’t see very often. I’m sure it has happened before, but this was certainly not a common or garden case. Indeed, it was quite impressive in a way, with the fraudster showing impressive attention to detail, and a good understanding of how procurement works. And the failing was not actually with procurement policy or people; it was the suppliers who were conned and whose processes let them down.

Fatade Idowu Olamilekan,  a citizen of Nigeria, was extradited from Nigeria to the US (with good cooperation between the authorities in each county) and recently sentenced to five years in prison in the US in connection with a scheme to fraudulently obtain and attempt to obtain millions of dollars.

From 2018 to 2020 he obtained details of various procurement executives in the US government sector. In particular, during the pandemic, he impersonated the Chief Procurement Officer of New York State to fraudulently obtain medical equipment, including defibrillators.  He set up email addresses that were as close as possible to the correct ones for the relevant people and organisations. He then contacted suppliers, principally those already working with New York, and said he was looking for quotes for items.

After they submitted quotes, he told the suppliers that they had been successful and won the contract, and issued them with fake purchase orders (POs). The goods were to be delivered to warehouses that he nominated, and from there he shipped them to locations in the UK, Australia and Nigeria.  The payment terms on the POs was 30 days, which is pretty standard, so didn’t raise any alarms. But of course that gave him 30 days to move the goods somewhere else once they were delivered, before the supplier started looking for their money. Presumably, when their cash didn’t arrive, the supplying firm eventually got through to the real buyer, who would then explain that they knew nothing about this order.

All very clever, although getting goods rather than direct cash via a fraud leaves you with the problem of disposing of the stolen goods. Criminals rarely get anything like the real value of their ill-gotten gains (so the bloke in the pub trying to flog me a laptop said).  So that’s a downside of this type of activity. 

Whilst this wasn’t really a very hi-tech fraud, it does raise some interesting questions as we move into the AI world.  A single phone call from the supplier and conversation with a real procurement manager from New York would have put an end to this within minutes.  So as transactions and even sourcing processes become more and more automated, you can imagine a situation where a clever fraudster uses a fake AI bot to place orders, which will then be processed by the suppliers’ AI powered bots. How long would it be before the supplier bot realises it has been conned?

This is not something I’ve thought about too much, but as we enter the ChatGPT era, there’s going to be a whole new world of Bad Buying fraud and corruption to think about and look out for!

Not a Wetherspoons to be honest – the picture shows my favourite pub in the world, the Strugglers Inn in Lincoln

No matter how much we like to talk about sustainability, complex strategies and supplier relationship management, procurement has some basic elements that cannot and must not be forgotten.  A couple of recent cases act as a good reminder of that.

The first is a dispute between Wetherspoons, the leading UK pub chain with 843 branches, and AB InBev, the world’s largest brewer (they produce Budweiser, Beck’s, Stella, and also some beers that aren’t tasteless).  In November 2021, Wetherspoons agreed to make AB InBev their lead brewer (“preferred supplier”) of mass-market lager, replacing Heineken. ‘Spoons, as it is affectionately known, sells a good range of real ales and interesting cask beers but still offers the standard products too for the less discerning drinker.

But the dispute relates to disagreement over who is going to pay to install the T-bars (the branded fittings that include the keg beer taps) in all the Wetherspoons pubs. The argument has gone to the UK high court now, to decide which company should be responsible for carrying out the works needed to fulfil a contractual requirement for pubs to display a set number of AB InBev beers on their T-bars. Wetherspoon claims that both parties believed the brewer was responsible, in line with standard industry practice. AB InBev denies this, saying the work should be subject to a sperate agreement.   

For two such large and apparently professional firms to be arguing over this seems incredible really. Presumably there is a formal contract between them, and surely that would include a clear allocation of responsibility for costs associated with the change.  If that was not included in the contract, then that represents both Bad Buying and Bad Selling, I would argue.

So the first of today’s two key learning points is this. A contract must detail the responsibilities that each party is expected to meet in order to uphold the legal agreement.  Now in very large or complex contracts, there might be some minor details that don’t get captured up front, but in particular, any activities that have an associated cost must be clearly laid out. Otherwise, there is a high probability of arguments later, as Wetherspoons and AB InBev have discovered.  I know this seems obvious, and yet there they are, in the high court.

The second case is both serious and quite amusing. Metal traders at Stratton Metals sold 24 tonnes of nickel to a German customer recently. Nickel is a valuable metal, increasingly used in batteries for electric cars, so much in demand. It is sold as briquettes, packed into 2-Tonne sacks. But when the customer took delivery and opened the sacks, they discovered that half contained worthless stones rather than nickel!

This was highly embarrassing for the London Metal Exchange (LME), which facilitated the contract and is Europe’s only remaining “open outcry” trading floor – rather than sitting in front of computer screens, traders literally shout at each other to arrive at buying and selling prices. The LME also operates through a network of 464 warehouses around the world which hold metals in stock, although LME does not own or manage these facilities. The dubious sacks were in a Rotterdam warehouse.    

Nickel seems to be a bit of a favourite for dodgy dealings at the moment. Last month, Trafigura, the Singapore-based commodities firm, took a hit of $577 million to its accounts when it discovered a huge fraud involving missing cargoes of nickel – although it is not clear that is linked to this recent stones substitution.  Trafigura is taking court action against Prateek Gupta, an Indian metals tycoon, over the missing metal.

Anyway, we might draw two wider procurement lessons from this. The first is very simple. Always check that you have been supplied with what you have paid for. Actually, that is not too difficult when it comes to physical metals – it is considerably more difficult when it comes to complex services, for instance. But the principle and the risk for the buyer is the same. You said you would provide this, I contracted to pay on that basis, and you have delivered something else.

Secondly, the nickel case shows that trust is still an important part of doing business. Despite the comments above about the importance of a robust contract, even a good example will not always protect you against corrupt, criminal or fraudulent behaviour. Trust does matter; so if you have a supplier you can trust, remember that is worth quite a lot. Nobody wants to find stones instead of nickel in their warehouse, literally or metaphorically.

After a couple of weeks featuring the travails of the Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply, let us return to the day-to-day world of Bad Buying.

Looking through a list of recent procurement-related frauds, there were the usual “fake invoice” incidents, still probably the most common way to extract money from an organisation. In most cases, it is an insider driving that, setting up fake companies and signing off payments themselves, but sometimes there may be external help too.

But then I spotted an interesting example of a type of fraud that is rarely reported. It involves a firm (or individual) submitting false information to a buyer and winning a contract on the basis of that information.  Now we might ask whether it is unusual to see this because it rarely happens – or because the perpetrators just don’t get caught!

In this case, Raymond White (who has used several other names during his long and not particularly illustrious criminal career) defrauded the US government by “submitting fraudulent documents and false information about himself, his company’s business, and his company’s finances in order to obtain a $4.8 million contract to build a munitions load crew training facility at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland”.

He also obtained a bond guarantee from the United States Small Business Administration in connection with the same contract, and just for good measure, he committed identity theft by using another person’s signature and Social Security number (presumably to avoid using his own name, as he was a known criminal!)

For his company, Kochendorfer Group USA Inc., to bid for the contract he submitted fake bank statements, accounting firm reports from a “firm” he had invented, and false financial statements. They showed the firm had plenty of cash when really it had almost nothing.  We shouldn’t laugh but some of it borders on the absurd – he also submitted a “false resume and firm dossier, which described fictitious construction jobs and provided fake references.  White claimed, among other things, that he had overseen the construction of a World Cup soccer stadium in Brazil from 2012 to 2014 when in fact, he  was in federal prison during that time frame, serving a prison term on a prior fraud conviction”.

I mean, if you’re going to lie, you might as well go big – not a local housing development but a World Cup stadium! Anyway, he won the contract but fortunately, the client (the National Guard) discovered the fraud before any work actually took place. White pleaded guilty, not surprisingly, and he will be sentenced in May.

If you are reading this and thinking, “this couldn’t happen here”,  then presumably you always check financial statements and take up supplier references, whether that is talking to another customer of the firm involved or indeed an employer or client if it is an individual contractor. Well done. But it doesn’t always happen.

A few years ago, I advised a firm that was challenging a procurement decision made by a very large UK government central department. Basically, another bidder had told lies in their bid and had won the contract. That bidder had provided a reference that would have exposed a lie – IF the Department has taken up that reference. There were other aspects of the bid that were dodgy and would have been exposed if the buyer had made a call or two. For instance, the bidder claimed that they were strong in certain regions of the UK when they clearly weren’t

When my client challenged this, the Department had an interesting response. They said that they were not required by procurement regulations to pursue references, or indeed that they had any obligation to check that anything a bidder said in their proposal was accurate and true! Now technically that might be correct, but we suggested to the Department that a judge might well make the assumption that a reasonably competent buyer had a duty to do some basic work around bid veracity! The Department went away to think about it, no doubt consulted their lawyers… and then re-ran the competition.

Obviously, buyers don’t always have time to check out every single detail of a bid and all the surrounding information and intelligence about the potential suppliers. But we are responsible for at least assuring ourselves that when someone claims to have built a football stadium in Brazil, they actually did, rather than being in jail at that time.  

As we enter 2023, what do the prospects for Bad Buying look like? No doubt, we will continue to see regular procurement and contract related fraud and corruption. It will be greeted on discovery by the CFO explaining that “it was a very sophisticated fraud”. Usually, that is simply not true.  What the CFO (or CPO) means is “our processes were rubbish and wide open to criminal exploitation, but I can’t say that because you might question why I’m paid a six or seven figure salary to manage this shambolic process”.

Talking of fraud, the long-running controversy over PPE procurement in the UK will continue in 2023, with an announcement this week that the government is going to court over the supply of gowns from supplier PPE Medpro. One paragraph in the Guardian report on this leapt out at me.

“The legal claim states that the DHSC had paid PPE Medpro the full £122m for the 25m gowns by 28 August 2020. This was before any of the gowns had been inspected in the UK, and before all the gowns had arrived. Health officials rejected the gowns after a first inspection at the NHS depot in Daventry on 11 September 2020”.

I know the situation was desperate back in 2020, but to pay the full contracted amount before inspecting the product at all – it just seems incredible that any procurement professional would agree to that. Anyway, more to come on PPE this year, no doubt with more discussion of links to politicians, dodgy suppliers and billions of wasted money.

Moving on from PPE, the public sector (in every country) will continue to struggle with complex and technologically complex procurement in areas such as Defence and major IT programmes. We can hope that the UK Ministry of Defence sorts out the long-running Ajax armoured vehicle fiasco, another programme with potentially billions of pounds on the line.  The latest comments in December during a House of Lords debate seemed a little more positive but let’s wait and see. It’s not just the UK of course. Just before Christmas, we saw reports in the German press and on the Jane’s website about some of their army’s vehicles following a major training exercise.

Germany suspended procurement of the Puma infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) on 19 December after 18 of the vehicles broke down in an exercise preparing for their first assignment to the NATO Response Force Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in January, when Germany takes over command of the force”.

But the UK MOD seems to have issues with low tech procurement too. Recent reports suggest that the organisation still hasn’t got to grips with maintenance of military housing, a long-running example of Bad Buying on several counts. It started with a dreadful PFI programme that cost the taxpayer billions, and now the relatively new contract for looking after the homes is not delivering satisfactory outcomes for those who live there.  A contract management failure maybe?

Of course, it isn’t just the public sector that demonstrates Bad Buying, although the private sector is better at keeping failures hidden. I would argue that the professional services market (audit, consultancy, legal services) demonstrates a long-term failure of markets, procurement and buyers generally. Last month, the 100 Group, which represents the Finance Directors of some of the UK’s biggest firms, wrote to the “big four” audit firms to complain about rising fees. To which we might respond – well, you are the clients, why don’t you do something about it?

In truth, there is an oligopoly in the audit market. So the firms can get away with saying they are “investing in audit quality,” whilst in practice the extra revenue is channelled into paying their partners more and more each year – £1 million plus now in large firms. EY also increased the salaries of its junior accountants by 13% recently – nice for those people no doubt, but we all know that it is the clients who will pay for that generosity.

To some extent, legal service and strategy consulting has gone the same way – higher and higher salaries for firm’s partners in particular, whilst clients get exploited. Yet too many buyers are unwilling to use approaches that might mitigate cost increases, such as applying real competitive pressure, negotiating hard and skilfully, managing individual assignments more carefully, or looking at alternative suppliers to the top (and most expensive) firms.

Anyway, I’ll leave you with four thoughts for the New Year – maybe they could form the basis of some procurement new year resolutions for your organisation!

  • Check that you have everything in place to minimise the risk of fraud and corruption in your procurement activities. You can’t make it 100% criminal-proof, but you can make wrongdoing much more difficult by applying reasonably basic processes, systems and policies.
  • Competition is still the best mechanism invented to drive positive outcomes and outputs from suppliers and contracts. Use it well and widely.
  • Be a little cynical – well, maybe more than a little – about what suppliers promise you and the claims they make about their products and services, particularly in areas such as technology.
  • Organisations that are “good at procurement” don’t just focus on the skills and knowledge of their procurement teams – they understand that a wide range of people in the organisation need to understand their own role in the end-to-end process. They must also have the right commercial skills to play their part in procurement success.

I’ve read about a couple of procurement-related frauds in the media in recent days. They go to show that there is very little new in this game – both rely on tried and tested techniques, and both really would not have happened if some basic controls had been in place.

Accountant Jeffrey Bevan stole £1.7 million by making 50 fake payments to himself when he was payments manager for the accountant general of Bermuda (the islands equivalent of a finance minister). The payments were presumably disguised as going to “suppliers” and he spent the money on cars, multiple properties and gambling. He was sent to jail in 2018 but was back in court recently having been released, hence the news reports last week. A proceeds of crime hearing is trying to recover more of the stolen money from his pension, which Bevan claims is unfair.

This type of fraud is not unusual and there are several examples in the Bad Buying book. This case again shows that the perpetrator can be anyone, including senior managers, accountants, head teachers, NHS directors … In fact, it is generally more senior people who have the power to authorise payments, or to choose suppliers, so of course they are more likely to commit fraud.

But the mitigation of this risk is pretty straightforward. All payments (other than the very smallest) should be authorised by more than one person. Any new “supplier” must be checked out to make sure the organisation is genuine – and not owned by the person making the payment!  Bank details should be checked and again more than one person should be involved in authorising new payment details or changes to details. This is all common sense really, yet many organisations don’t follow the basic principles.

The second case featured a senior engineering manager for Coca-Cola Enterprises UK, Noel Corry (it actually hit the news a few months back but I missed it at the time). His role included identifying electrical contractors for bottling plants across the UK, but in some cases he handed out contracts to favoured suppliers where no actual work was ever undertaken.

He took more than £1.5 million in backhanders from the firms as well as getting season tickets for Manchester United. The judge didn’t send him to jail, saying he had suffered enough (my little joke there).  Actually, he was spared jail, which seems rather lucky, being given a suspended sentence. Two executives from the supplier side were also given similar sentences.

Corry ensured that work went to various companies including Boulting Group Ltd, Tritec Systems Ltd and Electron Systems Ltd in return for large sums of money paid directly or indirectly to him. The prosecuting QC said, “‘Mr Corry had the power to award general contracts directly or through a tender process. He would determine which work needed to be done and by whom…  Mr Corry would ensure that companies were awarded genuine CCE contracts at inflated rates or contracts were raised in their names for bogus work never intended to be completed. The companies would invoice and then be paid. The extra money generated created a slush fund held on behalf of Noel Corry”.

Again, we see a single individual with too much power to make decisions. In this case, the fraud involved awarding contracts as well as making dubious payments. But where was the procurement function in all this? Was there no check on why and how these firms won the work? And in terms of paying for work that was not even delivered, that comes back to having multiple sign-off on invoices, so someone could have asked what exactly had been done for the money being charged.

So do check that your organisation is not open to these or other basic procurement-related frauds. Get a group of your most creative colleagues together, peple who do also know a bit about your organisations processes and systems, and ask them to “think like a crook”. How would they extract money from your organisation? Where are the weak spots in your processes, checks and controls? Most organisations do still have such issues; so it is up to procurement (and finance) leaders to find them before the criminals do – and close those loopholes!