Tag Archive for: HS2

It is a while since I wrote about the UK’s infinite rail transport money pit, also known as HS2. When I first started criticising it years ago, based on my view that the business case was a con (having seen many dodgy public sector business cases over the years and even having helped write a few), I got some comments on Twitter and LinkedIn saying it would all be a great success and I was being ridiculous when I predicted it would cost over £100 billion. I did think it might get completed for that much, I should say.

Anyway, a couple of weeks ago, two retired CPOs and I went for a 10 mile stroll in the Chilterns in a persistent drizzle. But I saw a badger close up for the first time in 40 years!  I also saw rather a lot of the HS2 works as our route crossed that swathe of land twice. The second time, we had to divert a few hundred yards and use a road bridge going over the works.

But as we approached the first crossing, our path was diverted for a few hundred yards, and then we were directed to a gatepost with high wire all around it. This was the HS2 works, all fenced off of course. At the gate, we were greeted by a chap in high-vis gear.  He nodded and said something into his walkie-talkie. We saw another chap a couple of hundred yards away, at the top of a slope, who presumably checked that no high-speed bulldozers were heading our way over the hill.

Hi-Vis 2 then gave Hi-Vis 1 permission to let us cross. We walked about 100 years across the site, mainly across rough gravel roadway, to another gate manned by Hi-Vis 3. He opened his gate and ushered us into a passage way about 2 metres wide with 3 metre high wire fencing each side. We followed this for another couple of hundred yards, before meeting Hi-Vis 4, who opened another gate which led into more wire-edged walkway.  We asked him how many people he’d seen that morning. “Just you three,” he said. It was noon by now.

So four people employed as far as we could see just to help walkers get across 100 yards of construction site.  Were those posts manned 24 hours a day, we wondered? If each guy is paid lets say £30K a year, the construction firm no doubt charges the tax payer at least twice that. So on a single shift, that’s a quarter of a million a year. If there is 24 hour cover, we’re talking a million a year.

Surely there must be better options. A simple crossing with some warning lights maybe?  Or just one person as an escort? I know it is a cliché but this felt like “health and safety gone mad”.  When we look at the relative costs of capital investment sin the UK, we wonder why it costs us so much more than other European countries, let alone China, India and so on.

Well, this sort of approach partly explains things. And I come back to one of my original fears about HS2. Who actually had a vested interest in getting the best possible value for money? Not the civil servants in Whitehall and the executives running the HS2 company,  who get promoted and bigger salaries if they “control” a bigger budget. Not the hordes of consultants and advisers to HS2, whose fees look more reasonable if the construction firms charge more. And certainly not the first-tier suppliers themselves.

In the greater HS2 scheme of things, four poor guys standing around doing absolutely nothing for hours, days, weeks on end (mind-numbingly boring work, by the way) just doesn’t matter. And that sums up some of the problems with the whole scheme.

Last week the Sunday Times ran an expose of the UK’s HS2 rail project. The programme is being severely curtailed now due to massive over spending against the budget.

Over several pages, the Times laid out a culture of overspending and bad financial forecasting, with those who tried to point out the problems often forced out or removed if contractors. The accusation is that senior managers knew that budgets were unrealistic but covered up the facts for as long as possible. Presumably that was to keep their lucrative jobs, and keep ministers happy. The thinking may have been that If the programme got to a certain point, then it could not be cancelled.

There was more in yesterday’s edition of the Sunday Times, including an interview with Stephen Cresswell, one of the whistleblowers.

This first phase was expected to cost £21 billion and yet his calculations suggested a fairer assessment was £30 billion — a huge discrepancy. “There were problems with the way the figures had been calculated and it was likely to cost an awful lot more,” he says. “I did the calculations pointing this out but I was told to concentrate my efforts on something else.”

Unfortunately this good piece of reporting did not get much discussion on national TV news certainly, perhaps unsurprisingly given the disaster unfolding in Israel and Gaza.  The report did say that the internal audit function at HS2 is looking into the allegations – but that isn’t good enough. We really need a detailed external review of what happened in HS2, to understand that specific case but more importantly, to see what lessons can be learnt that apply to other large capital programmes in the UK.  Maybe that is best done by the National Audit Office, although several ex-employees have written to the SFO (Serious Fraud Office) accusing HS2 of mismanagement of public funds, so maybe this will all turn more “criminal”. 

If no action is taken quickly, then we will have to see if Labour will have the appetite for driving a review if they do form the next government. After all, it was Labour and Lord Adonis, then Transport Minister, who kicked off HS2 and Adonis was a non-exec of HS2 for some years. But we really do need a review. We can’t allow huge expenditures where the people involved and responsible are pursuing their own goals rather than the taxpayers’ best interests. As Cresswell put it: “Costs, risks, timescales and benefits are being manipulated to suit individuals or organisational goals rather than the public interest”.

Another interesting point the Sunday Times highlighted last week is that Ministers appear to have lied to Parliament – or at best “misled” the house. Chirs Grayling was one, but a junior Minister is also accused.

“ On June 7, 2019, Cook sent a first draft of his report to Grayling. It suggested HS2 was billions of pounds over budget and years behind schedule.….  In July, the minister for transport, Nusrat Ghani, fielded questions during a Westminster Hall debate on HS2 before the Commons final vote on the bill to approve the Birmingham to Crewe phase two leg.  She said: “I stand here to state confidently that the budget is £55.7 billion and that the timetable is 2026 and 2033.” She repeated her assurances five days later, during the third reading debate in the Commons.

An FOI request exposed that she had been told 3 months earlier that the programme would breach its budget – so doesn’t that sound like lying to Parliament?  

It was good to see the shadow Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, announcing that a “covid corruption commissioner” will look into PPE procurement during the pandemic and the waste of billions of public money. In terms of waste, HS2 is at least on that scale, so surely that also deserves a very thorough and independent look at what happened there?

I’ve decided that I’m going to win the 100 metres sprint at next year’s Paris Olympics. I believe the benefits for the UK economy will be huge and I will inspire millions with my efforts. My wife has pointed out that my best time for the event was 13.8 seconds, recorded at Houghton School some years ago (many years ago to be honest). I need to beat that by some 4.5 seconds next year, but I am quietly confident.

However, in her annual report on my planned activities, Jane has had the temerity to rank my chances of success as “red”.  That red rating indicates that “successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable.” That means “there are major issues with project definition, schedule, budget, quality and/or benefits delivery, which at this stage do not appear to be manageable or resolvable”.

I am disgusted by this lack of positivity. My gold medal will lead to transformational benefits for generations to come, improving connections and helping grow the economy. And I have already spent billions on food supplements, very expensive training programmes and massages, so you wouldn’t want to waste that money, would you?

That is pretty much the situation with HS2, the high-speed rail programme that is going to link London with other cities in England. The latest report from the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA), which sits within the government’s Cabinet Office, has given the first two phases (1 and 2a) of the HS2 programme an unachievable “red” rating, defined as above.

There is no mention of HS2 anywhere in the report’s various narrative sections, despite the fact it is the biggest single programme in the UK in terms of cost.  In the table that list all 250+ projects, all it says next to the red rating is this. “A new railway connecting the country’s biggest cities and economic regions enabling rebalancing and regional growth in the Midlands Engine and Northern Powerhouse – through a high capacity, high speed and low carbon transport solution”.

And the Department for Transport’s response is also pretty much as above.

Spades are already in the ground on HS2, with 350 construction sites, over £20bn invested to date and supporting over 28,500 jobs. We remain committed to delivering HS2 in the most cost-effective way for taxpayers. HS2 will bring transformational benefits for generations to come, improving connections and helping grow the economy”.

That really is treating us as idiots. No attempt to actually respond to the undeliverability issues, or explain how “red” will turn to amber and green, just that they’re committed to it and we’ve spent a sh** load of money already, so hey, let’s spend another £50 billion or so. At least.  

Clearly, all those supposedly super-clever people in Treasury and Department of Transport have never heard of the sunk cost fallacy. Well, of course they have heard of it but this is politics. Civil servants just have to do what their masters tell them, but you can be sure HS2 will be disappearing from a lot of senior peoples’ cvs on LinkedIn in a few years’ time. This is just a terrible, disgraceful and ridiculous waste of public money, from the beginning when the business case was manipulated to appear positive, and my daughter’s generation will be asking questions for years to come about just how we allowed this to happen.

William Hague in The Times agreed.

“If I were still in government, I would be climbing the walls about this. I would want to stop all work on HS2 today, but I know I would be told that the contracts signed for its construction make that impossible. I would want to fire somebody senior, but I would be informed that the chief executive of HS2 Ltd already quit last month so that satisfaction would be denied me.

Then I would say that if we can’t cancel it we should at least make sure that the bits that haven’t been abandoned will work well, but I would be told that the cost of making it start in Euston has doubled recently, that no one could decide how many platforms they wanted to build, that this crucial part is currently unaffordable and that the transformational, high-speed connection of Birmingham to central London might not even reach the latter. And then I would want to scream”.

Indeed, the IPA report is generally disappointing. It is full of case studies of successful projects and programmes (244 now in the portfolio), with little or no discussion on the problems. And I’m not sure how the rapid charging fund for EVs can be seen as a success when you read this. Most of the case studies have a few initial issues but are turned round thanks to the IPA to deliver success.  It reads in the main like a marketing document from a consulting firm. (I actually wonder whether privatisation is on the cards?)  I suppose we shouldn’t be surprised, at the end of the day, the IPA is not truly independent, it is part of government, so it does have to toe the party line.

It is also noticeable that so many projects are rated amber – no less than 80%. That can be a bit of a cop-out rating really. It says there are issues, but nothing too much to worry about. I think when the IPA or its predecessor first started, there were amber/red and amber/green ratings too, but I suspect that put too many projects into the (at least partially) red bracket, which is embarrassing for the government. But really having 80% of the projects ranked at the same level reduces the usefulness for any external scrutiny.  

Anyway, in the couple of hours it has taken me to write this, another £4 million or so has been spent on HS2. What a waste.

So, the UK’s biggest case of Bad Buying for decades has hit the news again. The high-speed rail link (HS2) between London and “the north” is being delayed. The programme will slow down to spread the cost over a longer period. The line to Manchester will not open until at least 2043 and the new London terminal will also be delayed. So passengers travelling south will end their journey by being dumped in a siding near Willesden Junction*. Well, what a surprise.

The delays also kick the can down the road beyond the next election, so the government can continue making vague statements about levelling up and supporting growth in the north rather than just admitting they messed up. This is all stacking up to be a monumental waste of over £100 billion of our money.

I don’t claim amazing clairvoyant powers but since the beginning of the HS2 fiasco, I have predicted that it would cost far more than planned and would probably never be completed. I think it was on Twitter some years back that I got involved in an argument with a keen “train guy” who rubbished my claim that the eventual cost would be over £100 billion. And the business case was always dodgy – based on strange assumptions about how people use their time – but it became even more ridiculous once the working from home movement picked up steam during Covid. Back in September 2020 I wrote an article  – here is an excerpt.

“Construction of the HS2 high-speed railway network in England started formally last week. Some will be cheering – not me. At a time when working patterns have been changed because of Covid, perhaps for ever, and everyone is getting used to Zoom, Teams and the like, it seems crazy to be building new rail capacity so businesspeople can go to meetings. Other possibilities such as autonomous road vehicles make also make this very much a 20th century option.


HS2 is basically a job creation scheme, but an incredibly expensive one. The projected cost was initially £1-36 billion, but we’re now looking at £106 billion, incredibly.  The National Audit Office (NAO) report in January said this in summary. “In not fully and openly recognising the programme’s risks from the outset, the Department and HS2 Ltd have not adequately managed the risks to value for money”.

At the end of 2021, the eastern leg to Leeds got cancelled, and even the government had to admit that the business case was awful. As The Times said, “HS2 has long since ceased to be a project based on anything resembling a sound business case. The most recent business case published by the government, in June last year, awarded HS2 a benefit-cost ratio of 0.9. In simple terms, it will cost more to build than the advantages it bestows”.

Inflation is being quoted as one of the drivers for the delay – but ironically, delaying will only increase the cost further because of that very factor.  It is only the sunk cost fallacy that drives even the London-Birmingham leg to completion, and the political embarrassment if it were halted, after not just the money squandered but the impact on the countryside and wildlife through the construction to date.

In the meantime, much of the north of England suffers from dreadful public transport. A fraction of the HS2 budget could have made a real difference to local train and bus services, improving for instance the trans-Pennine routes which have been in a state of virtual collapse in the last few years.

The Times called for a “brisk inquiry into who got the country into this mess. Politicians, senior civil servants and the executives who have ridden the HS2 gravy train should be called to account”.  I’d also like to see a real analysis of why construction costs appear to be so much higher in the UK than elsewhere. There may be some genuine reasons – geographical, for instance – but I suspect there are other more addressable problems around the procurement process, risk appetite, the role of consultants and more. It would be good (but probably optimistic) to think that something could be learnt out of this disaster.

* Joke. Well, I think it is…

So the eastern arm of the high-speed rail programme HS2 from London up to Leeds, has been cancelled. Well, what a surprise. The biggest money pit dug in the UK for a long, long time has become too deep even for this spendthrift government. As Construction News reported,

“The eastern leg of HS2 phase 2b between Birmingham and Leeds has been scrapped by the government as part of its Integrated Rail Plan (IRP) for the Midlands and the North. The cost-cutting on HS2, which the government estimates will save around £18bn, was unveiled … by transport secretary Grant Shapps alongside pledges to upgrade local and intercity rail links in the regions. The £96bn investment package will cut journey times between many towns and cities, and increase the capacity of the rail network, Shapps said”.

I wrote here and here about HS2, with some thoughts on why huge programmes fail and how it sometimes seems that everyone involved with such programmes has an incentive to mislead the public – and often some of the decision makers – about the true costs. 

Most of the press commentary about the recent decision has focused on the “betrayal” of the north of England and what this means to the Prime Ministers supposed “levelling up” agenda, which is aimed at spreading wealth from the south of England to the north.  But surely a bigger question is whether the rest of HS2 should be going ahead, given the costs and a business case that look weaker and weaker as time goes by.  I pointed out a year ago that the initial business case was, in effect, a fiddle or a fix, designed to justify the programme.  As I said then:

“The business case for HS2 was always highly questionable. It relied on ascribing a value to the extra 20 minutes or so the passengers would have because of their somewhat faster journey from London to Birmingham. It assumed that the journey time was “wasted” from a benefit point of view, which is clearly not true (have they never heard of smartphones or laptops?), and also assumed that passengers wouldn’t use the extra 20 minutes by staying in bed a little longer!”

Now the new issue of Private Eye magazine has pointed out that the initial business case also made it clear that the whole programme would only offer value for money if it was all completed. The full benefits of “Northern Powerhouse Rail”, some of which is still going ahead, were also conditional on the HS2 leg to Leeds.

Private Eye also points out that economic growth in the UK has been slower than the figures used in the 2015 business case, which reduces the return further. And of course, the pandemic has driven a major drop in rail usage, and it is far from clear at the moment whether pre-Covid traffic levels will return, given what appears to be a seismic change in working habits and the growth of hybrid home /office working patterns. 

So we are now in the crazy situation where the government is subsidising existing rail companies and lines by billons a year because of the lower levels of usage, whilst spending £60+ billion on the western arm of HS2. Think what that money could do to improve the creaking railway system in the north of England, the trans-Pennine routes, commuter services into Manchester, Liverpool or Leeds, getting Sunderland connected properly… I am not anti-rail, I should say, but I do not believe HS2 is a good use of public money in such huge quantities.

I also have doubts about the HS2 programme’s ability to avoid Bad Buying in terms of how it spends money with suppliers, but that’s another issue altogether!

I was interviewed about my new Bad Buying book by Jeremy Vine on his UK Radio 2 BBC show last week – over 7 million listeners apparently. He seemed to have read at least some of the book which was surprising and pleasing, and said it was a “fascinating book … I haven’t read a book like it before”. Which you could interpret in a number of ways!

During the interview, the positioning from Vine was about governments wasting money, which was not my choice really in term of emphasis.  I believe private sector firms probably waste just as much money through bad buying (procurement) as public sector organisations. But it is not as visible, because there is no UK National Audit Office (or their equivalent in other countries) to keep an eye on private firms. And of course the private sector is only wasting shareholders cash, not that funding provided by every citizen via their taxes.

One issue we got onto during the interview was why major projects always seem to run way over budget.  HS2 is a good example. Some £30 billion was the initial budget – we’re now at around £100 billion and I’ll be pleasantly surprised if we come in at even that amount. But why does this happen?

One of the callers to the show identified a key issue. “If we’d known it was £100 billion from the start, HS2 would never have been approved,” he said. Another example is the Scottish Parliament building which amazingly went from initial estimates of around £40 million to a final cost of £414 million!  The eventual report into this said, “The figure of between £40 and £50 million originally put before the Scottish public was never going to be sufficient to secure the construction of a new Parliament building of original and innovative design”.  

My feeling is that there is little incentive for key stakeholders to be honest about costs at the early stages of major construction, technology or other programmes. The supply side wants the programme to be approved as they will benefit. On the buy-side, lots of civil servants, consultants and interim managers see a gravy train going on for years, maybe for the rest of their careers (in the case of something as mega as HS2).

The politicians want their vanity project to go ahead, knowing that when the chickens come home to roost and the overspends become public, they will have long gone to lucrative private sector jobs or the House of Lords.  (I’m sure some Scottish politicians just wanted a prize-winning new building, whatever the cost). So most of the key stakeholders are likely to underplay the potential costs, and overstate the benefits too (the HS2 business case is largely a work of fiction).

It is not just the UK that is vulnerable to this either. In 2019, Jean Nouvel, a celebrated French architect, started criminal action against the owners of the Philharmonie de Paris, the new concert hall he designed. He claimed fraud, embezzlement and favouritism, all in response to a 2017 claim by the owners as well as city and local government against him for payment of €170 million in damages for budget excesses and delays in the construction.

He was contracted to build the auditorium in 2007 for €119 million, but the final cost was estimated at €328 by the owners and €534 million by the regional state auditors (which in itself seems like a big discrepancy).

Le Monde reported Nouvel saying that the €119 million was quoted purely to match the ceiling set for the public tender, and was not really a genuine cost estimate. He claims that €100,000 per seat was the established cost for similar concert halls, and the €119 million total would have required spending only half that much, so it was never realistic. He also claims that everyone knew that the real cost would be much higher – “this is pretty usual in France in public tenders for cultural projects”, he was quoted as saying.

So in cases like this, do buyers really know the supplier isn’t to be believed, but everyone conspires to make sure the programme goes ahead? I’m sure this happen in defence projects, where the buy- side and sell-side are very cosy members of the same industry, and every major purchase seems to lead to a huge cost overrun.

The problem is, I’m not quite sure what we can do about this. Maybe more scrutiny up front, from NAO, the media, or opposition political parties? Or a “citizens convention” to review major spending ideas and bring a note of cynicism to the optimistic projections?  Or perhaps we will just keep spending a fortune, then wondering after the event how on earth it all happened. Again.

Construction of the HS2 high-speed railway network in England started formally last week. Some will be cheering – not me. At a time when working patterns have been changed because of Covid, perhaps for ever, and everyone is getting used to Zoom, Teams and the like, it seems crazy to be building new rail capacity so businesspeople can go to meetings. Other possibilities such as autonomous road vehicles make also make this very much a 20th century option.

HS2 is basically a job creation scheme, but an incredibly expensive one. The projected cost was initially £1-36 billion, but we’re now looking at £106 billion, incredibly.  The National Audit Office (NAO) report in January said this in summary. “In not fully and openly recognising the programme’s risks from the outset, the Department and HS2 Ltd have not adequately managed the risks to value for money”.

Does anyone really think that those “risks to value for money” will be achieved through the rest of the programme? Look at Crossrail, where the project is now three and a half years (at least) behind schedule, and the cost has risen to at least £19 Billion, some £5 billion over budget.

The business case for HS2 was always highly questionable. It relied on ascribing a value to the extra 20 minutes or so the passengers would have because of their somewhat faster journey from London to Birmingham. It assumed that the journey time was “wasted” from a benefit point of view, which is clearly not true (have they never heard of smartphones or laptops?), and also assumed that passengers wouldn’t use the extra 20 minutes by staying in bed a little longer!

This is an example of a vanity-driven Bad Buying project, and there are others described in my new book, Bad Buying – How organizations waste billions through failures, frauds and f*ck-ups,  published by Penguin on October 8th (you can pre-order it here). Politicians love to spend money in a way that they feel will provide them a “legacy”, assuming that posterity will thank them for their initiative and forget the huge waste of taxpayers’ money once a few years go by.

Another problem with huge programmes of this nature is the lack of anyone in a controlling position who has a vested interest in really managing costs. The engineering and construction firms are probably smart enough to avoid signing up to onerous fixed price deals, so they would like the construction to go on for ever. Likewise the well paid HS2 staff, including thousands of “contingent labour” workers (including procurement people) no doubt earning a very good day rate. The longer the better for them.

We might assume that the politicians have an interest in managing costs, but the problem here is both the relative timescales and the asymmetry of information. Even the Transport Minister has no idea whether they are being spun a line by the experts who are closely involved in the programme. And most Ministers last less than 3 years in post so they know that they probably won’t be around themselves to carry the can – and later Ministers can blame their predecessor! So who really represents the interests of the poor old taxpayer in this? NAO perhaps, but their reports, although excellent, tend to be put together well after the event.

The only positive I can see is that if I do write a sequel to Bad Buying, I’m sure HS2 will give me some good stories. But I’m not sure that offsets the likely spending of £5,000 for EVERY family in the UK, to build what may well become a major white elephant.