In many countries, the UK included, there is still a lot of admiration for German business and industry. The common view is that the German economy and the nation’s way of doing business generally is focused on organisation, efficiency and competence – and generally succeeds in terms of the results.  

That might seem to be a bit of a myth however,  if you read the story of Brandenburg airport, which featured as a major case study in the Bad Buying book. Years late and billions over budget, the story included dreadful programme management, terrible specifications for the airport and its internal fittings (such as escalators that weren’t long enough to reach the next floor…) as well as substantial fraud and corruption.

Now a recent report into the German military, the Bundeswehr, from Eva Högl, the parliamentary armed forces commissioner, suggests that that sector is also home to quite a range of shocking “bad buying” stories of bureaucratic incompetence and general failure. Högl says that the Bundeswehr needs 300 million to modernise properly and that at current rates of progress, it will take 50 years.

Högl is an ex-politician and travelled to 70 German military sites around the world and interviewed over 2300 people, so this wasn’t a quick management consultancy review. The Times reported that her findings included some almost unbelievable examples. A military hospital had no internet connection, so sensitive medical devices had to monitored manually. A microbiological laboratory was still using a dot matrix printer and an ancient refrigerator. The standard uniforms – introduced decades ago – are susceptible to “cold and damp”, which sort of negates the whole point of clothing, really!

Troops often had to buy their own equipment, and IT staff at one site waited months for computers. The bureaucracy is not just around procurement though – a sergeant in HR waited 3 years for a routine check on him to be caried out, during which time he was not allowed to access the HR systems or visit his own workplace unaccompanied!

We’ve featured plenty of stories about wasted money in the UK Ministry of Defence (and indeed the Bad Buying book has examples from that sector in several other countries ). But most of the stories related to major capital programmes; the Ajax armoured car, or the new aircraft carriers. An exception is the long-running and sorry tale of the army’s residential property estate.  However, the German report seems to suggest that the issues run across and through pretty much every aspect of  general management, including but not limited to procurement. 

Why is the situation so bad? Germany must have huge expertise in terms of management, including procurement and supply chain – you only have to look at their successful industries such as automotive and industrial equipment to see this. Why isn’t this translating into a professionally run military?

This isn’t just something to worry the people of Germany, of course. The country is a major contributor to NATO efforts, and that has been brought into the spotlight since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Germany spent some 1.44% of its GDP on defence last year,  less than the UK or France and well below NATO’s 2% target. That spend in Germany surely must be increased if western Europe faces a long-term stand-off (or worse) with Russia. But just as the UK’s Treasury (finance ministry) is wary of pumping more money into the Ministry of Defence until it shows it knows how to buy expensive military hardware better, we might assume that there are similar worries in Germany. No-one wants to throw money at an organization that does not appear to know how to run itself properly and efficiently.

In all the controversy over Gary Lineker, I missed another football-related story last week when it first broke. Barcelona, the legendary Spanish football club, are in trouble.  Following a tax investigation into Jose Maria Enriquez Negreira – a former vice-president of Spain’s referees’ committee – and a company he owns, it turns out Barca paid 8.4 m euros (£7.4 million) between 2001 and 2018 to Negreira and his firm.

That half a million a year was supposedly for consulting services. The explanation is that Negreira was advising Barcelona on how their players should behave around different referees. Barcelona say that his firm, Dasnil 95, which it described as “an external technical consultant”, was engaged to compile video reports related to professional referees “with the aim of complementing the information required by the coaching staff”. It added that contracting the reports was “a habitual practice among professional clubs”.

Well, we haven’t seen too many other clubs as yet admitting that they did follow the same practice, so Barca may well be in trouble.  And even if that was as far as it went, it doesn’t look good, as the club was trying to gain what most would consider to be an unfair advantage. But of course there is speculation that the payments were even more “corrupt” than that, being made with the intent to buy favourable treatment from referees for the club.  It doesn’t help that the contracts with Dasnil 95 were verbal and the lack of formal records suggests the parties were not keen on transparency!

As the BBC reported, a Barcelona court heard “that Barca, former club officials and Negreira had been indicted for “corruption”, “breach of trust” and “false business records”. These lawsuits, brought by the Barcelona public prosecutor’s office, target the club, as well as former presidents Josep Maria Bartomeu and Sandro Rosell”.

Whatever the outcome of this case, it highlights an important point that is highly relevant to all of us when it comes to corruption and inappropriate corporate behaviour. It is not just the direct intent behind the action that matters; how it looks and is perceived by others is also important.

I may be absolutely certain that my decision making about a current procurement decision is fair and unbiased. I can swear on my life that I have no preference as to which of the short-listed bidders win. But if colleagues see me having dinner at the £250-quid-a-head Fat Duck with the sales director of one of those firms … maybe we were discussing matters totally unrelated to the current competition, but how does it look? It looks bad, and that is Barcelona’s problem here. Their actions look really, really bad.

I checked on the Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply’s Code of Conduct, and was pleased to see this. Members should; “ Avoid any private or professional activity that would create a conflict of interest or the appearance of impropriety…”

The key word there is “appearance.”  Just telling me that of course you are honest and decent is not enough; if something would not look right, then don’t do it.  

But of course, there are difficult and grey areas. I have in my dim and distant past accepted corporate hospitality from some suppliers. I justified it as – for instance – an opportunity to meet a supplier’s CEO, who I might not get to see in the normal course of business as a medium-sized customer. I played in a Virgin Airlines golf day once when I was trying to use Virgin as a lever to get a better deal from BA, who did not want to negotiate.  I wanted to speak to Richard Branson directly and thought the golf was my best chance.  However, he seemed much more interested in talking to his lovely stewardesses who were there as hosts, rather than mingling with the customers, and I played really badly too. Served me right…

Some organisations have imposed very tight ethical rules in terms of behaviour with suppliers, which is admirable but maybe can go too far at times. I do think that if I’m visiting a supplier’s factory or offices, and they offer me lunch in their cafeteria or a sandwich at the local pub, I’m not going to get hung up on who pays for that.

I remember visiting a packaging factory in Belgium (the trip paid for by my own employer) and being given a little ashtray as a thanks for coming so far to see the firm. It featured a picture of the factory, and was made by the local pottery, so it would have seemed silly and ungrateful to refuse it, even though I have never smoked a single cigarette in my life. It raised 50p at the charity shop later… But at least those policies that are absolutely crystal clear about hospitality, gifts and so on have the benefit that no transgressor can claim they didn’t understand the rules.

Anyway, I think Barcelona are in trouble here unless they can show that paying for that sort of service really is commonplace amongst other clubs.  And in our own lives, it is worth remembering that if it looks wrong, sounds wrong, or feels wrong… then it almost certainly is wrong.

So, the UK’s biggest case of Bad Buying for decades has hit the news again. The high-speed rail link (HS2) between London and “the north” is being delayed. The programme will slow down to spread the cost over a longer period. The line to Manchester will not open until at least 2043 and the new London terminal will also be delayed. So passengers travelling south will end their journey by being dumped in a siding near Willesden Junction*. Well, what a surprise.

The delays also kick the can down the road beyond the next election, so the government can continue making vague statements about levelling up and supporting growth in the north rather than just admitting they messed up. This is all stacking up to be a monumental waste of over £100 billion of our money.

I don’t claim amazing clairvoyant powers but since the beginning of the HS2 fiasco, I have predicted that it would cost far more than planned and would probably never be completed. I think it was on Twitter some years back that I got involved in an argument with a keen “train guy” who rubbished my claim that the eventual cost would be over £100 billion. And the business case was always dodgy – based on strange assumptions about how people use their time – but it became even more ridiculous once the working from home movement picked up steam during Covid. Back in September 2020 I wrote an article  – here is an excerpt.

“Construction of the HS2 high-speed railway network in England started formally last week. Some will be cheering – not me. At a time when working patterns have been changed because of Covid, perhaps for ever, and everyone is getting used to Zoom, Teams and the like, it seems crazy to be building new rail capacity so businesspeople can go to meetings. Other possibilities such as autonomous road vehicles make also make this very much a 20th century option.


HS2 is basically a job creation scheme, but an incredibly expensive one. The projected cost was initially £1-36 billion, but we’re now looking at £106 billion, incredibly.  The National Audit Office (NAO) report in January said this in summary. “In not fully and openly recognising the programme’s risks from the outset, the Department and HS2 Ltd have not adequately managed the risks to value for money”.

At the end of 2021, the eastern leg to Leeds got cancelled, and even the government had to admit that the business case was awful. As The Times said, “HS2 has long since ceased to be a project based on anything resembling a sound business case. The most recent business case published by the government, in June last year, awarded HS2 a benefit-cost ratio of 0.9. In simple terms, it will cost more to build than the advantages it bestows”.

Inflation is being quoted as one of the drivers for the delay – but ironically, delaying will only increase the cost further because of that very factor.  It is only the sunk cost fallacy that drives even the London-Birmingham leg to completion, and the political embarrassment if it were halted, after not just the money squandered but the impact on the countryside and wildlife through the construction to date.

In the meantime, much of the north of England suffers from dreadful public transport. A fraction of the HS2 budget could have made a real difference to local train and bus services, improving for instance the trans-Pennine routes which have been in a state of virtual collapse in the last few years.

The Times called for a “brisk inquiry into who got the country into this mess. Politicians, senior civil servants and the executives who have ridden the HS2 gravy train should be called to account”.  I’d also like to see a real analysis of why construction costs appear to be so much higher in the UK than elsewhere. There may be some genuine reasons – geographical, for instance – but I suspect there are other more addressable problems around the procurement process, risk appetite, the role of consultants and more. It would be good (but probably optimistic) to think that something could be learnt out of this disaster.

* Joke. Well, I think it is…

After a couple of weeks featuring the travails of the Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply, let us return to the day-to-day world of Bad Buying.

Looking through a list of recent procurement-related frauds, there were the usual “fake invoice” incidents, still probably the most common way to extract money from an organisation. In most cases, it is an insider driving that, setting up fake companies and signing off payments themselves, but sometimes there may be external help too.

But then I spotted an interesting example of a type of fraud that is rarely reported. It involves a firm (or individual) submitting false information to a buyer and winning a contract on the basis of that information.  Now we might ask whether it is unusual to see this because it rarely happens – or because the perpetrators just don’t get caught!

In this case, Raymond White (who has used several other names during his long and not particularly illustrious criminal career) defrauded the US government by “submitting fraudulent documents and false information about himself, his company’s business, and his company’s finances in order to obtain a $4.8 million contract to build a munitions load crew training facility at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland”.

He also obtained a bond guarantee from the United States Small Business Administration in connection with the same contract, and just for good measure, he committed identity theft by using another person’s signature and Social Security number (presumably to avoid using his own name, as he was a known criminal!)

For his company, Kochendorfer Group USA Inc., to bid for the contract he submitted fake bank statements, accounting firm reports from a “firm” he had invented, and false financial statements. They showed the firm had plenty of cash when really it had almost nothing.  We shouldn’t laugh but some of it borders on the absurd – he also submitted a “false resume and firm dossier, which described fictitious construction jobs and provided fake references.  White claimed, among other things, that he had overseen the construction of a World Cup soccer stadium in Brazil from 2012 to 2014 when in fact, he  was in federal prison during that time frame, serving a prison term on a prior fraud conviction”.

I mean, if you’re going to lie, you might as well go big – not a local housing development but a World Cup stadium! Anyway, he won the contract but fortunately, the client (the National Guard) discovered the fraud before any work actually took place. White pleaded guilty, not surprisingly, and he will be sentenced in May.

If you are reading this and thinking, “this couldn’t happen here”,  then presumably you always check financial statements and take up supplier references, whether that is talking to another customer of the firm involved or indeed an employer or client if it is an individual contractor. Well done. But it doesn’t always happen.

A few years ago, I advised a firm that was challenging a procurement decision made by a very large UK government central department. Basically, another bidder had told lies in their bid and had won the contract. That bidder had provided a reference that would have exposed a lie – IF the Department has taken up that reference. There were other aspects of the bid that were dodgy and would have been exposed if the buyer had made a call or two. For instance, the bidder claimed that they were strong in certain regions of the UK when they clearly weren’t

When my client challenged this, the Department had an interesting response. They said that they were not required by procurement regulations to pursue references, or indeed that they had any obligation to check that anything a bidder said in their proposal was accurate and true! Now technically that might be correct, but we suggested to the Department that a judge might well make the assumption that a reasonably competent buyer had a duty to do some basic work around bid veracity! The Department went away to think about it, no doubt consulted their lawyers… and then re-ran the competition.

Obviously, buyers don’t always have time to check out every single detail of a bid and all the surrounding information and intelligence about the potential suppliers. But we are responsible for at least assuring ourselves that when someone claims to have built a football stadium in Brazil, they actually did, rather than being in jail at that time.  

In part 1 of this discussion, we talked about the issues CIPS (the Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply) has faced in implementing its new systems. Moving away from the CIPS specifics now, here are some lessons related to this field, based on both personal experience and wider research.

  1. Nothing wrong with Oracle software, but small clients (and CIPS are small in the greater scheme of things for a firm like Oracle) sometimes struggle to get the attention that a Unilever, Barclays or Toyota might receive as customers of any software giant. In many sectors, including procurement software (which is not what CIPS has bought, I should say), I’ve always felt there is a lot to be said for smaller organisations choosing smaller suppliers.  
  2. Optimism bias is often an issue too. Suppliers are almost always likely to tell you that “yes, our product can do this” and “yes, it can be up and running in six months, no problem”. They might not be lying – but they omit to mention the conditionality. “Yes our product can do this as long as the data is in this format…” Or “yes, six months is feasible – as long as a, b, c, and d all apply…”  
  3. My understanding is that CIPS went for the “big bang” approach with the Oracle software. An alternative might have been to look at different aspects of the requirement – the student and exam booking element, core membership management, conferences and events, etc – and perhaps gone for a staged approach, with a more “best of breed with good inter-operability” approach to the software products chosen too. Whilst this might have looked somewhat more expensive and less rapid in theory, incremental approaches do tend to de-risk programmes like this.  
  4. The US example in Bad Buying mentioned in part 1 was undoubtedly made more complex by the involvement of several parties. I do understand why Oracle “don’t do implementation”, but immediately you have potential for dilution of responsibility when another party or parties are involved. Most senior buy-side people tell me they would always prefer “one backside to kick”, if you pardon the language. It’s not always possible, but having real clarity about who is responsible and accountable for what on the vendor side is vital. That’s true not just in technology, I should say, but in many other areas including construction, outsourcing projects, etc.  
  5. The Enigen statement (see part 1) is interesting in its mention of “evolving and additional requirements”. The very first chapter of Bad Buying is all about getting the specifications right. It’s the first chapter because it is the most fundamental cause of failure – if you get the spec wrong, nothing else matters. For complex technology projects, and that includes something like the Army’s disastrous Ajax armoured car programme as well as digital tech, changing specifications once work is underway will almost always cause problems. In terms of a software project, a client that starts saying, “oh, could we have that functionality as well please, sorry, forgot to mention it earlier…” is asking for trouble. Suppliers like to say “yes” of course, but not only can it lead to delays, it muddies the water in terms of accountability.  
  6. Software implementation that involves a systems transition – rather than a totally new system / functionality – is often difficult because problems with (for instance) transferring data don’t always come to light until you’re well into the project. It is easy to say that thorough due diligence before choosing a supplier or starting the programme is the answer, and of course that is important. But sometimes issues do emerge from the woodwork (or from the silicon, we should say) only once you are actually pressing that “go live” button!  is It is often a sensible move to look at cleansing data, perhaps using a real specialist in this area, as part of the pre-contract award market engagement process and planning.  
  7. On the client side, effective programme management is absolutely key. One would hope CIPS recognised that, but there might be questions now about factors such as the programme manager, governance, reporting, stakeholder and risk management. Now you can have a brilliant programme manager and still end up with a failed programme, but I’d hope the CIPS Board would be insisting on a detailed review of what has happened (if they haven’t done that already).  
  8. Expanding on that point, clients MUST understand they are reputationally, contractually and commercially on the hook for leading the implementation. You can’t just hand this off to software providers, SIs (systems integrators) or consultants. Programmes must have the right level of senior people involved and fully engaged from programme inception, and involved in governance of the project throughout. A lack of appropriate senior input is the root cause of many implementation disasters – leaders must ensure early decisions are made and do not get missed. Small issues can fester into multi-million pound disputes  requiring un-picking, and causing cost, delays and disruption.  

In November 2021, CIPS net assets (excluding the defined benefit pension fund notional surplus) were about £6 million. The accounts up to November 2022 should be out in the next couple of months – it will be interesting to see if the systems issues have visibly affected the financial position. For the sake of next year’s membership fee inflation, I hope not!