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Coldplay go Legal – Dodgy Specifications Involved!

In recent weeks, it feels like I have been writing about pretty serious topics here – HS2, social value, fraud, failures in local government procurement in the UK and the like. So a story I saw recently was attractive as a topic because it wasn’t a matter of life, death or wasted taxpayer money. It was however (allegedly) about a waste of multi-millionaire rock star money. It was also an illustration of a key point that is forgotten surprisgly often when we’re writing specifications and talking to suppliers.

The band Coldplay has gone through an interesting critical trajectory. The hip and trendy NME made A Rush of Blood to the Head album of the year in 2002; but over the years, many started seeing them as purveyors of somewhat dull, middle-aged music. I’ve always thought they were fine songwriters although recent material is a little MOR for my tastes. But what no-one can deny is the level of their success – over 100 million albums sold and still the 14th most listened to band on Spotify today.

For some 22 years, their manager was Dave Holmes. Little is known about him, but more is coming out now as he and the band are busily suing each other. He started legal action in the summer, claiming £10 million from Coldplay in commission on earnings that (he sasy) they have not paid him. But the counter-case from the band is looking for £14 million from him, saying that he has wasted millions of their money. 

And this is where it gets Bad Buying interesting. Much of the claim is around preparation for the huge global Music of the Spheres tour, for which Holmes held ultimate responsibility. By the way, that tour took $617.8 million in ticket sales alone. (Ever thought you are in the wrong business?)  The band claims that costs escalated  and say that equipment was not suitable or was bought at inflated prices. As the Times reported;

Examples in the claim are eye-watering. They include, “16 bespoke stage pylons” for lighting and video that, it allegedly soon became apparent, would be unjustifiably expensive to even use. However, it was too late — €10.6 million had already been chucked at the pylons.

A “visual project known as Jet Screen” was commissioned for $9.7 million, with a huge chunk of that cost, the band claim, personally authorised by Holmes. The problem was that … the dimensions given to the manufacturers for the Jet Screen were wrong — and it was too big. It was only used for ten concerts in Buenos Aires.

Yes, it’s another “Irish government printer” faulty specification story!  In the Bad Buying book, we have the case study of the Irish government buying a state of the art printing machine that simply did not physically fit into the building that was supposed to house it. That was a reminder that sometimes getting the specification right is not a matter of highly complex technology or difficult outcome-based definitions – it can be as basic as the physical measurements!

The Times draws a parallel with the classic Stonehenge scene in the best comedy film of all time, Spinal Tap, where the band commission a model to use on stage – and when it is delivered, it turns out to be tiny. But in this case, the Jet Screen was just too big.

Holmes is also accused of not opening “the shared online Dropbox which contained the designs for the Music of the Spheres Tour at any time between August 2020 and February 2022”.  Rock and roll madness right there! More interesting is his relationship with Live Nation, the promoters of the tour. Holmes had taken loans from Live Nation at what look like preferential terms and the band say he owed some £27.5 million when he was negotiating terms for the tour with the firm. This, say Coldplay, was an inherent conflict of interest, and if those facts are acccurate, that does have some validity in my opinion. It is an interesting situation without a doubt – I certainly wouldn’t want one of my procurement managers negotiating with a supplier if she owed them money.

So we’ll see what happens next. And just remember, if you’re buying anything in the equipment line, just make sure you know how big you really want it to be! Many elements of the specification may be much more complex in many situations, but let’s face it – size really does matter.

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Too Soon for 30% Weighting for Social Value in Tenders

I spoke recently at the UK Universities Procurement conference and as usual, had some interesting conversations around the margins of my session. In one such discussion, a sustainability person from a major university told me that his organisation was looking to increase the percentage of marks awarded to “social value” in tenders from 20% to 30%.  I must admit this surprised me, and I am certainly not in favour of this at the moment. It feels like we are heading for another new category of Bad Buying stories – where firms win tenders based mainly on their social value proposals rather than on their capability and the real “value” of their offering.

I have been consistently in favour of including social value in public procurement. But we haven’t been doing it for long, and I have not seen much analysis of exactly how successful it has been to date. So it seems too soon to be putting quite so much emphasis on that at the expense of cost, wider quality or service issues, supplier innovation and so on.  I would personally like to see 10-15% of the marks allocated to social value until we have more evidence.

One key concern is that organisations in my experience sometimes don’t really understand their own evaluation processes. My question to anyone thinking of moving to 30% is this. Given the evaluation methodology you are using, how much more are you prepared to pay for a proposal that scores 100% on social value creation as against one that scores 50%? Because that is what your evaluation scheme actually determines.

Some might say “ah, but social value has a real financial benefit too”.  In general, that is simply not true – certainly for the contracting authority itself. Read my article from a year ago here if you want more to support my claim). A quick extract – “In almost all cases, this is not real money. “Wooden dollars” as someone described it to me recently. It does not show up on the buyer’s P&L or balance sheet. You can’t spend these “financial” benefits on more road maintenance, a new operating theatre, or re-opening a drop-in centre for vulnerable people. No cash appears in the CFO’s hands.

The other big problem is that where there are benefits from social value, they often don’t go to the actual buyer. So if a university is accepting something like “employing more apprentices” as a positive social value factor, then how exactly does that benefit the university itself? Maybe it is good for society more generally, although big firms always employ apprentices so whether this is real incremental benefit from this contract is often questionable. We are also building in a barrier for smaller suppliers when we do this.

If we go down the 30% route, I can see some scandals emerging where contracting authorities end up paying way over the odds for goods or services, and their defence is “but the social value was great – look, the supplier painted a scout hut”. Yes, but was that worth the extra million you paid to a supplier who turned out to be not very good at the core work?  Look at the Scottish ferries fiasco if you want an example of what can happen when a basically incompetent supplier wins a contract for non-value for money reasons.

I don’t want to become an “anti-social value” campaigner, but I really don’t like the idea of 30% of evaluation marks going on social value until we understand a lot more about best practice and how we can get the most out of this initiative for the taxpayer. And we’re not there yet.

However, there is one more innovative option. You could specify a fixed price and then evaluate on service, social value and other factors. I have heard of this being done and it has some merits. So you might say “we are prepared to pay £500K for this service – now tell me how you will do it and what social value you will provide”. In that case, I’m open to a 30% weighting.

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Yet Again, a “Sophisticated” Fraud Hits the NHS

The UK’s National Health Service has for years been a “good” source of Bad Buying fraud and corruption stories.  There are several reasons for that. Firstly, it is huge organisation, employing some 1.3 million people. Secondly, it actually has a pretty good counter-fraud unit, and when fraudsters are discovered, they are often prosecuted, so the news becomes public domain, whereas private sector firms often hush up embarrassing cases. But it has to be said – the cases I’ve seen over the years often also suggest that too many NHS organisations have very weak policies and processes around procurement and payments.

The latest case reported in the media recently saw Thomas Elrick, 56, jailed for 3 years and 8 months.  He was assistant managing director for planned and unscheduled care at Harrow Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) where he had the authority to approve invoices up to £50,000. That organisation is a purchaser rather than a direct provider of healthcare – so it buys services from providers on behalf of the local citizens. 

Elrick created a company, Tree of Andre Therapy Services Limited, using the name of his husband (who knew nothing about it) as the owner, and invoiced the Trust for services that were never provided. Between August 2018 and December 2020 he authorised payments totalling £564,484. To cover his tracks, he also sent an email from the account of his dead wife which claimed to show details of patients the firm had “treated”.

Elrick spent over £100,000 on holidays to Dubai, Hong Kong, the Maldives, Singapore and Switzerland, and also spent just under half a million on shopping, with Amazon, Apple and David Lloyd gyms. But eventually a smart colleague decided to look up the Care Quality Commission accreditation for this firm and found of course that it did not have one, and then the connection to Elrick was found.

There is an interesting angle here in terms of his response. In a statement after he was sentenced, Elrick said “I wish I could turn back the clock but I know that I cannot and I sincerely apologise…  I am not a bad person. I believe that I am fundamentally a good person who made bad decisions, for which I take sole responsibility.” 

Self-delusion is an amazing thing, isn’t it?  I stole half a million from the NHS but I am “fundamentally a good person”.  The mind of a fraudster is often interesting, I suspect.   

But we have to ask how on earth this fraud was possible?  In my Bad Buying book, I give seven key anti-fraud precautions every organisation should follow and this case study and organisation broke several of them. There was no check on the onboarding of a substantial new supplier, which had no trading record, no CCG listing and a conflict of interest in the ownership (although that might not have been easily spotted). There was no check apparently that services paid for were actually received; and of course most fundamentally one person could conduct the whole pseudo-procurement process and authorise payment of large invoices without anyone else being involved or approving the spend. “Separation of duties” and all that.

This was not a sophisticated fraud. It was enabled by an incredibly weak process that was wide open for exploitation by anyone with a modicum of intelligence (and a lack of morals).  Personally, I would fire the CFO and the Procurement Director at the Trust for allowing this money to be stolen so easily.  But this is the case in so many organisations and so often – basic precautions against fraud are simply not put in place. Is it ignorance, laziness, or maybe a management team that wants to leave the door open just in case they want to do something dodgy themselves? Who knows.

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Asahi Centralises Procurement – Will It Work?

Japanese brewer Asahi is setting up a new global procurement operation in Singapore, according to the Food Navigator Asia website. The target is to save $100 million a year from 2024. The new CEO of the operation is Tomas Veit, who told the publication, “the key focus is currently on creating a strong and capable team to provide efficient and effective services”.

But the bigger issue is the internal dynamics in the firm. What worries me here is this statement from Atsushi Katsuki, President and CEO, quoted in the company’s press release.

“Asahi Global Procurement is the first functional organization of the Asahi Group to be integrated globally. We view this as an initiative to elevate our management to a new level and promote the advancement of overall management. We expect the consolidation of category management and sourcing functions on a global scale to not only create group synergies, but also contribute to solving various issues in the global environment and society, leading to the promotion of sustainable procurement.”

So procurement is the “guinea pig”,  the early adopter of a new corporate strategy of more centralisation. I understand why firms often see procurement in that way – it looks like an “easy” area to start the centralisation journey and show rapid savings. But any business school or CIPS course would suggest that procurement strategy must be aligned with corporate strategy. In cases like this, the corporate strategy isn’t changing, and countries or regions still have considerable autonomy. However, the procurement strategy is now mis-aligned, so it is an outlier or an experiment in effect.

That is not to say it cannot work. But Veit will have to be prepared for considerable push-back from those who hold power locally. They won’t just be concerned about losing some power to choose suppliers and make procurement decisions – they will see this as the thin end of the wedge, a wedge that could lead to much more significant power loss if procurement is successful.

There is also the supplier side to consider. Many years ago, I was trying to set up a Eruopean procurement capability for the Dun & Bradstreet Group (when it included about 10 different businesses). We spent a fortune on car hire, so that looked like a fairly easy quick win. I negotiated a great deal with Avis for all the major European countries, leveraging our spend across the continent. The senior European account director for Avis assured me she had given me the very best pricing.

After a few months, I asked our businesses if they were using the deal. No, said our Spanish operations. They weren’t. So which supplier were they using, I asked?  “Oh, we’re using Avis, we just get a better deal from the local operation”, they said. That taught me a good lesson – sometimes suppliers aren’t set up to implement global or regional deals. So that’s something for Asahi to consider.

There is also an interesting dilemma for the CPO. I am sure that there is significant value that a central function can bring. That includes areas such as developing skills across the function, potential harmonisation of systems and data, support in specialist areas such as commodity price forecasting, and of course developing strategic and long-term initiatives with the most important global suppliers. It is interesting that sustainability is mentioned explicitly in the press release above; that is certainly an area where I can see some strong potential actions and benefits.

However, the new central team might struggle to show direct “savings” arising from this type of work. Because of that, there may be a temptation to look for those apparently obvious quick win, leverage-based, price-focused savings – my car rental deal, for instance. And those projects can be exactly those that will run into local opposition.

My advice to Veit therefore would be to look for a few large potential quick wins in areas that are not too contentious. Major IT contracts perhaps – some global licence deals or a major deal with a hosting service? Or areas where you are not even asking people to change suppliers. A global set of route deals with Japan Airlines maybe? Then combine that with delivering longer-term value in terms of the longer-term imperatives. Work hard to get the local or regional barons on your side (they can get you fired if you don’t).  And remember that bigger deals aren’t always better deals.

But Veit does have one major advantage – several years’ experience already with the firm. That gives him a much higher chance of success than a CPO brought in from outside with what might turn out ot be a controversial mandate. We wish him luck and success. 

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UK Government Spend With Smaller Firms Declines

Without fanfare or comment, in the middle of the holiday season, the UK government recently published the data for spend with SMEs (small and medium enterprises) for 2021/22.  This covers central departments, and some associated bodies, although the definition of what is in and what is out is not always clear. The data is given as direct spend – money that goes straight to the small firms – and indirect, the spend that goes via larger firms that then use SMEs in their supply chain.

It is not unusual for it to take over a year from the end of the period in question before data is published. That is in part because it does take a while to gather the data, but I suspect the publication might have happened sooner if there had been a positive story to tell.

But the headline number was that SME percentage spend declined in 2021/22 compared to 2020/21.  The total was down from 26.9% to 26.5%, and the direct spend was down from 14.2% to 12.3%. That does not look good against the government target of 33% of spend.

Indirect spend was up by 1.4% but that was not enough to compensate for the drop in direct spend.  It looks like the main reason for the overall decline was a big drop in the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) SME spend year on year. I suspect that is the “PPE effect” – as we know, there was lots of PPE bought in 2020 and 2021 from smaller firms. They were often crooks, chancers and friends of ministers, but they were SMEs, nonetheless.

Until the pandemic, the DHSC spend was relatively small compared to MOD and Transport – the two “traditional” big spenders.  Most health spend was out in the Trusts so not captured in this data. But the huge amount of “central “ buying, on PPE but also track and trace and other projects, pushed up the significance of DHSC in the overall numbers.

In 2019/20, DHSC spend was just £3.1 billion against MOD’s £21.1 billion. But the figure shot up to £13.3B in 20/21 (MOD was £19.5B) and was still £11.5B in 21/22.  In 20/21, 23.3% of the DHSC total was direct SME spend, so that made the year look better, but by 21/22 that dropped to 14.2%, pulling down the whole percentage.

I’m going into some detail there because it does demonstrate how ridiculous looking at the overall number actually is. When one factor – PPE – in one Department can skew the whole data set, it is pretty useless. But let’s go back in time and look at how this target emerged.  

Supporting smaller firms was one of the first “social value” type issues government embraced. I worked in the Office of Government Commerce (part of Treasury, the UK finance ministry) as a consultant back in 2009 on the implementation of the 2008 Glover report – “Accelerating the SME economic engine: through transparent, simple and strategic procurement”.  (That link took some finding!)

But Sally Collier (OGC’s Policy director) and I didn’t really like the idea of targets for spend with SMEs for various reasons. One was the difficulty of setting sensible targets, which really needed to vary by department to be meaningful. We were interested in departments and buyers simply doing the right things, and therefore also worried that targets would mean effort going into the data, not the real action. But our advice was ignored and after the 2010 election a 25% target was set. 

It quickly emerged that 25% was unachievable. The Ministry of Defence and the Highways Agency (Transport) accounted for almost half of central government procurement spend and there was no way an SME was going to build a warship or the M25 motorway.  So the target was changed to an “aspiration”, a classic Francis Maude fudge, and then indirect spend was included to make it easier to hit the target.

But many of the first-tier suppliers to government have no idea really how much they spend with SMEs, so the data is pretty dodgy. Then the 25% target – which had never been achieved – was stupidly changed in 2015 to 33%, purely because the Cameron government wanted to say something positive for the “small business” lobby in their election manifesto.  And 33% is unachievable too, as we’ve seen, even including indirect spend.

The other issue is whether supporting SMEs is the right target today. We have become much more sophisticated in the 15 years since Glover and now most large private firms are interested in supporting diverse suppliers, not simply small firms.

So why not shift the focus to using government procurement to support charities and social enterprises, minority owned firms, innovative businesses, firms in deprived areas or those that employ lots of disabled people?  You don’t see Unilever or other admired private sector businesses defining some prospective suppliers as special just because they are small. Indeed, many SMEs are small because they want to be, or because they just aren’t very good.

But there has been good work in government over the years in terms of helping SMEs. For example, even back in 2009, MOD led some impressive initiatives to promote SMEs through their supply chain. But really, this element of public procurement policy is crying out for a refresh, a more nuanced set of objectives and – if we must have targets – something that is realistic and motivating, not a painful data collection exercise that is bound to end in failure.  

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How Competitive is UK Public Procurement?

A few weeks ago, the UK National Audit Ofice issued a report titled “Competition in public procurement – lessons learned”. 

Unlike most of that organisation’s reports, it wasn’t looking at a specific project within one Department, but rather looked across central government at how procurement “competition” is working to help “support efficiency, innovation and quality in public services”. As the NAO says, when competition is lacking or ineffective, other safeguards need to be pursued otherwise the end results can be negative for the taxpayer. 

But the overall findings given in the report do not paint a reassuring picture.

“Our review of competition in public procurement has found that government cannot show how well competition is working, and that the structures to encourage and support the use of competition are not all working as intended. Departments are unclear how to engage with the market before they let a contract, and do not consistently follow central guidance. For example, they routinely extend contracts rather than retendering them. The Cabinet Office provides guidance but does not take advantage of the data it collects to understand more about competition and gain further benefits”.

Extending contracts can be done for good reasons, but often it is just the lazy option. It may be happening more often because of a shortage of staff today but that is no excuse really. The need for some further analysis of this and action from Cabinet Office is even more pressing when you read this.

“Government procured 72% of its large contracts through frameworks in 2021-22 compared to 43% in 2018-19. Frameworks are designed for procuring common goods and services to allow departments to access economies of scale, but they are not always the way to achieve the best competition. Guidance produced by government states that where the goods or services are not common, a full procurement process should be undertaken.”

I found that genuinely shocking. I’m not surprised use of frameworks has risen, and used properly, they can be an excellent mechanism. However, to see that growth, almost a doubling of the number of contracts awarded in that manner over just 3 years, is quite shocking. It really does require some serious analysis as to why this has happened and what the consequences might be. NAO didn’t look at how often “direct awards” are made from frameworks unfortunately.  Those awards are obviously much more anti-competitive than running a proper “call-off competition” from a framework (although even that does of course shut out non-framework participants). 

The NAO makes some sensible recommendations, suggesting Cabinet Office should work with Departments to improve data and published information, drive better early market engagement and look more carefully at the frameworks issue. But there seems little doubt that competition in central government procurement has declined dramatically in recent years. If like me you believe that competition is THE most fundamental driver for value for money, as well as an essential element in the fight against fraud and corruption, that has to be worrying.

My feeling is that too many people, from politicians to senior budget holders to some commercial / procurement people themselves, are happy for frameworks to be used and contracts extended. That is both to save time and money on running procurement processes, and in many cases, so they can fundamentally choose which supplier they want to use and just put a veneer of governance around that. Occasionally that choice is driven by corruption , but usually it is people who genuinely think they are doing the right thing. But it is fundamentally anti-competitive.

There is no doubt that Gareth Rhys Williams, (government’s Chief Commercial Officer), Crown Commercial Services and the GCO have done some good work in terms of the “inputs” to government procurement. The focus on people and training, and the various impressive “playbooks” are evidence of this. But certainly from the outside, there is less evidence of the tangible outputs that have resulted from this work, other than somewhat  spurious “savings” numbers that are produced.

Indeed, on that note, the NAO says this in the recent report. “Government monitors savings from individual frameworks by comparing their prices to estimations of prices charged by suppliers outside the framework”.  That’s not exactly rigorous, is it? Particularly when the procurement process for one of the largest frameworks (the management consulting example I analysed here) was explicitly designed to allow the big firms to win a place without needing to submit particularly competitive pricing.  (I should say that I believe Simon Tse has done a great job running the operational arm of Crown Commercial Services in terms of meeting that organisation’s objectives in recent years. I might question some of those objectives however!)

But more competitive government supply markets surely must be a fundamental objective for government procurement. The NAO report suggests that it has not been achieved over recent years.

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HS2 Rail Programme Rated as “Undeliverable” by Government’s Own Experts

I’ve decided that I’m going to win the 100 metres sprint at next year’s Paris Olympics. I believe the benefits for the UK economy will be huge and I will inspire millions with my efforts. My wife has pointed out that my best time for the event was 13.8 seconds, recorded at Houghton School some years ago (many years ago to be honest). I need to beat that by some 4.5 seconds next year, but I am quietly confident.

However, in her annual report on my planned activities, Jane has had the temerity to rank my chances of success as “red”.  That red rating indicates that “successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable.” That means “there are major issues with project definition, schedule, budget, quality and/or benefits delivery, which at this stage do not appear to be manageable or resolvable”.

I am disgusted by this lack of positivity. My gold medal will lead to transformational benefits for generations to come, improving connections and helping grow the economy. And I have already spent billions on food supplements, very expensive training programmes and massages, so you wouldn’t want to waste that money, would you?

That is pretty much the situation with HS2, the high-speed rail programme that is going to link London with other cities in England. The latest report from the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA), which sits within the government’s Cabinet Office, has given the first two phases (1 and 2a) of the HS2 programme an unachievable “red” rating, defined as above.

There is no mention of HS2 anywhere in the report’s various narrative sections, despite the fact it is the biggest single programme in the UK in terms of cost.  In the table that list all 250+ projects, all it says next to the red rating is this. “A new railway connecting the country’s biggest cities and economic regions enabling rebalancing and regional growth in the Midlands Engine and Northern Powerhouse – through a high capacity, high speed and low carbon transport solution”.

And the Department for Transport’s response is also pretty much as above.

“Spades are already in the ground on HS2, with 350 construction sites, over £20bn invested to date and supporting over 28,500 jobs. We remain committed to delivering HS2 in the most cost-effective way for taxpayers. HS2 will bring transformational benefits for generations to come, improving connections and helping grow the economy”.

That really is treating us as idiots. No attempt to actually respond to the undeliverability issues, or explain how “red” will turn to amber and green, just that they’re committed to it and we’ve spent a sh** load of money already, so hey, let’s spend another £50 billion or so. At least.  

Clearly, all those supposedly super-clever people in Treasury and Department of Transport have never heard of the sunk cost fallacy. Well, of course they have heard of it but this is politics. Civil servants just have to do what their masters tell them, but you can be sure HS2 will be disappearing from a lot of senior peoples’ cvs on LinkedIn in a few years’ time. This is just a terrible, disgraceful and ridiculous waste of public money, from the beginning when the business case was manipulated to appear positive, and my daughter’s generation will be asking questions for years to come about just how we allowed this to happen.

William Hague in The Times agreed.

“If I were still in government, I would be climbing the walls about this. I would want to stop all work on HS2 today, but I know I would be told that the contracts signed for its construction make that impossible. I would want to fire somebody senior, but I would be informed that the chief executive of HS2 Ltd already quit last month so that satisfaction would be denied me.

Then I would say that if we can’t cancel it we should at least make sure that the bits that haven’t been abandoned will work well, but I would be told that the cost of making it start in Euston has doubled recently, that no one could decide how many platforms they wanted to build, that this crucial part is currently unaffordable and that the transformational, high-speed connection of Birmingham to central London might not even reach the latter. And then I would want to scream”.

Indeed, the IPA report is generally disappointing. It is full of case studies of successful projects and programmes (244 now in the portfolio), with little or no discussion on the problems. And I’m not sure how the rapid charging fund for EVs can be seen as a success when you read this. Most of the case studies have a few initial issues but are turned round thanks to the IPA to deliver success.  It reads in the main like a marketing document from a consulting firm. (I actually wonder whether privatisation is on the cards?)  I suppose we shouldn’t be surprised, at the end of the day, the IPA is not truly independent, it is part of government, so it does have to toe the party line.

It is also noticeable that so many projects are rated amber – no less than 80%. That can be a bit of a cop-out rating really. It says there are issues, but nothing too much to worry about. I think when the IPA or its predecessor first started, there were amber/red and amber/green ratings too, but I suspect that put too many projects into the (at least partially) red bracket, which is embarrassing for the government. But really having 80% of the projects ranked at the same level reduces the usefulness for any external scrutiny.  

Anyway, in the couple of hours it has taken me to write this, another £4 million or so has been spent on HS2. What a waste.

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Always Check Those Invoices!

The US Government Department of Justice recently issued a news release.  

“Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation has agreed to pay the United States $377,453,150 to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by improperly billing commercial and international costs to its government contracts. Booz Allen, which is headquartered in McLean, Virginia, provides a range of management, consulting, and engineering services to the Government, as well as commercial and international customers”.

I do love the precision of the final $150 on that number! Couldn’t they have rounded it slightly?

The accusation was that between 2011 and 2021, the consulting firm charged costs to its government contracts and subcontracts that should instead have been billed to its commercial and international contracts. That particularly applied to some indirect costs. So the government was allegedly paying for activities and services that had nothing to do with the work the firm was actually doing for government organisations.

Now allocating overheads can be a tricky issue, as many of us know. And Booz Allen issued a statement, as you might expect.

“Booz Allen has always believed it acted lawfully and responsibly. It decided to settle this civil inquiry for pragmatic business reasons to avoid the delay, uncertainty, and expense of protracted litigation. The company did not want to engage in what likely would have been a years-long court fight with its largest client, the U.S. government, on an immensely complex matter. The company fully cooperated with the government and is pleased to move forward.”

So there is no admitting liability or guilt here. I can understand why the firm does not want a long, expensive fight – on the other hand, if you were 100% sure of your position, many firms would choose to take it further rather than handing over quite such a large amount of cash.

The most amazing element of this story is this. The investigation was sparked by a whistleblower, a former Booz Allen employee, Sarah Feinberg, who tipped off the authorities about the alleged misconduct from 2011 to 2021. And now she will receive no less than $69,828,832 as a thanks (it’s that precision again…)  

$69.8 million!  Good grief, I’m going to have a good think now about every firm I’ve ever worked for and whether they might have done anything “naughty” in their dealings with the US government …  

The moral of thee story is simple. Check your billing from professional service firms. I once took on a senior interim commercial/procurement role in government with an organisation that had around 100 consultants from one firm working on its major programme. That was £500K A WEEK we were paying this firm (it better be nameless…)  

I took a look at the invoices – incredibly there was no contract manager for this contract – and found that amongst other things, we were being billed for the senior partner’s assistant. The partner was only working about a day a week on our project, but we appeared to be paying a grand a day, every day, for his PA. We were also billed for the whole day for the whole team when I knew they had stopped work at lunchtime for their office Christmas Party! “An unfortunate error” I was told.  I saved £50K with one phone call there…

Of course, if you can structure any professional services assignment on a fixed price basis, most of these issues are avoided. That approach is usually – although not always – better for the buyer and actually arguably for the provider too. That is another question in this Booz Allen example. Why was so much government work being done on what sounds like a pretty loose “time and materials” basis?

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Support to Disadvantaged Suppliers Attracts Fraudsters

Programmes to support minority owned businesses, smaller firms, social enterprises and the like via public sector procurement have become increasingly popular over recent years in many countries. The Social Value Act in the UK in 2012 made this sort of action more prevalent in the UK, but the USA is probably where such schemes are longest established.

However, the irony is that the more successful such programmes are in terms of actually directing spend towards such suppliers, the greater the temptation for fraud and corruption to spring up. Genuine firms that need support might lose out to unscrupulous criminals and conmen/women.

One mechanism for that is basically using what we might call “non-value for money” evaluation criteria to award contracts to a supplier that doesn’t really deserve them. That can lead to distortion in the selection of winning bidders. “This firm’s bid wasn’t the cheapest but they are a small firm / owned by a women / promise to employ lots of disabled local people. That gave them lots of marks for “social value” in the bid evaluation”.  What isn’t made public is that the firm is also owned by the budget holder or decision maker’s sister-in-law.

The other quite common fraud is where a firm is apparently owned by a person or people who qualify as a “minority” but in fact, control rests with non-minority owners. We have seen that a lot in the USA and also in countries such as South Africa which have had schemes to give preference to black-owned businesses in public procurement.  I gave several examples of this in the Bad Buying book from both of those countries.

But this is still going on – a recent report in the Chicago Tribune highlighted a current case. It is not clear yet which of those two mechanisms is suspected here; is it disguised ownership or the use of minority programmes to favour a firm for improper reasons?  But federal prosecutors are “investigating possible minority-contracting fraud involving a series of Chicago government contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars, including many with ties to a clout-heavy trucking and recycling company owner, according to sources and documents obtained by the Tribune”.

James Bracken and his wide Kelly own several companies engaged in construction, waste management and transportation. Investigators have asked city agencies for copies of bid documents and more relating to several contracts and for information relating to the city’s women and minority owned “set aside” programmes.

The programmes started in 1990 with the aim of awarding at least 25% of the total value of all city contracts to minority businesses and 5% to women-owned operations. But there have been accusations of fraud from the beginning. Company owners, chasing multimillion-dollar contracts, have put up phony “frontpeople” to get certified as minority or women-owned. Another route is to claim that a high percentage of work will got to minority subcontractors. In my experience, that is the sort of claim that rarely gets checked once a contract is operational!

A lot of this comes down to procurement carrying out the appropriate due diligence and checking out firms at the bidding stage, managing contracts well once they are operational, and of course keeping an eye out for conflicts of interest and other potential drivers of corruption. It is a constant battle between the forces of good (procurement, usually) and evil (certain dodgy potential suppliers and general low-life scum!)

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2022 – How Was It For You, CIPS?

The Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply (CIPS) has had a troubled couple of years. We saw major arguments about changes to governance, then implementation of a new Oracle technology platform to manage membership, exam bookings, events – pretty much everything really – has been a disaster. The CEO, Malcolm Harrison, left at the end of March in circumstances that weren’t altogether happy, I understand. The Institute did manage to publish its accounts on time, and you can now examine the document on the Charities Commission website here. They run up to October 31st, 2022, so we’re already two-thirds of the way though the subsequent financial year.

The headlines – CIPS Group turnover in FY22 was £30.2 million with net income of £2.4 million before investments and pension scheme movements. The turnover was below budget expectations, but still represents an increase 11% above FY21, and operating profit was above budget despite the revenue shortfall. Reserves were down on plan but not dangerously low.  

There are a number of wider points of interest in the report. I liked the focus on volunteers; I don’t think I have ever seen information provided before on number of volunteers, where they are and so on. The report is pretty honest about the problems caused by the system failure; there is talk of staff having to go above and beyond to keep the show on the road, workarounds and more.  But the report makes this claim.

“A programme is now in place to resolve the issues with the platform and to remove all workarounds. However the impacts have been significant with membership, exam bookings, revenue and profits all being negatively impacted.”  But clearly the issues were not resolved by the end of March when Harrison went – I’m not convinced all is sorted even now in July.   

But there is no simple number provided in terms of what the programme has cost or what more it might still cost to get the platform up and running.  However, there is a table that gives figures for “Intangible Fixed Assets. “Assets under development” stood at £4.9 million in November 21 and a further £2.6 million was spent in 2022. The assets under development were “brought into use” during 2022 – if all of this was the new platform, that means some £7.5 million had been spent by November 22.

Maybe some of this was other development though, but it is not clear. I was told a while ago that the budget was in the £5-6 million area so this would represent a major overspend by last November, with more since then. We’ll have to see what the number is in this year’s accounts, and maybe next year’s too! But it seems quite possible that CIPS will end up spending the best part of £10 million.

There have been other impacts too driven by these problems. MCIPS membership is down some 700 on the year, and the blame for that is put at the door of the system. Examinations revenue was up, although there was also mention of system issues there, so maybe it should have been even better. Some of the impact is not really financial but still matters. Talking to a Fellow the other day, it is clear that the issues have made even organising basic events much more difficult. The Fellows group has been one of the success stories of recent years; it would be a shame if it lost momentum simply because of a technical issue.

Looking at those membership numbers, and where revenue comes from, I think it is fair to say that CIPS is no longer primarily a membership organisation. Its two “core businesses” are student education and examinations; and corporate training and development. In terms of the latter, CIPS does not say how much of that revenue comes now from NGOs, governments and charities who provide grants to CIPS to help develop procurement in the developing world. The Bill Gates Foundation is mentioned, and the work in the health system in Africa sounds very worthwhile. Such revenue is not reliable year after year of course, but my feeling is once you get a decent reputation, there are a lot of funds out there for delivering these “good works”.

But 17,000 MCIPS members means membership fee revenue of around £4 million, only some 13% of total revenues. And it is hard to see that growing much, to be honest. As I’ve said before, so much of what used to be the CIPS membership proposition is now replicated by other organisations, from Procurious to the Sustainable Procurement Pledge, by tech and consulting firms or even by individual “influencers” in the profession, who together provide a huge among of insight, IP, networking opportunities and more – free of charge. Why pay CIPS if that is what you value?

So – wild idea – maybe CIPS should make membership free?

You would still need to do the exams or go through a rigorous non-examination route to get your MCIPS, but the “affiliate” status could be developed further for those who don’t want that. And just think how much more the CIPS membership list would be “worth” if it was five times the size it is now!  CIPS also needs to get better at working with software firms, consultancies etc – there is a lot more potential revenue there if CIPS gets its act together. But an expanded membership list would be a huge benefit.  And the credibility CIPS has in terms of winning corporate work or NGO and charity funded projects would also be far greater with more members.

The alternative is for MCIPS numbers to stagnate at best, and the organisation becomes that training and education body as I suggested earlier, with more and more focus on Africa and the Middle East  in the main.  But there are issues with the overseas approach too; the US was a disaster last year, losing over £230K after revenues fell and costs rose quite dramatically.  I’m also not totally sure about the ethics of doing so much work in Saudi Arabia. I guess our government and our football clubs don’t worry too much about that so there is no reason why CIPS should. 

In summary; CIPS had a difficult year, but to be clear, it is not about to go bust. However, the new system has cost millions more than planned and has caused other problems. Some of the overseas operations also look problematical. There is a new Chair and a new CEO (who has solid IT and procurement experience but has never run a business or a P&L before) just getting their feet under the table.  Core membership is static or declining, but education and training activities are going pretty well, with grant funded work in particular showing a lot of potential.

I gave up my membership last year after the governance shambles – but I wish the Institute well and hope 2023 proves a better year than 2022. I suspect some innovative thinking is necessary though.

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