Tag Archive for: Public sector

It is a while since I wrote about the UK’s infinite rail transport money pit, also known as HS2. When I first started criticising it years ago, based on my view that the business case was a con (having seen many dodgy public sector business cases over the years and even having helped write a few), I got some comments on Twitter and LinkedIn saying it would all be a great success and I was being ridiculous when I predicted it would cost over £100 billion. I did think it might get completed for that much, I should say.

Anyway, a couple of weeks ago, two retired CPOs and I went for a 10 mile stroll in the Chilterns in a persistent drizzle. But I saw a badger close up for the first time in 40 years!  I also saw rather a lot of the HS2 works as our route crossed that swathe of land twice. The second time, we had to divert a few hundred yards and use a road bridge going over the works.

But as we approached the first crossing, our path was diverted for a few hundred yards, and then we were directed to a gatepost with high wire all around it. This was the HS2 works, all fenced off of course. At the gate, we were greeted by a chap in high-vis gear.  He nodded and said something into his walkie-talkie. We saw another chap a couple of hundred yards away, at the top of a slope, who presumably checked that no high-speed bulldozers were heading our way over the hill.

Hi-Vis 2 then gave Hi-Vis 1 permission to let us cross. We walked about 100 years across the site, mainly across rough gravel roadway, to another gate manned by Hi-Vis 3. He opened his gate and ushered us into a passage way about 2 metres wide with 3 metre high wire fencing each side. We followed this for another couple of hundred yards, before meeting Hi-Vis 4, who opened another gate which led into more wire-edged walkway.  We asked him how many people he’d seen that morning. “Just you three,” he said. It was noon by now.

So four people employed as far as we could see just to help walkers get across 100 yards of construction site.  Were those posts manned 24 hours a day, we wondered? If each guy is paid lets say £30K a year, the construction firm no doubt charges the tax payer at least twice that. So on a single shift, that’s a quarter of a million a year. If there is 24 hour cover, we’re talking a million a year.

Surely there must be better options. A simple crossing with some warning lights maybe?  Or just one person as an escort? I know it is a cliché but this felt like “health and safety gone mad”.  When we look at the relative costs of capital investment sin the UK, we wonder why it costs us so much more than other European countries, let alone China, India and so on.

Well, this sort of approach partly explains things. And I come back to one of my original fears about HS2. Who actually had a vested interest in getting the best possible value for money? Not the civil servants in Whitehall and the executives running the HS2 company,  who get promoted and bigger salaries if they “control” a bigger budget. Not the hordes of consultants and advisers to HS2, whose fees look more reasonable if the construction firms charge more. And certainly not the first-tier suppliers themselves.

In the greater HS2 scheme of things, four poor guys standing around doing absolutely nothing for hours, days, weeks on end (mind-numbingly boring work, by the way) just doesn’t matter. And that sums up some of the problems with the whole scheme.

I commented recently on the major UK political parties’ manifestos in terms of their procurement ideas, and literally thousands of readers – well, one or two – said “so what would you do then, smart-ar**?”

So here we go.

A Public Procurement Manifesto from the Peter Smith Party

The UK public sector spends over £300 billion a year with third party suppliers – although different definitions of “third-party spend” give somewhat different numbers.  That is £6,000 for every adult in the country, every year. Suppliers are also central to every aspect of public services, from provision of tanks and ships for our country’s defence to medical and social care, from administering benefits to building schools or roads.

So the first priority here must always be to obtain excellent value for money for the taxpayer  – buying the most appropriate goods and services to support effective management of all the country’s public organisations.

Unfortunately, the Conservative government has been responsible for some of the biggest fiascos and wastes of public money that we have even seen, such as HS2, the PPE scandal, Ajax armoured cars that literally deafened the troops inside them, awarding contracts to ferry companies that did not have any ships, or the Carillion disaster, which jeopardized numerous NHS projects.  

Much (but not all) of this has been down to political failings, but procurement officials must play their part too if we are to improve the situation. There have been some positive developments in recent years in terms of procurement capability, in central government in particular, but we need to see more focus on spreading that capability across local government, the NHS, education, police and all government bodies.

Procurement related fraud and corruption has also increased under the Tories’ watch. In 2022 Britain slumped to its lowest-ever international ranking in the independent Transparency International’s global Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). There needs to be more focus on transparency and competition – the first of those is addressed somewhat in the new Procurement Act, the second imperative is not.

And value for money is about a lot more than “getting a good deal”, or finding the lowest possible price for an item. Public procurement and the way it is carried out is relevant to many different goals, from fighting against corruption to supporting exciting new businesses.

So I will address this be delivering on key themes in terms of how this massive amount of public money is spent every year.  I have 3 key goals for public procurement. As well as delivering on the core value for money promise, we will use these billions of taxpayers’ money  to:

  1. Drive economic growth for the UK
  2. Release cash to invest in better services
  3. Fight against corruption and fraud

Let’s look at the broad objectives my party will pursue under each of those headings.  

1. Drive economic growth for the UK – we will:

  • Encourage and provide early opportunities for innovative young UK businesses.
  • Introduce a programme to identify and support “critical national industries”, including how they can be helped through public procurement.
  • Drive carbon reduction with a stronger approach to public sector supplier requirements.
  • Use government procurement and spend to support charities, CICs, social enterprises, SMEs and minority owned businesses, and make “social value” more relevant locally.

2. Release cash to invest in services – we will:

  • Drive more competition for contracts, with potential to save billions (as the NAO has independently identified).
  • Reduce spend on consultancy services by 50% (including managing risk of “leakage”).
  • Identify and take action where public sector suppliers are making clearly excessive margins.
  • Conduct a thorough review of major capital programmes, particularly HS2, to identify the failings of last decade and the way forward. 
  • Introduce a sceptical “NAO type review” process BEFORE major programmes are started.
  • We will hold an open competition titled “how do we sort out defence competition”? The best response will win £100,000 and a seat on the MOD main Board.

3. Fight against corruption and fraud – we will:

  • Investigate the PPE contracting process.
  • Appoint a “Procurement Ombudsperson” to improve relationships between suppliers and government buyers and to handle complaints, whistleblowing, etc.
  • Introduce stronger safeguards against conflicts of interest.

If you really want further detail… here we go

  1. Drive economic growth for the UK

Encourage and provide early opportunities for innovative young UK businesses

We will launch an innovation programme that gives start-ups the opportunity to “pitch” their offering to government, with the promise that they will be awarded some sort of contract if they are amongst the “winners”. That should be possible under the new UK procurement legislation if handled properly.  The programme would be supported by publicity and promotional opportunities for the participating firms.

Programme to identify and support “critical national industries” including through procurement

The pandemic identified goods and services that really should have some domestic providers within the supply landscape. Proper analysis needs to take place to determine critical areas of weakness, which could range from PPE to complex electronic components. Appropriate actions can then follow, which might take the form of grants, targeted procurement with a UK focus or even government-backed start-ups.

Drive carbon reduction with a stronger approach to public sector supplier requirements

Firms bidding to win large government contracts already have to provide carbon reduction plans. But they only have to show a plan with achievement of a 2050 target – a long way away. So an intermediate (2035?) target should be introduced and the current threshold for this applying reduced to bring more contracts and firms into the policy.

Support charities, CICs, social enterprises, SMEs and minority owned businesses

The long-standing SME spend target simply has not worked. Indeed, it is a classic example of the many Tory policies that were both badly designed, and then not implemented properly. We will replace that with a much more carefully constructed programme and KPIs that focus on a wider range of “deserving cases” in terms of suppliers; businesses with a social purpose, minority owned firms, social enterprises and charities – as well as smaller firms, particularly innovative start-ups. But we will not lose sight of the value for money issue, so  “social value” weighting will be capped at 15% in procurement exercises, at least until proper academic research analyses performance to date of this initiative.

2.         Release cash to invest in services

Drive more competition for contracts, with potential to save billions (as per NAO report)

Competition for major government contracts has decreased under the Tory government. Lack of competition means the taxpayer gets worse deals from suppliers and is also an indicator of corruption. There have been too many examples of contracts being given “to your mates” in recent years – if there is no competitive process, this often suggests some nepotism or favouritism even if we are not looking at outright fraud.

Competition also drives suppliers to give government the best deal. The National Audit Office (NAO) in a July 2023 report showed that 72% of large contracts were bought through frameworks (which restrict or eliminate competition) in 2021-22 compared to 43% in 2018-19. NAO estimates that lack of competition has cost the taxpayer £4 – £7.7 billion per year. So our new policies will drive government bodies into using proper competition in all but the most unusual situations. Use of frameworks and of collaborative buying organisations, including Crown Commercial Services, will be reduced, by legislation if necessary.  Single-supplier frameworks will be banned and non-competitive call-offs controlled more actively, with disciplinary action for transgressors.  

Reduce spend on consultancy services by 50% (including managing risk of “leakage”)

Consultancy spend has risen dramatically in recent years. Some of that is down to lack of skills in the public sector, some is because of the unhealthily close relationship between the big firms, Ministers and senior civil and public servants. Much tighter rules on consultancy frameworks will be introduced and the CCS framework re-tendered with a proper focus on value this time around. 

Labour and the Conservatives have announced that spend will be reduced by 50% through tighter controls on expenditure. But there will need to be close management of “leakage” – consulting spend must not be re-classified as “interim staff” or “managed services” – if that is to succeed. That is what happened when the Tories tried to implement a similar policy in 2010, a policy that initially had some success but quickly dissipated.  

Identify and take action where public sector suppliers are making clearly excessive margins

There is nothing wrong with good suppliers making decent profits from supplying the public sector. However, there comes a point where excessive profit margins indicate a “failed market” and action needs to be taken. For instance, one firm that supplies software to the NHS – and the NHS is virtually its only customer – made £45 million profit last year on a turnover of £70 million, a margin of over 50%. Coincidentally the same firm has become a huge donor to the Conservatives.  That cannot be right on several counts. Such examples will be identified and targeted negotiations will take place to reduce margins to reasonable level and free up cash for spending on key services.

Review of major programmes particularly HS2 to identify failings of last decade and way forward

This is a very important step towards making sure the UK spends public money wisely.  We cannot make progress with the capital investment the country needs if we do not spend the money needed wisely and effectively. We will also publish the review into the Nuclear Decommissioning Agency  procurement fiasco with Bechtel that cost the taxpayer over £100 million. It has been supressed for five years now.

Introduce a sceptical “NAO type review” process BEFORE major programmes are started.

The National Aduit Office does great work in explaining why billions of pounds have been wasted. The problem is that it’s too late by then to do anything, and the lessons learnt become lessons forgotten very quickly. We will introduce an independent, transparent review process (by NAO or equivalent body) to examine all programme plans before money starts to be spent. We will introduce legislation so that government cannot commit to initiatives before they have been validated.

We will hold an open competition titled, “How do we sort out defence procurement”? The best response will win £100,000 and a seat on the MOD main Board.

Frankly, I do not know how to sort out defence procurement. Perhaps someone out there does.

3.         Fight against corruption and fraud

Investigation into PPE contracting process

Labour has announced this and we agree – it is a necessary investigation into the many billions of public money was wasted on PPE during the pandemic. We need to identify the reasons behind this huge loss to the public purse, identify where corruption played its part and look to recover money wherever possible from crooked and incompetent suppliers.

Appointment of “procurement Ombudsperson” to handle complaints, whistleblowing, etc.

Countries such as Canada have appointed an ombudsman whose role is to act as a neutral and independent arbitrator that helps resolve contracting disputes between businesses and government bodies.  Such a role can help improve the competence of procurement but also acts as a bulwark against corruption and fraud in public procurement.

Conflicts of interest

We have seen a worrying growth in “conflicts of interest” affecting public procurement during the Tory government. That is not just friends of Ministers being awarded PPE contracts; it covers MPs and Ministers getting too close to government suppliers and taking up lucrative roles whilst they are in office or immediately on their departure. The same applies to senior public and civil servants, and MOD is probably the major area of concern where conflicts of interest are endemic and ongoing. But other areas such as senior tech roles in the NHS are of increasing concern. We cannot have a situation where the best route for a supplier to win contracts is to quietly promise senior decision-makers in the public sector jobs later if they favour the firms now. That is happening too regularly today.

Vote Peter Smith!

June 2024

The BBC ran a story this week about the UK’s spend on PPE during the pandemic. I was contacted by the journalist, Jon Ironmonger, and did a video interview at the BBC, although I believe it has only appeared (a short excerpt anyway) on a BBC East programme, which I haven’t seen! The report centred on Full Support Healthcare, who are based in Wellingborough in that region.

But there were articles on the main BBC website, quoting my remarks. The journalist actually wanted me to be balanced and give an “expert” perspective on what happened with PPE procurement.  I tried to explain the problems when demand for anything suddenly rockets, but I was critical of a number of aspects of the programme, all of which I have written about over the years since 2020.

One continuing mystery is why the initial forecast of demand turned out to be so far out – about twice what in retrospect would have been reasonable. That was what triggered the “panic buying” in May 2020, so arguably it was the single biggest cause of the subsequent disastrous waste of money (over £10 billion).  The forecast led to some incorrect specifications being issued in haste, use of very strange suppliers (not all of whom were properly vetted, despite the re-writing of history that some politicians have attempted), the lack of anything much in the way of cost / price analysis or negotiation with suppliers, and the infamous “VIP Lane” for suppliers with a contact in government.  

The latest article from Ironmonger focuses on the stock management aspect. It appears that some £1.4 billion of aprons, masks and googles just from Full Support have been incinerated, recycled or written off. A general rule of thumb is that around twice as much PPE was contracted for as was needed, as it turned out. So given the total bought from that firm was £1.8 billion, it is not clear why such a high percentage of their product has been wasted.

The Department of Health and Social Care disputes that loss number, saying some money has been recouped by recycling, but the Department basically refused to engage with Ironmonger while he pursued this story, ignoring his requests, and has failed to provide clear evidence of what has happened to stock or financial details.

Full Support was an established supplier of PPE before the pandemic, unlike many of the cowboys who got in on the game once panic set in. Sarah Stoute of the firm told the BBC the shipping containers that transported her company’s PPE were unloaded “various times up to 207 days post-arrival”. She said the masks were “perishable goods and required to be kept cool and dry” and “not intended to be stored for a prolonged period in a shipping container, yard or field”.

The port of Felixstowe became jammed with PPE containers in November 2020, and they were moved to various airfields, other ports and available land. After some stock was sold off to other dodgy people for disposal, it was found dumped on a site in a New Forest.

Here is is one of the many articles I have written on this topic. This one gives a good summary of what I still feel are the key issues or questions around what happened. It’s right that we remember the desperate situation that faced us back in early 2020, and both users and buyers of PPE were in a particular crisis situation. But I still wonder if we have really learnt lessons from what certainly wasn’t one of UK public procurement’s finest hours.

Yes, as we’re into the UK election campaign now, articles for the next few weeks may well have a political theme I’m afraid.

Alex Burghart has been in his role for 18 months, which given the turnover in the “UK Minister for Public Procurement” role over the previous few years is a positive. He is a teacher and academic by background, with a PhD in History, who then became a political adviser. So no business experience, but a clever guy, clearly. He spoke at the Procurex National event in Liverpool last month, and his speech is now up on the Cabinet Office website. So first of all, let’s give him credit for showing up and also to Procurex for getting him to attend. Let’s have a look at some of his comments on the new UK public procurement regulations, due to come in to force in October, with my comments on various of his remarks.

“And at the heart of this is ensuring more transparency than ever before, so that we’re spending taxpayers’ money in a way that can be properly scrutinised”.

Rather oddly, that is about all he says in terms of transparency, which is actually one of the biggest changes in the Regulations, with a host of new requirements for buyers. I’m in favour of more transparency but I do worry about the workload burden for already stretched organisations.

A new duty will require any contracting authority to consider SMEs, to take account of their unique challenges, and we have introduced 30-day payment terms on a broader range of contracts, in response to what SMEs asked us to do”.

“Consider” SMEs does not of course mean using them. I’ve written many times before about the daft SME target for government spend and indeed I do not really see why we support SMEs rather than social enterprises, minority owned firms, local firms, innovative start-ups… The answer is political of course.  So we’ll see whether the Act has any impact on public procurement SME spend – I have my doubts.

“We’re also creating a new central digital platform for suppliers to register and store their details, so that they can be used for multiple bids, and enable them to see all the opportunities in one place”.

Yes, good idea, Sally Collier and I proposed this in 2009 when I was working in government. But given the track record of government developing new platforms, I’ve got my fingers crossed for this one.

“It puts a requirement on public bodies to provide feedback on bids, giving you greater consistency of feedback, helping you shape your next bid”.

This is one of a couple of rather odd or misleading statements from Burghart. There has been a requirement to provide feedback for as long as I can remember and indeed, there are some concerns that the new requirements may lead to less useful feedback. But we’ll have to see how that pans out. Not new or radical though in any sense.

“We are making value for money a core part of our process – ensuring that all contracting authorities must place value for money at the forefront of all procurement activities”.

So what were we basing our procurement decisions on up to now? It seems odd, particularly for a party that has been in charge for 14 years, to suggest that public procurement hasn’t been based on value for money up to now!  But it has, this is just nonsense, unless I’m missing something.

But, perhaps most importantly, we are also going to create a register, accessible to all public sector organisations, that will list suppliers who must – or may – be excluded from contracts.

This is clearly NOT the most important aspect of the new regulations. (I would say that the flexibility to design new procurement processes, which he didn’t really mention, and the transparency rules are the most important).  It is to be welcomed, but benefits will be limited and the proof will be in the implementation. I will be amazed if there are more than a handful – literally – of suppliers on this list by the end of 2025, let’s say. It is well-meaning but will prove very difficult to implement.

A new National Security Unit for procurement in the Cabinet Office will review suppliers for potential risk to our national security in a way never achieved before. It will also conduct investigations and make debarment recommendations to Ministers alongside the Procurement Review Unit, which will do the same for other exclusion grounds.

That sounds good but again let’s see if it actually has any real effect.

Not a bad speech then, all in all, but assuming there isn’t a miracle on July 4th, the Tories will be blaming Labour for “not implementing the new regulations properly” if it all proves to be a disappointment. Burghart has what looks like a very safe seat, even with the predicted swings, so he may well still be around to comment anyway. Indeed, he might be Leader of the Opposition the way things are going.

As we’re into the election period in the UK, the Labour Party is promising capital investment (in roads for instance) but saying that much of the money will apparently come from the private sector. This has brought back memories of the previous “Private Finance Initiative”, which was actually invented by the conservatives under John Major in the early 1990s but was enthusiastically embraced by Labour after 1997 when Tony Blair won the election.

I was procurement director at the Department for Work and Pensions for two and a half years, 1995-7, serving when Labour came into power, and was involved in some large PFI projects, including new construction programmes and some IT initiatives. Then in the noughties, I was consulting in government and held a couple of interim commercial director posts where PFI or similar initiatives were relevant too, including the ID Card programme.

So speaking from the inside, I can say that there were a number of positive aspects to PFI, despite later criticism. Having a single entity responsible for the financing, construction and then maintenance of a new hospital for instance created a clarity of purpose and an interest in whole-life costs. However, there were some less positive aspects which Labour must avoid if it is to make a success of PFI Mark 2 (or Mark 3, or wherever we are up to now).

In the past, some dubious financial engineering was definitely encouraged to get projects through the business case process. The comparisons were generally made in terms of the basic cost of the building in the case of construction projects. So PFI projects were often compared using “cost per square metre” metric, as the ongoing PFI charges overt the contract period were often based on that as the charging “unit”. That figure included the cost of capital, the construction cost and probably the basic infrastructure maintenance. It would then be looked it against the “public sector comparator”, i.e. what it would cost the government to provide the same facilities.

I actually sat in meetings where the PFI adviser (more on that later) said to a supplier, “the public sector comparator is marginally lower than your figure – you need to improve that”. Now that sounds like good negotiation, but the twist was this. The contract usually included a whole list of ongoing activities where the buyer would be locked into using the PFI supplier. And these were rarely included in that value for money comparison. So suppliers were encouraged to make their money on these extras, often around ongoing supply of goods or services, and keep their base charges low to get through the business case process.

The other way of making the contract attractive for the provider was to make it longer. Hence ridiculous 60 year contract periods, with guaranteed price increases of course, which again circumvented the business case issue as the comparisons would rarely look that far into the future.

So this is why seemingly trivial services or one-off type activities ended up costing schools and hospitals a fortune.  “Another school had to pay £302 for a socket, five times the cost of the equipment it wanted to plug in”, as the Daily Telegraph said in one report. This wasn’t an accident or bad negotiation – this was because the payment mechanisms were constructed deliberately to make the basic occupation charges look lower, with the provider making their money from these ‘extras’.

That would improve the apparent business case; then later on the occupier gets hit with unexpectedly high charges. It represented a conspiracy really between all the parties to make these projects happen, and arguably was a failure of finance and procurement across many organisations while these deals were being done; or at least a failure to stand up to pressure from other quarters and point out loudly the problems that were being stored up for the future.  I will take some credit though – one of the (probably few) good things I did in my DSS job was refuse to allow catering, cleaning and security to be included in one large property PFI deal we did, because I was concerned about future lock in for decades. That probably saved millions.

The other very dodgy aspect of “old PFI” was the role of Partnerships UK (PUK) in all this.  From 2000 onwards, Treasury promoted the use of PUK’s services – at extortionate consulting rates – for advice to public sector clients on particularly the commercial and financial elements of PFI deals. If you didn’t pay your three grand a day for a PUK adviser, you wouldn’t get your project approved by Treasury, was the feeling.

Yet PUK was 49% government owned, and 51% owned by the banks! That was a clear conflict of interest there in terms of PUK’s enthusiasm for PFI deals which made huge profits for those same banks. And the politicians – and even some top civil servants – were probably looking forward to their nice non-exec roles with the same organisations once they retired.

So Labour needs to take care here if it wants to bring back PFI-type ideas. It needs considerable commercial and procurement expertise on the government side of the table – and it must make sure the people who are supposedly representing the taxpayer in those discussion really do have our interests at heart, and are not feathering their own nests.   

After writing last week about competence in UK local government, as if by magic, a case of alleged fraud in a council very close to my home popped into view the other day.

Now several of my local councils haven’t been doing very well in recent years in terms of looking after taxpayers money. The Tory council in Surrey Heath, where I live, now ousted by the LibDems, bought well over £100 million worth of commercial property in Camberley right at the top of the market, and is now sitting on a loss in asset value of £50 million or so. Woking council, a few miles to the east, has basically gone bust after property deals and investments that make Surrey Heath’s look minor.

And now Guildford, to the south-east, has published a report into what is an alleged fraud and is at best a prime example of Bad Buying in its housing department. Two employees have been suspended and five agency workers had their contracts terminated.

The report to the Council by Jeanette McGarry of SOLACE, (the society of local government CEOs), is good but focused more on the governance issues rather than the procurement events. That may be because the matter is with the police now and an arrest was made in March, so precise details of the core issues may be sub judice.

But basically, a contractor working on the council’s housing stock was paid far more than the original contract value (which is not disputed) and also there was a possibility (as the report says),

  1. That work may have been ordered when it wasn’t necessary;
  2. That work may have been ordered, invoiced and paid for when it was not completed at all or;
  3. Not to a satisfactory standard;
  4. That duplicate invoices may have been submitted and paid for the same work;
  5. That works may have been ordered and undertaken that were not the responsibility of the Council.

Back in 2022, the council agreed to spend £24.5 to update its housing stock. But there were no in-house surveyors and doesn’t appear to have been much in the way of internal procurement either, as “Several agency staff were appointed and were able to appoint housing repair and maintenance contractors”.

A three-year contract for £2.4 million was agreed for EICR (electrical installation condition reports) testing and inspection to Seville Developments Ltd, “under direct award” via a framework. This was apparently achieved under the Council’s procurement process and “was found to be compliant”. I’d like to know more about how a direct award of that size could be acceptable, and if there was no competition within the framework, but the report does not go into that.

But the council realised in 2023 that expenditure had reached £18.9 million with Seville, with no authorisation or action taken such as contract variation. At this time, “the Corporate Procurement Team was staffed solely by temporary officers and there is evidence that an officer identified the unauthorised expenditure and raised this with the Housing client but did not escalate the matter”.  

Whistleblowing concerns were raised in 2023, and the staff suspensions and terminations took place in September 23, and in March 24 “An arrest was made by the South East Regional Organised Crime Unit”.

If we look at the anti-fraud measures outlined in my Bad Buying book, we can see a number of flaws in the Guildford process. There will I suspect be questions around the lack of transparency in supplier selection. Then we have the issues on signing off work – was that power too concentrated? Perhaps the biggest question is how on earth invoices that exceeded the contract value by £16 million got signed off and paid – that entire budget control process at Guildford must have been absolutely pathetic.

But an interesting point which is not one I really covered in the book is this dependence on contractors and temporary staff. To have a procurement team that is entirely “temporary officers” brings obvious dangers. It is not that contractors are necessarily crooks, but they cannot have the knowledge of the organisation and the internal relationships that are vital when things go wrong or strange events occur.

I also don’t understand why if Guildford was so short of staff, they didn’t call on Orbis for help. Orbis is the shared service organisation, hosted by Surrey County Council, that runs procurement for Surrey, East Sussex, and Brighton councils, and does a pretty good job. Surely they could have assisted Guildford if the council there couldn’t find its own procurement staff?

Anyway, another case study for “Bad Buying 2”!

This is a big year for public procurement in the UK. In October (probably) the new Procurement Act becomes law, finally replacing the EU public procurement legislation with a new set of regulations designed by and for UK organisations.

Generally, I feel the Cabinet Office policy team did a good job steering the consultations and proposals into a set of new rules, although there are some issues that concern me. But the team has now tied itself in knots somewhat over a different issue that has suddenly leapt to the forefront of everyone’s minds – how AI might affect public procurement (and many other aspects of our life of course!)

A PPN (Procurement Policy Note) was issued the other day that has caused some controversy and confusion. I must say, PPNs are usually clear and helpful, whether or not you agree with the underlying policy they are communicating, but PPN 02/24 is a mess.  Having read it a few times now, I think the problem is that it tries to cover too many issues, all AI related but really quite different, in one note.  I can see the following all mentioned in the note:

  1. Concerns about the use of AI in writing tender responses and proposals, in particular whether AI responses are likely to be inaccurate in terms of reflecting the actual capability of the supplier or how they will deliver the contract. In other words, the risk of AI generated bullsh*t showing up in bids. 
  2. Confidentiality or even national security issues in terms of firms using government documents connected with the procurement process to train AI systems and models.
  3. Worries that AI becoming ubiquitous and cheap is going to lead to many more suppliers putting in bids in response to opportunities, putting stresses and strains on procurement (and other) resources in public bodies.
  4. Issues around the actual purchase of AI solutions.

It seems to me that these are totally different issues. For instance, even if there was an outright ban on any use of AI in developing bids (which would be daft), there would still be legitimate security and confidentiality issues around the use of government documents in “training” AI.  That needs to be considered, but really has very little to do with procurement.

Similarly, advising people how to buy AI technology well is fine, but that surely is no differ relay to “category-related procurement advice” around energy, laptops of anything else. It is not really a procurement policy issues.

The first point – on use of AI in writing bids – has probably gained the most comment and criticism. The PPN suggests that buyers should ask suppliers to disclose whether AI has been used in bid construction, but that the answer “should not be scored” as part of the evaluation process. However, if the supplier says “yes” , might that mean their scores for other questions will be reduced if buyers know AI was involved? This could be a legal minefield.  And as others have pointed out, asking questions “for information only” in tenders is not good practice, only increasing bureaucracy and cost for bidders and indeed buyers.

The PPN also mystifyingly mentions the “risks” inherent “if a bid writer has been used by the bidder”. Sorry? I mean, someone always writes the bid. I assume they mean an “external” bid writer, but in my experience such individuals usually take more care to reflect the organisation accurately than some poor sales person who gets landed with the task of writing the document! 

The key point surely is that any bid should reflect the organisation’s capability and experience accurately, and provide a proposal that is meaningful and realistic about the actual goods and service that will be delivered if that bidder is chosen. That applies whether AI was involved or not. Indeed, humans are just as capable as AI of making up nonsense to put into bids – in fact, I suspect humans, being more creative, are more likely to write lies or nonsense than AI.

Anyway, this is a badly thought-out PPN, written in haste I assume, and further clarification and development of the very different points discussed within it will surely be necessary.

Congratulations to Shirley Cooper, CIPS Past President, who has become the UK government’s “Crown Representative for small businesses”. In that role, she will represent the interests of smaller firms, particularly in terms of their ability to win government contracts. “She will work with the Cabinet Office’s Small Business Advisory Panel, departments, suppliers and trade bodies to further level the playing field for small businesses, start-ups and social enterprises and ensure they can compete for and win more government contracts” says the announcement.

The government’s policy goal to increase the amount of spend going to SMEs is a long-running failure. I worked with Sally Collier of OGC on the implementation of the first review of small business and government procurement, the Glover review, way back in 2009. We recommended that there should not be a target or targets set for spend with SMEs – we felt targets would distract and take resources away from actually doing real stuff that would help SMEs. But the new coalition government disagreed, so a target of 25% was set, with no real logic behind it.  

It wasn’t hit in the first few years, but ridiculously, the Tories said they would increase the target to 33% in the 2015 election manifesto, purely to say something that sounded good to appeal to the small business lobby. Everyone in public procurement knew it was a ridiculous move. But surprisingly, the Tories won the election and the target was increased. Even the Public Accounts Committee in 2016 concluded “it is not clear how the Government decided on 33% as a target or how achievable it is”. 

The answer to the achievability question is that the target is impossible to hit because a few organisations dominate the overall spend figures – particularly MOD and National Highways (previously the Highway Agency). Because SMEs can’t build aircraft carriers or the M25, even if every other department does really well, the target won’t be achieved because of those big spenders.

So the government decided that the target should include second tier spend, the money big suppliers spend with smaller suppliers of their own. Of course, if you are going to add this in, then following the logic, really you should subtract the money SME first tier suppliers spend themselves with big suppliers! Anyway, many of the large suppliers to government don’t really track their own spend with SMEs. I suspect when government asks its first tier suppliers for the data, many of them just make up the numbers.

So in 2021/22, the total spend with SMEs went down from 26.9% to 26.5%, including that indirect second tier spend. Direct spend went down more dramatically from 14.2% to 12.3%.  But what happened in 2022/23, you say? We don’t know yet. The data tend to come out around 18 months after the end of the period in question, either because it is so difficult to put together or because if you publish it really late, it takes some of the potential political heat out of the report. Maybe both.

The decline may be due in part to another trend that has been reported by the National Audit Office. More spend is not competed these days, with more use of frameworks, direct awards and single supplier contracting. Whilst SMEs are on many frameworks, that mechanism makes it easy for buyers to just choose their favourite (usually large) firm. 

There is talk about how the new Procurement Act will help SMEs, and to be fair, there are a couple of positive factors there. “The Act places a requirement on contracting authorities to assess the particular barriers facing SMEs throughout the entire procurement lifecycle, and to consider what can be done to overcome them”, for instance.  

Tougher “rules” on prime contractors paying sub-contractors could also help if policed. A single registration system for potential suppliers is a good move for everyone (Sally and I suggested that in 2009). But the idea that the greater flexibility for buyers and contracting authorities will suddenly lead to a boom for SMEs is just wishful thinking in my opinion.

There are also a whole range of arguments around whether supporting SMEs is a sensible policy goal at all.  Might it be better to support diverse, minority owned business? Or social enterprises? Or innovative start-ups? Or firms based in deprived areas?  Is simply looking at size a sensible way of targeting assistance?

So really, the role of the SME Crown Rep has historically been as a figurehead to show the government “cares” about SMEs, and get some votes from small firm owners. In fact, big firms have continued to rule the roost in terms of actually winning contracts.  Maybe Cooper can change that – we’ll see, but I wish her luck and hope she can have an impact. It woudl also be interesting to know how she plans to measure her effectiveness.

There was a major announcement this week in UK public sector procurement.  Gareth Rhys Williams (GRW), who has been Chief Commercial Officer for government since 2016 was appointed the new Chair of National Highways, which looks after major roads across the country.

I assume that Rhys Williams will therefore be standing down from his commercial role. I’ll be taking a longer look at his track record shortly, which is mixed. There have undoubtedly been some positives, but the many billions wasted on PPE during the pandemic and the infamous “VIP route” for friends of Ministers will always sit in the other column. On the other hand, I don’t see him getting involved in a business committing a huge (alleged) fraud when he eventually leaves government, unlike his predecessor…

He has also appeared recently in an exciting and inspirational video made by recruitment firm Odgers to promote a current senior vacancy in the government commercial world, the Commercial Director for the Ministry of Justice. OK, the video is not really exciting and inspirational. Rhys Williams comes over as a very decent chap, which I believe he is, but there is not a hint of charisma or energy in his “performance”.  Lucy Harding, the excellent Odgers Partner and interviewer, tries her best but my goodness, it is hard going.

Indeed, my reason for writing this is to say this – the job is more interesting than you might think if you merely watch the video!

The MoJ is a very interesting and complex Department, and the Commercial Director role reflects that. You’ve got the core central department, then related organisations such as the Probation Service, Prison Service and the Legal Aid Agency. I was a Commissioner (a non-exec in effect) for its predecessor, the Legal Services Commission in about 2006-10 and just working out how to manage the £2 billion legal aid spend with the legal “market” is a task that would challenge most CPOs! And it still hasn’t been sorted out from what I can see.

There have been major capital investment construction programmes in the prison sector and the  courts service, some moderately disastrous IT programmes, and probably some better ones we don’t get to hear about, and the famous prisoner tagging scandal, where the then CPO at MoJ and his colleagues put their Sherlock Holmes hats on to investigate a tangled web of dodgy supplier behaviour. (That was one of the most interesting procurement stories I ever reported on in my Spend Matters days).  All in all, it really is a fascinatingly complex Department, and there is as wide a range of procurement tasks and objectives as you will find anywhere.

So if you like a challenge, go for it. You will also be working in areas that really matter to citizens. In my time as a government procurement director, I did find that genuinely satisfying, compared to buying skimmed milk power for Mars or computers for Dun & Bradstreet. You do run the risk of appearing on the front page of the newspapers – which happened to me once – but actually, that just emphasises that you will be doing stuff that matters.

I’m sure Odgers is very open to applicants with different backgrounds, so don’t think that your track record in terms of which sector(s) you have worked in matters. And in the video, GRW talks about progression. Well, there is his job to aspire to, which he doesn’t mention!

Assuming he is going soon, it would be too soon I guess for this new appointee, but that role is a possibility in the future. As GRW does say, there is also the chance to move into a non-commercial operational role in government. A very capable women who worked for me at NatWest in her early career moved into government procurement at a middle management level but ended up in a very senior and high profile line management role in the civil service.

Anyway, you’ve got to get your application in by February 25th, so you haven’t got long…

Incentivisation is a topic that probably isn’t discussed in procurement as often as it should be. I find it fascinating, as it encompasses a mix of finance, economics, contract law, psychology, low cunning…  How we construct contracts, the success measures we set for suppliers, how we reward their good behaviour or performance and punish the opposite – these all feed into how they behave.

Suppliers generally behave rationally given the incentives they are presented with. In the Bad Buying book, there is a whole chapter on the topic, because I found so many interesting case studies about incentives going wrong.

We see another example in a slightly different context in the UK at the moment, where the dental element of the National Health Service has failed in its core objective – to keep the nation’s teeth in good condition. A BBC investigation in 2022 found that nine out of ten dental practices weren’t accepting new NHS patients.  In some regions, that figure was 98%. That has led to more and more patients turning up at hospitals with terrible dental problems that require urgent treatment – which puts more pressure on over-stretched hospitals of course. Tooth decay is the most common reason for hospital admission of young children, shockingly. And 20,000 adults and 60,000 children were hospitalised last year to have teeth extracted under general anaesthetic. 

There are stories of people pulling out their own teeth, or making homemade dentures, fillings and crowns. We seem to have gone back to Victorian times. And it is all because the contract for dentists incentivises the profession in a manner that has led to that situation. The NHS contract does not pay dentists based on their actual effort, and does not allow them to make what they consider a reasonable income. So they have learnt that treating only private patients will reduce their patient numbers, but overall, the dentist will make more money. More and more practices are taking this view, unfortunately, making totally rational decisions.  

Funding for dentistry has been cut under this government. And one of the incentivisation issues is that the dentists’ contract does not always relate the income they make to the amount of work they do. So, simplifying the problem, their pay is broadly based on a fee for each course of treatment they deliver to an individual. So they receive the same amount whether they do one filling for me or six.

There is a vicious circle here – if people can’t find an NHS dentist easily, by the time they do, they probably do need more work doing, so they are even less attractive for the remaining NHS surgeries.  The current contract actually goes back to the days of the last Labour government, but the Tories have done nothing to address this issue in recent years – until now, when they see it becoming a potential election issue this year.

One solution would be to increase the supply of dentists, which in classic economic terms should drive prices down in the market – pushing more back into NHS work perhaps. But the five-year training scheme means this is impossible in the short or medium term. Another possibility would be forcing dentists to do NHS work for a certain number of years after qualifying, given they benefit from the taxpayer subsidising their training. Neither option has been tried.

Last week, the government announced incentives to encourage more dentists to do NHS work, but the profession doesn’t think this will work. We will see. But devising a contract that incentivises the behaviour the government (and the taxpayer) want to see should surely not be impossible.

However, politicians have struggled with contracts and incentivisation for the medical profession for years. I remember the new GP contract for first line “family doctors” that was agreed by the Labour government back in 2004. My friend who was a GP told me that he and his colleagues were astonished how favourable it was to them. When he first read the letter about his new payments and contract, he honestly did not believe it.

Anyway, I am fortunate to still have an NHS dentist, although I’m also fortunate to be able to afford private additional treatment when I need it. But the current situation is a disgrace. When we see people travelling from the UK to the Ukraine – a country at war – to get dental treatment, you know something has gone badly wrong with the UK situation.